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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Main Propulsion System
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
approach features a top-o_n ° analysis of the-_dware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results for the Orbiter Main Propulsion
System (MPS) hardware.
The Orbiter MPS consists of two subsystems; the Propellant
Management Subsystem (PMS) and the Helium Subsystem. The PMS is
a system of manifolds, distribution lines and valves by which the
liquid propellants pass from the External Tank (ET) to the Space
Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) and gaseous propellants pass from
the SSMEs to the ET. The Helium Subsystem consists of a series
of helium supply tanks and their associated regulators, check
valves, distribution lines, and control valves. The Helium
Subsystem supplies helium that is used within the SSMEs for in-
flight purges and provides pressure for actuation of SSME valves
during emergency pneumatic shutdowns. The balance of the helium
is used to provide pressure to operate the pneumatically actuated
valves within the PMS.
The IOA analysis made use of available Orbiter MPS schematics and
hardware assembly and component drawings. Each component was
evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects.
Criticalities were assigned based on the worst possible effect
of each failure mode.
A summary of the number of possible failure modes and correspond-
ing criticalities is given below. The presentation format is
Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F) criticality
second.
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality:
Number
i/i
129
2/IR
142 2/2 I 3/IRI 3/2R30 94 70
3/3
225
TOTAL
690
1
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the MPS subsystems.
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HWlF)
I Criticality:
Number
+-
l/i
129
2/IR
142
2/2
3O
3/1R 3/2R TOTAL
25 23 349
Of the 690 failure modes analyzed, 349 were determined to be PCIs.
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ORBITER MPS SUMMARY
CRIT #FM #PCI
111 129 129
2/1R 142 142
2/2 30 30
3/1R 94 25
3/2R 70 23
3/ 3 225 -
TOTAL 690 349
LH2
PREVALV
LH2 FILL/DRAIN
DISCONNECT
ORBITERIET
LO2 DISC
ORBrTERIET
LH2 DI SC
LO2 PREVAL_¢E
LO2 SYSTEM
CRIT #FM _PCI
1/1 53 53
2/1R 61 61
212 11 11
3/1R 56 14
3t2R 43 7
313 39 -
LH2 SYSTEM
CRIT #FM _PCI
111 64 64
211R 30 30
212 - -
311R 25 11
312R - -
3/3 64 -
HELIUM SYSTEM
CRIT #_FM #PCI
111 12 12
2/1R 51 51
212 19 19
3/1R 13 -
3/2R 27 1 8
3/3 122 -
Figure 1 - ORBITER MPS OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY
2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis utiliz-
ing as-available drawings to break down the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization
1.1 Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Orbiter MPS Ground Rules and Assumptions
The Orbiter MPS ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B.
3.0 SUBSYSTEMDESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The Orbiter Main Propulsion System is composed of the Propellant
Management Subsystem (PMS) consisting of the L02 and LH2
subsystems and the Helium Subsystem (Figures 2A thru 2D). The
PMS is a system of manifolds, distribution lines, and valves by
which the liquid propellants pass from the ET to the SSMEs. Some
of the propellants are vaporized in the engine and returned to
the ET to maintain ullage pressure. The Helium Subsystem
consists of a series of helium supply tanks and their associated
regulators, check valves, distribution lines, and control valves.
The Helium Subsystem supplies helium that is used within the
SSMEs for in-flight purges and provides pressure for actuating
SSME valves during emergency pneumatic shutdowns. The balance of
the helium is used to provide pressure to actuate all the
pneumatically operated valves within the PMS.
3.1.i Propellant Management Subsystem Function
During engine burn, propellants under tank pressure flow from the
ET to the Orbiter through two umbilicals; one for LO2 and the
other for LH2 (Figures 3 and 4, respectively).
The PMS also provides a path which allows gases tapped from the
three engines to flow back to the ET, through two gas umbilicals,
to maintain pressures in the fuel and oxidizer tanks•
The PMS also functions during phases other than engine burn.
During prelaunch, the PMS is used to control the loading of
propellants in the ET. During orbit, PMS controls propellant
dump, vacuum inerting, and system repressurization (for entry).
3.1.2 The PMS Components
The PMS contains the following major components (Figures 3 and
4).
A• Liquid Propellant Supply and Distribution Network. The
network is compose_-_ll--_he liquid propellant lines
used to load propellants during prelaunch, feed
propellants to the SSMEs during engine burn, and dump
residual propellants after ET separation.
Specifically, the network consists of:
i • Propellant Feedline Manifolds - There are two 17-
inch diameter manifolds in the Orbiter, one for
L02 and one for LH2. Both of the manifolds have a
feedline disconnect valve at one end and two fill
and drain valves (one inboard, one outboard)
connected in series at the other end. The feed-
line manifolds connect to the ET liquid propellant
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Figure 2A - ORBITER MPS SUBSYSTEMS
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Figure 2B - ORBITER MPS L02 SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
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Figure 4 - PROPELLANT MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM FUEL FLOW
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umbilicals at the feedline disconnect valve, and
to either GSE liquid propellant umbilicals
(prelaunch only), or overboard at the outboard
fill and drain valves.
Between the feedline disconnect valves and the
inboard fill and drain valves are three outlets
for the three engine propellant feedlines and one
outlet for the propellant feedline relief line.
The LH2 feedline manifold contains an extra outlet
for the LH2 Return to Launch Site (RTLS) feedline
dump line. (See paragraph 4 below.) Pressures
within the L02 and the LH2 feedline manifolds
(MANF) can be monitored on the two ENG MANF meters
on Panel F7 or the CRT display Guidance and
Navigation Control (GNC) System (SYS) SUMM 1
Backup Flight System (BFS).
Engine Propellant Feedlines - There are six 12-
inch diameter feedlines in the Orbiter, three for
L02 and three for LH2. Each of the L02 engine
propellant feedlines connects to the L02 feedline
manifold at one end and to the Low Pressure
Oxidizer Turbopump (LPOT) inlet of one of the
SSMEs at the other end. Likewise, each of the LH2
engine propellant feedlines connects to the LH2
feedline manifold at one end and to the Low
Pressure Fuel Turbopump (LPFT) inlet at one of the
SSMEs at the other end. There is one prevalve in
each of the six engine propellant feedlines. The
prevalves are designated as left, center, or right
(engine) L02 prevalve; or left, center, or right
(engine) LH2 prevalve.
Propellant Feedline Relief Line - There are two l-
inch diameter relief lines in the Orbiter, one for
L02 and one for LH2. Each relief line connects to
one of the propellant feedline manifolds at one
end and to an overboard port at the other end.
Each relief line contains a relief valve and a
pneumatically actuated relief isolation valve•
The isolation valve is mounted in series with, and
upstream of, the relief valve. Flow through the
relief line and relief valve is enabled by reliev-
ing closing pressure on the normally open
isolation valve, allowing it to open.
The position of the relief isolation valve (2) is
controlled by one of two FEEDLINE RLF ISOL
switches on Panel R4. Normally these switches are
left in the GPC position. With the switches (2)
in this position, both relief isolation valves
will be opened automatically immediately after
MECO.
13
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The purpose of the relief lines is to prevent
excessive pressure build-ups, generated by heatup
and expansion of the propellants in the feedline
manifolds, by allowing the pressure to be vented
overboard through the relief valves•
. LH2 RTLS Feedline Dump Line - This is a single 2
inch diameter line which connects to the LH2
feedline manifold at one end and to an overboard
port at the other end. (The overboard port is
located on the outer skin of the left side of the
Orbiter between the Orbital Maneuvering System
(0MS) .pod and the upper surface of the wing.) The
line is used for dumping residual LH2 during an
RTLS abort. In non-RTLS situations, the pilot can
use the backup LH2 dump switch to open these
valves. Flow through the line is controlled by
two series-connected, normally closed, LH2 RTLS
dump valves (one inboard, one outboard) which are
mounted in the line. The LH2 RTLS dump valves are
controlled automatically by GPC commands.
Gaseous Propellant Collection and _ Network. The
network consists of all the lin--_ used to collect and
supply gaseous propellants (GO2 and GH2) from all three
SSMEs to the ET to maintain propellant tank pressure
during main engine burn. (Note: This network has no
major function after ET separation.) Specifically, the
gaseous propellant collection and supply network
consists of the following.
io Engine ET Pressurization Output Lines - There are
six 0.63-inch diameter pressurization lines in the
Orbiter, three for GO2 and three for GH2. Each of
the GO2 pressurization lines connects to the
oxidizer heat exchanger outlet of one of the SSMEs
at one end and the GO2 ET pressurization manifold
at the other end. Each of the GH2 pressurization
lines connects to the LPFT turbine outlet of one
of the SSMEs at one end and the GH2 ET pressuriza-
tion manifold at the other end. Six flow control
valves are used to control ullage pressure in the
two ET propellant tanks.
• ET Pressurization Manifolds - There are two 2-inch
diameter manifolds in the Orbiter, one for GO2 and
one for GH2. At each end of both manifolds are
self-seallng quick disconnects. The pressurization
manifolds connect to the ET gaseous propellant
umbilicals at one set of quick-disconnects and to
the GSE helium pressurization umbilicals at the
other set of quick-disconnects. The GSE helium
14
C.
pressurization umbilicals (2) are used for the
initial pressurization of the ET propellant tanks
during prelaunch.
Each pressurization manifold contains inlets for
the three engine ET pressurization output lines.
(The ET GH2 pressurization manifold contains, in
addition to the three inlets, an outlet for the
GH2 pressurization vent line. (See paragraph 3
below.)
. GH2 Pressurization Vent Line - This is a single
line which connects to the ET GH2 pressurization
manifold line at one end and to an overboard port
at the other end. This line is used exclusively
for vacuum inerting the GH2 pressurization lines
during orbit. Flow through the line is controlled
by the normally closed GH2 pressurization line
vent valve which is mounted in the line. This
valve is controlled by the GH2 PRESS LINE VENT
switch on cockpit Panel R4.
Valves - There are two basic types of valves used in
the PMS: those that are pneumatically actuated and
those that are electrically actuated. Pneumatically
actuated valves are used where large loads are
encountered, such as in the control of liquid
propellant flows. Electrically actuated valves are
used where lighter loads are encountered, such as in
the control of gaseous propellant flows.
Pneumatically actuated valves can be further divided
into two subtypes - those that require pneumatic
pressure to open and close the valve (type i) and those
that are spring-loaded to one position and require
pneumatic pressure to move to the other position (type
2).
The following is a list of the type 1 valves.
LH2 feedline disconnect valve
L02 feedline disconnect valve
LH2 prevalves (3)
L02 prevalves (3)
LH2 inboard fill/drain valve
L02 inboard fill/drain valve
LH2 outboard fill/drain valve
L02 outboard fill/drain valve
Each type 1 valve actuator is equipped with two
electrically actuated solenoid valves. Each of the two
solenoid valves controls helium pressure to either an
"open" port or a "close" port on the actuator.
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Energizing the solenoid valve connected to the "open"
port will allow helium pressure to open the pneumatic
valve. Similarly, closing of the pneumatic valve is
performed by energizing the solenoid valve connected to
the "close" port. (The L02 Prevalves have four
solenoids, two redundant solenoids each to control
helium pressure to the "open" and to the "closed"
ports.)
Removing power from a solenoid valve not only removes
helium pressure from the corresponding port of the
pneumatic actuator, but also allows the helium pressure
trapped in that side of the actuator to vent overboard.
Removing power from both solenoids allows the pneumatic
valve to remain in its last commanded position.
The following is a list of the type 2 valves.
LH2 RTLS inboard dump valve, Normally Closed (NC)
LH2 RTLS outboard dump valve (NC)
LH2 feedline relief shutoff valve, Normally Open (NO)
L02 feedline relief shutoff valve (NO)
LO2 Pogo accumulator recirculation valve (NO)
Each type 2 valve is equipped with a single
electrically actuated solenoid valve which controls
helium pressure to either an "open" port or a "close"
port on the actuator. Removing power from the solenoid
valve removes helium pressure from the corresponding
port of the pneumatic actuator and allows helium
pressure trapped in that side of the actuator to vent
overboard. Spring force will then take over and drive
the valve to the opposite position. If the spring
force drives the valve to the open position, the valve
is referred to as a Normally Open (NO) valve. If the
spring force drives the valve to the closed position,
the valve is referred to as a Normally Closed (NC)
valve.
The following is a llst of the electrically actuated
solenoid valves:
H2 pressurization line vent valve (NC)
GH2 pressurization flow control valves (3) (NO)
GO2 pressurization flow control valves (3) (NO)
The above electrically actuated valves are spring-
loaded to one position and move to the other position
when power is applied. These valves are referred to as
either normally open or normally closed, based on their
position in the de-energlzed state.
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3.1.3 Orbiter MPS - Helium Subsystem General Description
The helium subsystem consists of seven 4.7-ft3 helium supply
tanks, three 17.3-ft3 helium supply tanks, and their associated
regulators, check valves, distribution lines, and control valves
(Figure 5). Four of the 4.7-ft3 helium supply tanks are located
within the Orbiter aft of the payload bay area. The other three
4.7-ft3 supply tanks and the three 17.3-ft3 supply tanks are
located below the payload bay liner and above the main landing
gear cavity. Each of the 17.3-ft3 supply tanks is plumbed to two
of the 4.7-ft3 supply tanks (one in the mid-body, the other in
the aft body) to form three sets of three tanks. Each set of
tanks, thus formed, normally provides helium to only one engine
and for this reason is commonly referred to by the engine's
designation; for example, "left engine helium." This helium is
used for in-flight purges of engines, aft compartments, and
provides pressure for actuating engine valves during emergency
pneumatic shutdowns.
The remaining 4.7-ft3 helium supply tank (the one which is not
connected to a 17.3-ft3 tank) is called the "pneumatic helium"
supply tank. It normally provides pressure to actuate all of the
pneumatically operated valves within the propellant management
subsystem (Figure 5).
Each of the four helium supply circuits described above (three
engine helium and one pneumatic helium) will operate
independently until after MECO, when the three "out" helium
interconnect valves will be opened, connecting all circuits to a
common manifold. This interconnectlon can be performed manually
by the crew; however, normally the GPC will automatically
interconnect the circuits Just before the start of the MPS
propellant dump.
3.1.4 Helium Subsystem Components
The helium subsystem contains the following major components.
A. Supply Tank - Each engine helium supply tank cluster
consists of two 4.7-ft3 supply tanks and one 17.3-ft3
supply tank. One of the 4.7-ft3 tanks and the 17.3-ft3
tank are located in the mid-body area of the Shuttle
under the payload bay liner, in an area originally
reserved for additional Power Reactant Supply and
Distribution (PRSD) cryogenic storage. The 17.3-ft3
tank is identical to that used in the OMS. The
remaining 4.7-ft3 tank is located in the rear of the
Shuttle, aft of the payload bay bulkhead. The single
4.7-ft3 pneumatic helium supply tank is also located in
this area. Prior to lift-off, all helium supply tanks
will be pressurized to a nominal value of 4500 psia.
17
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cFigure 6B - PNEUMATIC HELIUM DISTRIBUTION
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Solenoid Actuated Valves - All of the valves in the
helium subsystem are spring-loaded to one position and
electrically actuated to the other position.
valve position is controlled via electrical signals
from either the GPCs or a manual switch. The crew can
control only a portion of the valves through cockpit
switches, the remainder are controlled automatically
by the GPCs.
Supply Tank Isolation Valves - There are eight supply
tank isolation valves in the helium subsystem. The
valves are connected in parallel to each engine helium
supply tank cluster and to the pneumatic supply tank in
pairs. In the case of the engine helium supply tanks,
each pair of isolation valves control helium flow
through one leg of a dual helium supply regulator
circuit. Each helium supply circuit contains two check
valves, a filter, an isolation valve, a regulator, and
a relief valve.
The two isolation valves connected to the pneumatic
supply tank are also connected in parallel. The rest
of the corresponding helium supply circuit consists of
a filter, the two isolation valves, a regulator, a
relief valve, and a single check valve.
Each isolation valve (with the exception of the two
pneumatic helium isolation valves) can be individually
controlled by it's own cockpit switch. The two
pneumatic helium isolation valves are controlled by a
single switch on Panel R2.
Interconnect Valves - Each engine helium supply tank
cluster has two interconnect valves. Each valve in the
pair of interconnect valves is connected in series with
a check valve. Because of the check valves, helium can
flow through the interconnect valves in one direction
only. The interconnect valves are oriented in such a
manner that one interconnect valve controls helium flow
into the circuit and the other interconnect valve
controls helium flow out of the circuit. The "in"
interconnect valve controls He flow into the associated
engine helium distribution lines from the pneumatic
helium supply tank. The "out" interconnect valve
controls helium flow out of the associated engine
helium supply tank cluster to the pneumatic helium
distribution lines.
Each pair of interconnect valves (per engine) are
controlled by a single cockpit switch. This switch has
three positions: IN OPEN/OUT CLOSE, GPC, and IN
CLOSE/OUT OPEN. with the switch in the IN OPEN/OUT
CLOSE position, the "in" interconnect valve will be
21
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opened and the "out" interconnect valve closed. The IN
CLOSE/OUT OPEN switch position will do the reverse.
With the switch in the GPC position, both valves are
closed unless commanded to the open position by the
GPCs. In the event of an RTLS during a normal flight
the GPC will signal the "in" interconnect valve to open
automatically at MECO and close automatically 20
seconds later. The "out" interconnect valve is opened
automatically at the beginning of the L02 dump and
closed automatically at the end of the LH2 dump. If an
engine was shut down prior to MECO, however, the
corresponding "in" interconnect valve will remain
closed at MECO. At any other time, placing the switch
in the GPC position results in both interconnect valves
closing and remaining closed.
There is an additional crossover (interconnect) valve
connected downstream of the left engine helium supply
regulators to the pneumatic helium distribution system.
In the event of a pneumatic helium regulator failure
(note - only one regulator in this line), this cross-
over valve would be opened, the pneumatic helium
isolation valve would be closed, and the left engine
helium supply would then provide regulated helium
pressure through the crossover valve to the pneumatic
helium distribution system. This crossover valve is
controlled by it's own three-position cockpit switch.
The three switch positions are labeled OPEN, GPC, and
CLOSE.
Manifold Pressurization valves - (Figure 6A) - The
manifold pressurization valves are located downstream
of the pneumatic helium pressure regulator and are used
to control the flow of helium to the propellant
manifolds during nominal propellant dumps and manifold
repressurization. There are four of these valves,
grouped in pairs. One pair of valves controls helium
pressure to the L02 propellant manifolds, and the other
pair controls helium pressure to the LH2 propellant
manifolds.
LH2 RTLS _ Pressurization Valves - (Figure 6B) - The
LH2 RTLS dump pressurization valves are located down-
stream of the pneumatic helium pressure regulator and
are used to control the pressurization of the LH2
propellant manifolds during an RTLS LH2 dump. There
are two of these valves, connected in series. Unlike
the LH2 manifold pressurization valves, the LH2 RTLS
dump pressurization valves cannot be controlled from
the cockpit. During an RTLS abort, valves will be
opened and closed automatically by GPC commands.
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One additional difference between the nominal and the
RTLS LH2 dumps is in the routing of the helium and the
location at which it enters the LH2 feedline manifold.
For the nominal LH2 dump, helium passes through the LH2
manifold pressurization valves and enters the feedline
manifold in the vicinity of the LH2 feedline disconnect
valve. For the RTLS LH2 dump, helium passes through
the LH2 RTLS dump pressurization valves and enters the
feedline manifold in the vicinity of the LH2 inboard
fill/drain valve (on the inboard side).
Go Pressure Regulators - Each engine helium supply tank
cluster has two pressure regulators, operating in
parallel. Each regulator controls pressure in one leg
of a dual-redundant helium supply circuit. The
pressure regulators for the helium supply tanks are set
to provide outlet pressures in the range of 715 psig to
770 psig. Downstream of this regulator are two more
regulators, the LH2 manifold pressure regulator and the
L02 manifold pressure regulator. These regulators are
used only during MPS propellant dump and manifold
repressurization. Both regulators are set to provide
outlet pressures in the range of 20 to 25 psig. Flow
through the regulators is controlled by the appropriate
set (2) of normally closed manifold pressurization
valves (Figure 6).
H. Relief Valves - Downstream of each pressure regulator
(with the exception of the two manifold repress
regulators) is a relief valve. The purpose of the
relief valve is to protect the downstream helium
distribution lines from the overpressurization (and
rupture) in the event the associated pressure regulator
fails fully open. The relief valves in the helium
supply circuits are set to relieve at 825 +/- 25 psig
and reseat at 785 psig.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The MPS system hardware is located in the aft fuselage
compartment behind the payload bay but forward of the main
engines. The MPS system interfaces with the Orbiter's three main
engines, the external tank, and the ground during prelaunch and
post landing.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 ill_strates the hierarchy of the MPS hardware
components.
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities. Further discussion of each of these
subdivisions and the applicable failure modes is provided in
subsequent paragraphs.
TABLE I Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
L02
LH2
Helium
i/1
53
64
12
2/IR
61
3O
51
2/2
11
19
3/IR
56
25
13
3/2R
43
u
27
3/3
39
64
122
TOTAL
263
183
244
TOTAL 129 142 30 94 70 225 690
+ +
Of these 690 failure modes analyzed, 349 were determined to be
PCIs. A summary of the PCIs is presented in Table II. Appendix
D contains a cross reference between each PCI and analysis work-
sheets in Appendix C.
TABLE II Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality:
L02
LH2
Helium
i/l
53
64
12
2/IR
61
3O
51
2/2
11
19
3/1R
14
Ii
3/2R
7
16
TOTAL
146
105
98
4.1 Analysis Results - Liquid Oxygen (L02)
Failures related to the L02 components were analyzed. Critical
failures were due to external leaks, spontaneous ignition and
mechanical failures of valves.
The L02 components were individually analyzed. Critical failures
involved the loss of propellant overboard, fire in the aft
fuselage and fire/explosions in the SSMEs. The L02 manifold
repressurization was the only noncritical failure in this system.
One hundred twenty-nine (129) failures were identified to be
PCIs.
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4.2 Analysis Results - Liquid Hydrogen (LH2)
Critical failures of components involved line ruptures and flow
restrictions, mechanical and electrical failures of valves and
disconnects, and external leakage. One hundred five (105)
failures were identified to be pcIs.
4.3 Analysis Results - Helium
Critical failures of components involved mechanical and
electrical failures of valves, and external leakage. Noncritical
failures involved quick disconnects' inability to mate/demate,
and electrical failures of valves. Ninety-eight (98) failures
were identified to be PCIs.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
AFV
ASI
ATVC
CCV
CCVA
EIU
EMR
ET
FBV
FPB
FPL
FPOV
GCV
GH2
GHe
GN2
GND
GO2
GSE
H2
He
HEX
HGM
HPFT
HPOT
HPV
I/C
ISP
LH2
L02
L0X
LPFT
LPOT
LPS
MANF
MCC
ME
MEC
MECO
MFV
MOV
MPL
MPS
MVA
NC
NO
NPSP
OBV
0PB
w
i
m
D
m
m
m
m
m
m
u
I
m
u
m
m
m
D
n
D
u
m
D
Anti-Flood Valve
Augmented Spark Igniter
Ascent Thrust Vector Control
Chamber Coolant Valve
Chamber Coolant Valve Assembly
Engine Interface Unit
Engine Mixture Ratio
External Tank
Fuel Bleed Valve
Fuel Preburner
Full Power Level
Fuel Preburner Oxidizer valve
Gaseous Oxygen Control Valve
Gaseous Hydrogen
Gaseous Helium
Gaseous Nitrogen
Ground
Gaseous Oxygen
Ground Support Equipment
Hydrogen
Helium
Heat Exchanger
Hot Gas Manifold
High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Helium Precharge Valve
Interconnect
Specific Impulse
Liquid Hydrogen
Liquid Oxygen
Liquid Oxygen
Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Low Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Launch Processor System
Launch Processing System
Manifold
Main Combustion Chamber
Main Engine
Master Events Controller
Main Engine Cutoff
Main Fuel Valve
Main Oxidizer Valve
Minimum Power Level
Main Propulsion System
Main Valve Actuator
Normally Closed
Normally Open
Net Positive Suction Pressure
Oxidizer Bleed valve
Oxidizer Preburner
A-I
OPOV
PAV
P/B
PBVA
Pc
PCI
PCV
PMS
POP
RIV
RPC
RPL
SRB
SSME
SSMEC
m
m
B
m
m
w
Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer Valve
Pressure Actuated Valve
Preburner
Propellant Bleed Valve Assembly
Chamber Pressure
Potential Critical Item
Purge Check valves
Propellant Management Subsystem
Preburner Oxidizer Pump
Recirculation Isolation Valve
Remote Power Controller
Rated Power Level
Solid Rocket Booster
Space Shuttle Main Engine
SSME Controller
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206 r Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i00ctobe_ 19__86, were used with the following
a-mpliflcations an-d a_tlons.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(oPs)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP__SS- software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at translti_ out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHAS_____EEE- begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL r I0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions---?-
io
•
•
•
0
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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••
•
.
i0.
Ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project•
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APPENDIX B
B.3 SUBSYSTEM SPECIFIC GROUNDRULES AND ASSUMPTIONS
The IOA was performed to the component/assembly level of the
subsystem of the MPS. The analysis considered the worst case
effects of the hardware/functional failure on the subsystem,
mission, and crew/vehicle safety•
I • All like and unlike redundancy will be considered in
determining functional criticality. The MPS function
is to provide delta V for the vehicle to reach orbit.
Since loss of one main engine during the early part of
ascent requires a mission abort, any failure that
results in the loss of one main engine will be
considered loss of mission (Crit 2). Since, for most
of the ascent, two engines are required for a
successful abort, loss of two or three engines will be
considered loss of life/vehicle (Crlt 1).
RATIONALE: These failure modes are directly applicable
to worst case MPS subsystem component
analyses•
• Only MPS Orbiter items will be analyzed for the MPS
interface to the Ground, External Tank, and the Main
Engines.
RATIONALE: Non-orbiter program hardware are not within
the scope of this task.
• Aborts are assumed to be caused by loss of an engine.
Any failure within a component that can shut down an
engine could leave only one engine in operation and
therefore could lead to loss of vehicle (Crit i).
RATIONALE: This failure mode is directly applicable to
worst case MPS subsystem component
analysis•
• Undesignated or "Mil-Spec" lines in the MPS system will
not be considered as failure sources except at unwelded
component Joints• The components will be identified
from generic MPS system schematic drawing(s) vS70-
41500X. The component connection configurations
(welded, screwed, flanged) will be determined from the
appropriate RI Specification drawing• Failure modes of
the unwelded lines will not be considered, unless
different from the failure modes of the component(s) or
system to which they are attached•
RATIONALE: Undesignated lines do not have any reference
documentation, and they are out of the
scope of this task.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206 r Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, I0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at the
bottom of each sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1001 - L02 MECHANICAL WORKSHEETS
2001 - LH2 MECHANICAL WORKSHEETS
3010 - ENGINE HELIUM MECHANICAL WORKSHEETS
4010 - PNEUMATIC HELIUM MECHANICAL WORKSHEETS
5000 - L02 ELECTRICAL WORKSHEETS
6011 - LH2 ELECTRICAL WORKSHEETS
7100 - HELIUM ELECTRICAL WORKSHEETS
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/2R
i001 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CVI8, 19, 20)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
O2 TANK PRESS
G02 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/2 R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 7/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0479-0003,0023
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE SUPPLIES GO2 FROM A SSME TO PRESSURIZE THE ET L02
TANK. THIS ULLAGE PRESSURE IS NECESSARY FOR EFFICIENT OPERATION
OF THE SSMES (THE PROPELLENT WILL RUN OUT).
THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING AN ABORT WILL RESULT IN THE
LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
02004C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: /NA
1002 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CVI8, 19, 20)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 TANK PRESS
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0479-0003,0023
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS VALVE PREVENTS THE LOSS OF GO2 USED TO PRESSURIZE THE ET LO2
TANK THROUGH A SHUT DOWN SSME (TWO SSMES RUNING IS AN ABORT
CASE). THE LOSS OF ULLAGE PRESSURE THROUGH THIS VALVE CAN CAUSE
THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 1/1
1003 ABORT: i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CVI8, 19, 20)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) L02 TANK PRESS
4) GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0479-0003,0023
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE SUPPLIES GO2 FROM A SSME TO PRESSURIZE THE ET LO2
TANK.
A GO2 LEAK IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD (LOSS OF VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-4
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 1/1
1004 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CVIS, 19 20)
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
I) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) LO2 SSME INTERFACE
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
i/I RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
/NA AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0479-0003,0023
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THIS VALVE IS OPEN DURING THE PRELAUNCH PHASE, HELIUM SUPPLIED
FROM THE GROUND TO PRESSURIZE THE ET LO2 TANK CAN ENTER THE SSME
AND RUPTURE THE HEAT EXCHANGER. THE RESULT CAN BE A
FIRE/EXPLOSION IN THE SSME. (LOSS OF VEHICLE)
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C7
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-5
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: i/i
1005 ABORT: I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CVI8, 19, 20)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 SSME INTERFACE
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0479-0003,0023
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED IF THIS VALVE DOES NOT OPEN BEFORE
LIFTOFF.
IF THE CHECK VALVE DOES NOT OPEN, THE PRESSURE CAUSED BY THE
TRAPPED GO2 WILL RUPTURE THE HEAT EXCHANGER. THE RESULT CAN BE A
FIRE/EXPLOSION IN THE SSME. (LOSS OF VEHICLE)
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C7
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-6
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: I/i
1006 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CVIS, 19, 20)
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF PART
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 SSME INTERFACE
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0479-0003,0023
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FIRE CAN BE STARTED BY SPONTANEOUS IGNITION OF A CONTAMINATE
PARTICLE. THE IMPACT OF A CONTAMINATE PARTICLE CAN SUPPLY ENOUGH
ENERGY TO START THE VALVE ON FIRE. THIS IS A PURE 02 ATMOSPHERE
EFFECT.
THE FIRE COULD SPREAD CAUSING A LARGER FIRE/EXPLOSION IN THE
SSME. (LOSS OF VEHICLE)
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C; PROBLEM REPORT NO AC8335-01
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o7/86
MPS
i011
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI6)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 TANK PRESS
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0005
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THIS CHECK VALVE FAILS TO OPEN DURING PRELAUNCH, THE ET L02
TANK WILL NOT BE PRESSURIZED. THE LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-8
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1012 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
L02 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI6)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
_)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 TANK PRESS
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/2R TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
ULLAGE PRESSURE IS NECESSARY FOR EFFICIENT OPERATION OF THE
SSMES. THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF THE
MISSION (NOT ENOUGH PROPELLENT).
IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT, THE VEHICLE WILL BE LOST.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-9
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
1013 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CVl6)
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF PART
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
1) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) LO2 TANK PRESS
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: I/I
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FIRE CAN BE STARTED BY SPONTANEOUS IGNITION OF A CONTAMINATE
PARTICLE. THE IMPACT OF A CONTAMINATE PARTICLE ON THE VALVE CAN
SUPPLY ENOUGH ENERGY TO START THE VALVE ON FIRE. THIS IS A PURE
02 ATMOSPHERE EFFECT. (FIRE HAZARD)
BURN THROUGH OF THIS VALVE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ULLAGE PRESSURE.
THE PROPELLENT WILL RUN OUT (LESS EFFICIENT SSME OPERATIONS).
THE VEHICLE WILL BE LOST IF THIS HAPPENS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; NO PROBLEM REPORT NO.
AC8335-01; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-10
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
 i/13/86
MPS
1014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI6)
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF PART
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
HDW/FUNC
1/1
I/1
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
i) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) SSME INTERFACE
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUM BER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FIRE CAN BE STARTED BY SPONTANEOUS IGNITION OF A CONTAMINATE
PARTICLE. THE IMPACT OF A CONTAMINATE PARTICLE ON THE VALVE CAN
SUPPLY ENOUGH ENERGY TO START THE VALVE ON FIRE. THIS IS A PURE
02 ATMOSPHERE EFFECT.
THE VEHICLE WILL BE LOST IF THE FIRE SPREADS TO A SSME, CAUSING A
LARGER FIRE/EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; NO PROBLEM REPORT NO.
AC8335-01; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-ll
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111o718 
MPS
1021
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
Pogo SUPPRESSION
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0515-0002,0003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE VALVES SUPPLY L02 TO THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM.
FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM ON ONE OR MORE ENGINES
COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF
UNPREDICTABLE AMPLITUDE WHICH CAN LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86
MPS
1022
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 DUMP & PURGE
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 2/IR
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0515-0002,0003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THIS VALVE TO OPEN DURING THE DUMP WILL LEAVE LO2
TRAPPED IN A SSME. LO2 TRAPPED IN TWO OR THREE SSMES WILL
VIOLATE THE AFT CG LIMIT. THEREFORE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
RESULT IN LOSS OF THE VEHICLE DURING LANDING.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-13
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86
MPS
1023
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
312R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 SSME INTERFACE
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0515-0002,0003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE WILLCAUSE LO2 PUMP CAVITATION
LEADING TO SSME SHUTDOWN.
THE LOSS AF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING AN ABORT CAN LEAD TO THE LOSS
OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: i/i
1024 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 SSME INTERFACE
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: i/i
TAL: i/1
AOA: I/1
ATO: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0515-0002,0003
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF THIS VALVE TO REMAIN CLOSED DURING ENGINE OPERATION
COULD CAUSE RUPTURE OF THE ENGINE AND/OR ORBITER LO2 BLEED LINE.
THE RESULTING FIRE/EXPLOSION WILL DESTROY THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: /NA
1025 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROPELLENT FEED
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: I/1
ONORBI T: /NA AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0515-0002,0003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE PREVENTS THE LOSS OF LO2 THROUGH A SHUTDOWN SSME (TWO
SSMES RUNING IS AN ABORT CASE). THIS LOSS OF LO2 CAN CAUSE THE
LOSS OF THE VEHICLE (NOT ENOUGH PROPELLENT TO FINISH THE ABORT).
THE L02 LOST THROUGH THE SHUTDOWN SSME IS FROM THE POGO
SUPPRESSION SYSTEM. FAILURE OF THIS POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM CAN
ALSO LEAD TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86
MPS
1026
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
FAILS TO OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MPS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROPELLENT FEED
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0515-0002,0003
B [ F] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CASE APPLIES FROM AFTER MECOAND BEFORE THE MPS DUMP. THE
UNLIKE REDUNDANT PART IS THE PREVALVERELIEF VALVE. THE LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE PROPELLENT FEED LINE (BETWEEN THE
PREVALVE AND THE SSME) TO RUPTURE.
THE RESULTING OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE AFT FUSELAGE WILL CAUSE
THE LOSS OF THE MISSION IN THE ONORBIT MISSION PHASES AND THE
LOSS OF THE VEHICLE DURING THE DEORBIT MISSION PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-17
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
1027 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
L02 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
FILL & DRAIN
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0515-0002,0003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CHECK VALVE MUST BE CLOSED PRIOR TO SSME IGNITION.
WILL DELAY THE LAUNCH.
FAILURE
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-18
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86
MPS
1028
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
FILL & DRAIN
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C CNA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0515-0002,0003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CHECK VALVE MUST BE OPEN TO CHILLDOWN THE SSMES DURING
PRELAUNCH. FAILURE WILL DELAY THE LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-19
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/13/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 1031
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM: GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 TANK PRESS
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2 R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC280-0017-0018,0024,0028
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TWO OF THE THREE (ONE FOR EACH SSME) VALVES ARE NECESSARY TO
PRESSURIZE THE ET LO2 TANK. THE ET LO2 TANK ULLAGE PRESSURE IS
NECESSARY FOR EFFICIENT OPERATION OF THE SSMES (NOT ENOUGH
PROPELLENT TO FINISH THE MISSION).
FLOW THROUGH BOTH ORIFICES IS NECESSARY FOR PROPER OPERATION OF
THIS VALVE. CONTAMINATE PARTICLES CAN CLOG ONE AND/OR BOTH
ORIFICES IN THIS VALVE. THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING AN
ABORT CAN LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; MPS
2102; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-20
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
1032 ABORT:
HDWlFUNC
312R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MPS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 TANK PRESS
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC280-0017-0018,0024,0028
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TWO OF THE THREE (ONE FOR EACH SSME) VALVES ARE NECESSARY TO
PRESSURIZE THE ET L02 TANK. THE ET LO2 TANK ULLAGE PRESSURE IS
NECESSARY FOR EFFICIENT OPERATION OF THE SSMES.
GO2 FLOW THROUGH THIS VALVE IS NECESSARY TO PRESSURIZE THE ET LO2
TANK. THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING AN ABORT CAN CAUSE THE
LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
1033 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 TANK PRESS
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC280-0017-0018,0024,0028
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THESE VALVES TO CLOSE COULD OVERPRESSURIZE THE ET LO2
TANK. THE ET LO2 TANK FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE
IF THE ET LO2 TANK PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES ALSO FAIL (SECOND ORDER
FAILURE).
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.II; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-22
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86
MPS
1034
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF PART
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 TANK PRESS
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 2/ 2 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC280-0017-0018,0024,0028
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FIRE CAN BE STARTED BY SPONTANEOUS IGNITION OF A CONTAMINATE
PARTICLE. THE IMPACT OF A CONTAMINATE PARTICLE ON THE VALVE CAN
SUPPLY ENOUGH ENERGY TO START THE VALVE ON FIRE. THIS IS A PURE
02 ATMOSPHERE EFFECT. (FIRE HAZARD)
BURN THROUGH OF THIS VALVE WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF ULLAGE
PRESSURE. THE PROPELLENT CAN RUN OUT (LESS EFFICIENT SSME
OPERATIONS). (LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING AN ABORT)
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; MPS 2102; SEIFASSMEO
SD75-SH-0200C; PROBLEM REPORT NO AC8335-01
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-23
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86
MPS
1035
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF PART
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
SSME INTERFACE
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC280-0017-0018,0024,0028
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FIRE CAN BE STARTED BY SPONTANEOUS IGNITION OF A CONTAMINATE
PARTICLE. THE IMPACT OF A CONTAMINATE PARTICLE ON THE VALVE CAN
SUPPLY ENOUGH ENERGY TO START THE VALVE ON FIRE. THIS IS A PURE
02 ATMOSPHERE EFFECT. (FIRE HAZARD)
THE VEHICLE WILL BE LOST IF THE FIRE SPREADS TO A SSME CAUSING A
LARGER FIRE/EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C; PROBLEM REPORT NO AC8335-01
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-24
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o7/86
MPS
1041
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0389-0511, 0521, 0161
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE MUST BE OPEN TO LOAD LO2 INTO THE ET. FAILURE OF THIS
VALVE WILL PREVENT THE LOADING OF LO2 INTO THE ET. THE SUDDEN
CLOSING OF THIS VALVE DURING FAST FILL WOULD RESULT IN A PRESSURE
SPIKE.
THE WORST CASE IS RUPTURE OF ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY LINES.
THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATIONAND FIRE
HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-25
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/ov/86
MPS
1042
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0389-0511,0521, 0161
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LO2 MUST FLOW THROUGH THIS DISCONNECT FROM THE GROUND TO THE ET.
LEAKAGE AT THE ORBITER/ET INTERFACE CAN SPRAY LO2 ON THE ORBITER
TPS, DAMAGING THE TILES.
LEAKAGE INSIDE THE ORBITER IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD (LOSS OF
VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; V070-415203
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-26
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86
MPS
1043
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1
LIFTOFF: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: I/1
TAL: I/i
AOA: 1/1
ATO: I/I
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0389-0511, 0521,0161
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LO2 MUST FLOW THROUGH THIS VALVE TO FEED THE SSMES. THE POSSIBLE
RESULTS OF A FLOW INTERRUPTION INCLUDE SSME SHUT DOWN,
UNCONTAINED SSME DAMAGE AND FIRE/EXPLOSION.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-27
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/2
1044 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0389-0511,0521, 0161
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE IS CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT OUTGASSING IN THE
ONORBIT PHASE. THIS OUTGASSING COULD INTERFERE WITH THE
OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS. THEREFORE FAILURE OF THIS VALVE WILL
CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION.
THIS VALVE IS ALSO CLOSED TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION OF THE MPS
DURING/AFTER ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.II; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-28
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11107186
MPS
1045
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
_)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0389-0511, 0521, 0161
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKING LO2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD (LOSS OF VEHICLE).
HDWIFUNC
1/1
i/i
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; V070-415203
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-29
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/2
1046 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
L02 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
L02 ET INTERFACE
LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 2/ 2 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0389-0511, 0521,0161
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE IS CLOSED FOR ET SEPARATION TO LIMIT MOVEMENT OF THE
ET (CAUSED BY THE BOILING LO2) DURING SEPARATION. FAILURE OF
THIS VALVE WILL DELAY ET SEPARATION UNTIL TANK PRESSURE HAS
DECAYED TO SAFE PRESSURE LEVEL.
OUTGASSING COULD INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS.
THEREFORE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFAETO SD75-SH-0130
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-30
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o7/86
MPS
1051
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PD4)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, EXTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
/NA AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0391-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DISCONNECT PASSES GAS (HE FROM GROUND SUPPORT AND GO2 FROM
THE SSME HEAT EXCHANGERS) TO PRESSURIZE THE ET LO2 TANK. IF THE
ET LO2 TANK IS NOT AT THE REQUIRED ULLAGE PRESSURE, THE LAUNCH
WILL BE DELAYED.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01116187 C-31
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
1052 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PD4)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 TANK PRESS
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0391-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DISCONNECT PASSES GO2 TO PRESSURIZE THE ET LO2 TANK. THE ET
LO2 TANK ULLAGE PRESSURE IS NECESSARY FOR EFFICIENT OPERATION OF
THE SSMES. THIS LOSS OF ULLAGE PRESSURE WILL RESULT IN NOT
ENOUGH PROPELLENT TO FINISH THE MISSION.
IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE, THE
MISSION WILL BE LOST. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT,
THE VEHICLE MAY BE LOST.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-32
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111o 186
MPS
1053
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PD4)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
_)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 TANK PRESS
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0391-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DISCONNECT PASSES GO2 TO PRESSURIZE THE ET L02 TANK. THE ET
L02 TANK ULLAGE PRESSURE IS NECESSARY FOR EFFICIENT OPERATION OF
THE SSMES (NOT ENOUGH PROPELLENT TO FINISH THE MISSION).
A LO2 LEAK IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD (LOSS OF VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C; V070-415404
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/8 
MPS
1054
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PD4)
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF PART
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 TANK PRESS
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/1
ONOREIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0391-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FIRE CAN BE STARTED BY SPONTANEOUS IGNITION OF A CONTAMINATE
PARTICLE. THE IMPACT OF A CONTAMINATE PARTICLE ON THIS PART CAN
SUPPLY ENOUGH ENERGY TO START THE PART ON FIRE. THIS IS A PURE
02 ATMOSPHERE EFFECT. (FIRE HAZARD)
THE BURN THROUGH OF THIS VALVE WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE ET LO2
TANK ULLAGE PRESSURE. THE PROPELLENT WILL RUN OUT (LESS
EFFICIENT SSME OPERATIONS). (LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING AN ABORT)
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C; PROBLEM REPORT NO. AC8335-01
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-34
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86
MPS
1055
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PD4)
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF PART
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) SSME INTERFACE
4) GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCR: 1/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0391-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FIRE CAN BE STARTED BY SPONTANEOUS IGNITION OF A CONTAMINATE
PARTICLE. THE IMPACT OF A CONTAMINATE PARTICLE ON THIS PART CAN
SUPPLY ENOUGH ENERGY TO START THE PART ON FIRE. THIS IS A PURE
02 ATMOSPHERE EFFECT.
THE VEHICLE WILL BE LOST IF THE FIRE SPREADS TO A SSME CAUSING A
LARGER FIRE/EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C; PROBLEM REPORT NO. AC8335-01
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-35
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
1056 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PD4)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 ET INTERFACE
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0391-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THIS VALVE TO CLOSE WILLRESULT IN CONTAMINATION OF
THE MPS DURING THE DEORBITAND LANDING MISSION PHASES.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFAETO SD75-SH-0130
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-36
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11107186
MPS
1061
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
aDW/ C
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC (PD9)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, EXTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAXDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
FILL & DRAIN
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA" /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0003-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ET LO2 TANK IS PRESSURIZED WITH GROUND SUPPORT HE THROUGH
THIS DISCONNECT. IF THE ET LO2 TANK IS NOT PRESSURIZED, THE
LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-37
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
1062 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC (PD9)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
GROUND INTERFACE
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0003-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CHECK VALVE PREVENTS THE LOSS OF THE ET LO2 TANK ULLAGE
PRESSURE THROUGH THE DISCONNECT. THE LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED IF
THE ET LO2 TANK PRESSURE FALLS BELOW LIMITS.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-38
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86
MPS
1063
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC (PD9)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
s)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 TANK PRESS
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0003-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ET LO2 TANK ULLAGE PRESSURE IS NECESSARY FOR THE EFFICIENT
OPERATION OF THE SSMES (NOT ENOUGH PROPELLENT LEFT TO FINISH THE
MISSION).
THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING THE LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE WILL
CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION. THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING
AN ABORT MAY CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.II; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-39
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o7/86
MPS
1064
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC (PD9)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
L02 TANK PRESS
L02 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0003-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A GO2 LEAK IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD (LOSS OF VEHICLE).
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-40
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11107186
MPS
1071
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
(PDI2)
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 GROUND FILL & DRAIN (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
L02 GROUND FILL & DRAIN (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC274-0005-0012,0032
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LO2 IS LOADED INTO THE ET LO2 TANK THROUGH THIS DISCONNECT.
LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED IF THE LO2 IS NOT LOADED.
THE
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; V070-415703
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-41
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111ov186
MPS
1072
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
(PDI2)
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 GROUND FILL & DRAIN (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (ONTO THE ORBITER SKIN)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9)
1) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) LO2 FILL & DRAIN
LO2 GROUND FILL & DRAIN (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC274-0005-0012,0032
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE AT THE GROUND/ORBITER INTERFACE OF THIS DISCONNECT CAN
SPRAY LO2 ONTO THE ORBITER TPS. THIS LEAKABE WILL CAUSE THE
LAUNCH TO BE DELAYED (POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO TPS, FIRE HAZARD).
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; V070-415703
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-42
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o7/86
MPS
1073
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
/NA
ITEM:
(PDI2)
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
LO2 GROUND FILL & DRAIN (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (INTO AFT FUSELAGE)
K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
LO2 GROUND FILL & DRAIN (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC274-0005-0012,0032
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SEAL FAILURE OF THIS DISCONNECT WILL SPRAY LO2 INTO THE AFT
FUSELAGE. THE 02 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSIONHAZARD. THE WORST CASE IS
THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; V070-415703
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-43
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
1081 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (PDI3)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) L02 FILL & DRAIN
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
/NA AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0004-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LO2 FLOWS OUT OF THIS DISCONNECT DURING THE PRELAUNCH SSME
THERMAL CONDITIONING. SINCE THIS THERMAL CONDITIONING IS
NECESSARY FOR SSME IGNITION, THIS FAILURE WILL DELAY THE LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-44
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
1082 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (PDI3)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (ONTO THE ORBITER SKIN)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
L02 FILL & DRAIN
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0004-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE AT THE GROUND/ORBITER INTERFACE OF THIS DISCONNECT CAN
SPRAY LO2 ONTO THE ORBITER TPS. THIS LEAKAGE WILL CAUSE THE
LAUNCH TO BE DELAYED (POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO TPS, FIRE HAZARD).
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-45
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: i/I
1083 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (PDI3)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (INTO AFT FUSELAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0004-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
SEAL FAILURE OF THIS DISCONNECT WILL SPRAY LO2 INTO THE AFT
FUSELAGE. THE LO2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C; V070-415305
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-46
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1084 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (PDI3)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC276-0004-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE PREVENTS THE VENTING OVERBOARD OF THE LO2 FROM THE
SSME BLEED CHECK VALVES. THE VENTING OF THIS LO2 MAY NOT LEAVE
ENOUGH PROPELLENT TO REACH ORBIT.
THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING THE LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE WILL
CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION. THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING
AN ABORT MAY CAUSE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-47
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
1085 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (PDI3)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
POGO SUPPRESSION
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/ IR TAL: 2/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0004-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE PREVENTS THE VENTING OVERBOARD OF THE LO2 (USED IN THE
POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM) FROM THE SSME BLEED CHECK VALVES. THIS
LOSS OF THE L02 WOULD PREVENT THE PROPER OPERATION OF THE POGO
SUPPRESSION SYSTEM.
THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM PREVENTS THE BUILDUP OF LOW FREQUENCY
OSCILLATIONS. THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MPS 2102; SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-
12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-48
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: I/1
1091 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
(PDI5)
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
L02 FILL & DRAIN
GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME276-0032-0017
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A GO2 LEAK IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
THE WORST CASE IS THE
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-49
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: i/1
1092 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
(PDI5)
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
L02 TANK PRESS
GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME276-0032-0017
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE AT THIS TEST POINT COUPLING CAN CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE ET
LO2 TANK ULLAGE PRESSURE. THIS TANK PRESSURE IS NECESSARY FOR
THE EFFICIENT OPERATION OF THE SSMES (NOT ENOUGH PROPELLENT LEFT
TO FINISH THE MISSION).
A GO2 LEAK IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. THE WORST CASE IS THE
LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-50
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/2
1093 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
(PD15)
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF PART
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 TANK PRESS
GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME276-0032-0017
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FIRE CAN BE STARTED BY SPONTANEOUS IGNITION OF A CONTAMINATE
PARTICLE. THE IMPACT OF A CONTAMINATE PARTICLE ON THIS PART CAN
SUPPLY ENOUGH ENERGY TO START THE PART ON FIRE. THIS IS A PURE
02 ATMOSPHERE EFFECT. (FIRE HAZARD)
THE BURN THROUGH OF THIS PART WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE ET LO2
TANK ULLAGE PRESSURE. THE PROPELLENT WILL RUN OUT (LESS
EFFICIENT SSME OPERATIONS). (LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING AN ABORT)
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C; PROBLEM REPORT NO AC8335-01
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-51
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: i/i
1094 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
(PD15)
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF PART
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
SSME INTERFACE
GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME276-0032-0017
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FIRE CAN BE STARTED BY SPONTANEOUS IGNITION OF A CONTAMINATE
PARTICLE. THE IMPACT OF A CONTAMINATE PARTICLE ON THIS PART CAN
SUPPLY ENOUGH ENERGY TO START THE PART ON FIRE. THIS IS A PURE
02 ATMOSPHERE EFFECT.
THE VEHICLE WILL BE LOST IF THE FIRE SPREADS TO A SSME CAUSING A
LARGER FIRE/EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.iI; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C; PROBLEM REPORT NO AC8335-01
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-52
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/ov/86
MPS
Ii01
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 PREVALVE (PVI, 2, 3)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) 5o2 FILL _ DRAIN
4) LO2 PREVALVE
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0396-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PREVALVES ARE OPEN DURING THE LO2 LOADING TO THERMALLY
CONDITION THE SSMES. SINCE THIS THERMAL CONDITIONING IS
NECESSARY FOR SSME IGNITION, THE LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED IF THE
PREVALVES DO NOT OPEN.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-53
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111o71s6
MPS
1102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 PREVALVE (PVI, 2, 3)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) LO2 PROP FEED
4) L02 PREVALVE
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: i/1
TAL: 1/1
AOA: 1/1
ATO: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0396-0005
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PREVALVE MUST BE OPEN FOR SSME OPERATION. THE PREMATURE
CLOSURE OF A PREVALVE WILL SHUTDOWNANDPOSSIBLY DAMAGETHE SSME.
IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE, THE
MISSION WILL BE LOST. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT,
THE VEHICLE MAY BE LOST.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-54
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o7/86
MPS
Ii03
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 PREVALVE (PVI, 2, 3)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) LO2 PROP FEED
4) LO2 PREVALVE
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0396-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LO2 LEAK IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/l
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-55
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86
MPS
1104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 PREVALVE (PVI, 2, 3)
FAILS TO RELIEVE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) LO2 PROP FEED
4) LO2 PREVALVE
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0396-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CASE IS FOR THE TIME AFTER MECO AND BEFORE THE MPS DUMP.
THE UNLIKE REDUNDANT PART IS THE BLEED CHECK VALVE. THE LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE THE PROPELLENT FEED LINE (BETWEEN THE
PREVALVE AND THE SSME) TO RUPTURE.
THE RESULTING OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE AFT FUSELAGE WILL CAUSE
THE LOSS OF THE MISSION IN THE ONORBIT MISSION PHASES AND THE
LOSS OF THE VEHICLE DURING THE DEORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-56
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o7/86
MPS
1105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 PREVALVE (PVl, 2, 3)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) LO2 DUMP & PURGE
4) LO2 PREVALVE
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0396-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PREVALVE MUST BE OPEN TO DUMP THE LO2 TRAPPED IN THE LINES.
THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY ONORBIT WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE
MISSION (OUTGASSING MAY INTERFERE WITH SOME PAYLOADS).
THE AFT CG LIMIT WILL BE VIOLATED IF THIS PROPELLENT IS NOT
DUMPED. THEREFORE, THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE
LOSS OF THE VEHICLE DURING THE DEORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-57
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/27/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
1106 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
L02 PREVALVE (PVl, 2, 3)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) LO2 DUMP & PURGE
4) LO2 PREVALVE
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0396-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PREVALVESARE CLOSED AFTER THE DUMP TO PREVENT THE
CONTAMINATION OF THE MPS DURING AND AFTER REENTRY. FAILURE WILL
NOT HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-58
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/27/86
MPS
1107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 PREVALVE (PVI, 2, 3)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) SSME INTERFACE
4) LO2 PREVALVE
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 1/ 1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING" 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0396-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RESULTS OF A PREMATURE PREVALVE CLOSURE MAY INCLUDE UPSTREAM
FEEDLINE RUPTURE (CAUSED BY A EXCESSIVE SYSTEM PRESSURE SURGE),
UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE, POSSIBLE MULTIPLE ENGINE DAMAGE AND/OR
FIRE/EXPLOSION.
THE WORST CASE RESULT IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.II; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-59
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/27/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: i/1
1108 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST:
L02 PREVALVE (PVl, 2, 3)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) SSME INTERFACE
4) LO2 PREVALVE
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0396-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE (CRITICAL DURING MECO) WILL CAUSE A LOSS OF PRESSURE
AT THE LO2 PUMP INLET. THIS COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED,
UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION.
THE WORST CASE RESULT IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.iI; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-60
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
1121 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
L02 FEEDLINERELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PVT)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
O2 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0406-0001, 0002
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE PREVENTS THE LOSS OF LO2 FROM THE FEEDLINE MANIFOLD.
THE FAILURE OF THIS VALVE WILL DELAY THE LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-190411 MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-61
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86
MPS
1122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEEDLINERELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0406-0001, 0002
B [P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING ASCENT WILL ALLOW THE VENTING
OF LO2 THROUGH THE MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE. POSSIBLY THERE WILL
NOT BE ENOUGH PROPELLENT TO REACH ORBIT.
THE MISSION WILL BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE MAY BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-62
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o7/86
MPS
1123
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0406-0001,0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THIS VALVE WILL SPRAY LO2 INTO THEAFT
FUSELAGE. THIS LO2 IS A POTENTIAL FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD DURING
ASCENT. THE MISSION IS LOST IN THE ONORBIT MISSION PHASES
(OUTGASSING GO2 COULD INTERFERE WITH SOME PAYLOADS).
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-63
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111ov186
MPS
1124
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 DUMP & PURGE
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0406-0001, 0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS VALVE TO OPEN AFTER MECO WILL CAUSE THE
RUPTURE OF THE LO2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD. THE AFT FUSELAGE WILL BE
OVERPRESSURIZED.
THE MISSION IS LOST IN THE ONORBIT MISSION PHASE (OUTGASSING GO2
CAN INTERFERE WITH SOME PAYLOADS). THE VEHICLE COULD BE
DESTROYED IN THE DEORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-64
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/ov/86
MPS
1131
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVg)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
HDW/FUNC
i/i
/NA
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) LO2 FILL & DRAIN
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0007,0010,0013
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LO2 FLOWS THROUGH THIS VALVE DURING PROPELLENT LOADING. THE
SUDDEN CLOSING OF THIS VALVE DURING FAST FILL WOULD RESULT IN A
PRESSURE SPIKE.
THE WORST CASE IS RUPTURE OF ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY LINES.
THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATIONAND FIRE
HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-65
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o7/86
MPS
1132
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVg)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) LO2 FILL & DRAIN
L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0397-0007,0010, 0013
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE COULD SPRAY LO2 INTO THE AFT FUSELAGE.
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
THE O2 IS A
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-66
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
1133 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (Pvg)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERIOR
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /NA
TAL: /NA
AOA: /NA
ATO: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0007, 0010, 0013
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE PROVIDES A REDUNDANT CLOSURE OF THE LO2 PROPELLENT
FEED MANIFOLD. SINCE IT IS NECESSARY FOR THIS VALVE TO BE CLOSED
PRIOR TO LAUNCH, THIS FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE LAUNCH TO BE
DELAYED.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-67
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86
MPS
1134
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVg)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERIOR LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
O2 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 OUTBOARD FILLAND DRAIN VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/2R TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0007,0010,0013
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL ALLOW THE LOSS OF LO2 THROUGH
THIS VALVE. THIS COULD LEAVE THE VEHICLE WITHOUT ENOUGH
PROPELLENT TO REACH ORBIT.
THE MISSION WILL BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE COULD BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-68
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/se
MPS
1135
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/nmC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 OUTBOARD FILLAND DRAIN VALVE (PVg)
EXTERIOR LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
L02 PROP FEED
LO2 OUTBOARD FILLAND DRAIN VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
2/1R TAL: 2/1R
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0007,0010, 0013
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERIOR LEAKAGE OF THIS VALVE WILL SPRAY LO2 INTO THE AFT
FUSELAGE. THERE MAY NOT BE ENOUGH PROPELLENT TO REACH ORBIT.
THE 02 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-69
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/8e
MPS
1136
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/  a C
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
L02 DUMP & PURGE
L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0397-0007,0010,0013
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE OPENS FOR VACUUM INERTING TO DUMP ANY REMAINING LO2
TRAPPED IN THE MPS. THIS FAILURE WILL NOT CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE OR OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-70
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
1137 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVg)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 DUMP & PURGE
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SKFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0007,0010,0013
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE CLOSES AFTER VACUUM INERTING TO PREVENT THE
CONTAMINATION OF THE MPS DURING REENTRY/LANDING. THIS FAILURE
WILL NOT CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE OR OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-71
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86
MPS
1151
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0008,0011, 0014
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LO2 FLOWS THROUGH THIS VALVE DURING PROPELLENT LOADING. THE
SUDDEN CLOSING OF THIS VALVE DURING FAST FILL WOULD RESULT IN A
PRESSURE SPIKE.
THE WORST CASE IS RUPTURE OF ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY LINES.
THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND FIRE
HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.II; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-72
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86
MPS
1152
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVl0)
EXTERIOR LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0008,0011, 0014
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE COULD SPRAY LO2 INTO THE AFT FUSELAGE.
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
THIS 02 IS A
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-73
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
1153 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
L02 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERIOR
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
L02 FILL & DRAIN
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0008,0011, 0014
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS VALVE PROVIDES A REDUNDANT CLOSURE OF THE LO2 PROPELLENT
FEED MAINFOLD. SINCE IT IS NECESSARY FOR THIS VALVE TO BE CLOSED
PRIOR TO LAUNCH, THIS FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE LAUNCH TO BE
DELAYED.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-74
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86
MPS
1154
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 DUMP & PURGE
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0397-0008,0011,0014
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE OPENS FOR VACUUM INERTING TO DUMP ANYREMAINING LO2
TRAPPED IN THE MPS. THIS FAILURE WILL NOT CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE
MISSION AND/OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.II; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-75
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86
MPS
1155
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
SSME INTERFACE
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0397-0008,0011, 0014
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPENING OF THE INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE DURING BOOST WOULD
ALLOW A GAS POCKET TO ENTER THE FEEDLINES RESULTING IN POTENTIAL
CAVITATION OF PUMPS ON ONE OR MORE SSMES.
THE POSSIBLE RESULTS INCLUDE MULTIPLE SSME SHUTDOWN (LOSS OF
VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-76
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86
MPS
1156
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 OUTBOARD FILLAND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0008,0011,0014
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL ALLOWTHE LOSS OF LO2 THROUGH
THIS VALVE. THIS COULD LEAVE THE VEHICLE WITHOUT ENOUGH
PROPELLENT TO REACH ORBIT.
THE MISSION WILL BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE COULD BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.II; OMRSDI BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-77
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
1157 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0008,0011,0014
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERIOR LEAKAGE OF THIS VALVE WILL SPRAY LO2 INTO THE AFT
FUSELAGE. THERE MAY NOT BE ENOUGH PROPELLENT TO REACH ORBIT.
THE 02 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-78
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/1:/86
MPS
I171
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWlFUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PVI9)
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
L02 FILL & DRAIN
L02 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0395-0035,0045,0055
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LO2 FLOWS THROUGH THIS VALVE AS PART OF THE PRELAUNCH SSME
THERMAL CONDITIONING. SINCE THIS THERMAL CONDITIONING IS
NECESSARY FOR SSME IGNITION, THIS FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE LAUNCH
TO BE DELAYED.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-79
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
1172 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
L02 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PVI9)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERIOR
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
LO2 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0395-0035,0045,0055
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SINCE THIS VALVE PREVENTS THE VENTING OVERBOARD OF THE LO2 FROM
THE SSME BLEED CHECK VALVES, IT MUST BE CLOSED PRIOR TO SSME
IGNITION. IF THIS VALVE FAILS, THE LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-190411 MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-80
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1173 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PVI9)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERIOR
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
L02 PROP FEED
L02 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-0035,0045, 0055
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS VALVE PREVENTS THE VENTING OVERBOARD OF THE LO2 FROM THE
SSME BLEED CHECK VALVES. THIS FAILURE MAY NOT LEAVE ENOUGH
PROPELLENT TO REACH ORBIT.
THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING THE LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE WILL
CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION. THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING
AN ABORT MAY CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-81
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86
MPS
1174
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PV19)
EXTERIOR LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0395-0035,0045,0055
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERIOR LEAKAGE OF THIS VALVE WILL SPRAY L02 INTO THE AFT
FUSELAGE. THERE MAY NOT BE ENOUGH PROPELLENT TO REACH ORBIT.
THE 02 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-82
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86
MPS
1175
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PV19)
FAILS TO RELIEVE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
L02 PROP FEED
LO2 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0395-0035,0045, 0055
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE INCORPORATES A RELIEF FUNCTION (AFTER MECOAND BEFORE
THE MPS DUMP). FAILURE OF THIS PART COULD CAUSE THE RUPTURE OF
THE LINE BETWEEN THE SHUTOFF AND DISCONNECT VALVES.
THE BOILING OF THE LO2 COULD OVERPRESSURIZE THE AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSING THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE DURING REENTRY/LANDING.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-83
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: i/1
1176 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PVI9)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
POGO SUPPRESSION
L02 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 1/1
TAL: I/1
AOA: 1/1
ATO: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0395-0035, 0045,0055
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THIS VALVE WOULD STOP THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM.
FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL
OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE AMPLITUDE
WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-84
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
1181 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
21)
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
L02 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20,
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
s)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-0012,0022,0032,0052
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE VALVES ARE CLOSEDAS PART OF THE PRELAUNCHSSME THERMAL
CONDITIONING. SINCE THIS THERMAL CONDITIONING IS NECESSARY FOR
SSME IGNITION, THIS FAILURE WILL DELAY THE LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG 10.11t OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-85
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
1182 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
21)
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20,
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
s)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
L02 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
INA AOA: INA
/HA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0395-0012,0022,0032,0052
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE VALVES ARE OPENED JUST PRIOR TO SSME IGNITION. SINCE BOTH
VALVES MUST BE OPEN FOR THE OPERATION OF THE POGO SUPRESSION
SYSTEM, THE FAILURE OF EITHER VALVE WILL DELAY THE LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: I/i
1183 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
21)
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20,
EXTERIOR LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) LO2 PROP FEED
4) LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
1/1 RTLS: 1/1
I/1 TAL: i/1
3/3 AOA: i/I
3/3 ATO: I/I
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0395-0012,0022,0032,0052
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERIOR LEAKAGE OF THIS VALVE WILL SPRAY LO2 INTO THE AFT
FUSELAGE. THERE MAY NOT BE ENOUGH PROPELLENT LEFT TO REACH
ORBIT. THE 02 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/1R
1184 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
21)
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20,
FAILS TO RELIEVE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN suBsYs LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
SSME INTERFACE
LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-0012,0022,0032,0052
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE VALVES INCORPORATE A RELIEF FUNCTION TO PREVENT THE RUPTURE
OF THE L02 FEEDLINE (FOR THE TIME AFTER MECO AND BEFORE THE MPS
D n P).
THE CONSEQUENCES INCLUDE FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND
OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE AFT FUSELAGE. THIS COULD RESULT IN THE
LOSS OF THE VEHICLE DURING REENTRY/LANDING.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-88
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
1185 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
21)
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20,
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
S)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
POGO SUPPRESSION
LO2 POGOACCUMULATORRECIRCULATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-0012,0022,0032,0052
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE OF THESE VALVES MUST BE OPEN FOR THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM
OPERATION.
THE FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN
STRUCTURAL OSILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE
AMPLITUDE WHICH CAN LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770; SEIFASSMEO SD75-SH-
0200C
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-89
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86
MPS
1191
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 LOW LEVEL LIQUID SENSOR (MT1, 2)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (FALSE WET)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 LOW LEVEL LIQUID SENSOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC432-0205-0022
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FALSE WET SENSOR READINGS COULD ALLOW THE SSMES BURN UNTIL ALL
THE PROPELLENT IS USED. THE POSSIBLE RESULTS OF A SSME RUNNING
DRY INCLUDE UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND FIRE/EXPLOSION.
THE LOSS OF _ REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-90
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/8 
MPS
1192
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 LOW LEVEL LIQUID SENSOR (MTI, 2)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (FALSE DRY)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 LOW LEVEL LIQUID SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC432-0205-0022
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FALSE DRY SENSOR READINGS COULD PREMATURELY SHUT DOWN THE SSMES.
THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-91
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/e6
MPS
1201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 SYSTEM DELTA P TRANSDUCER (MT44, 50)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
LO2 SYSTEM DELTA P TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC449-0164-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS COMPONENT PROVIDES AN INDIRECT MEASURE OF THE PROPELLENT
LEVEL IN THE ET LO2 TANK. THE FAILURE OF THIS COMPONENT WILL
DELAY THE LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-92
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86
MPS
1202
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 SYSTEM DELTA P TRANSDUCER (MT44, 50)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
L02 TANK PRESS
LO2 SYSTEM DELTA P TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC449-0164-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LO2 LEAK IS A POTENTIAL FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-93
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/14/86
MPS
1211
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
211R
211R
ITEM:
(TP9)
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 PREPRESS DISCONNECT CHECK VALVE TEST PORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
57
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 TANK PRESS
LO2 PREPRESS DISCONNECT CHECK VALVE TEST PORT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
VO70-415446-001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE THROUGH THIS TEST PORT COULD CAUSE A LOSS OF ET LO2 TANK
ULLAGE PRESSURE. BECAUSE OF THE LESS EFFICIENT SSME OPERATIONS,
THERE WILL NOT BE ENOUGH PROPELLENT TO FINISH THE MISSION. THE
VEHICLE MAY BE LOST DURING AN ABORT.
AN 02 LEAK IS A POTENTIAL FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. THE WORST CASE
IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41S00X; SSSH DWG i0.II; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-94
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: i/i
1221 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
18)
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 17 INCH ORBITER DISCONNECT TEST PORT (TPI7,
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
s)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
L02 PROPELLENT FEED
LO2 17 INCH ORBITER DISCONNECT TEST PORT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0389-0501, 0521
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A L02 LEAK IS A POTENTIAL FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-95
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/14/86
MPS
1231
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF TEST PORT (TP24)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
L02 PROPELLENT FEED
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF TEST PORT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
V070-415468-001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LO2 LEAK IS A POTENTIAL FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-96
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/14/se
MPS
1241
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD (MAI)
BLOCKED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
MPS
O2 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DE ORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0074-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS LINE TRANSPORTS L02 FROM THE GROUND TO THE ET LO2 TANK
(PRELAUNCH) AND FROM THE ET LO2 TANK TO THE SSMES (LIFTOFF).
THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF BLOCKED FLOW INCLUDE PREMATURE SSME SHUT
DOWN, UNCONTAINED SSME DAMAGE AND FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE
IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.II; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-97
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/14/8e
MPS
1242
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD (MAI)
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC271-0074-0005
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS LINE TRANSPORTS LO2 FROM THE GROUND TO THE ET LO2 TANK
(PRELAUNCH) AND FROM THE ET LO2 TANK TO THE SSMES (LIFTOFF).
THE SSMES WILL BE SHUT DOWN. LO2 FROM THIS RUPTURED LINE IS A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. BOILING OF THE LO2 CAN OVERPRESSURIZE AND
THUS DESTROY THE AFT FUSELAGE. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-98
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/14/8s
MPS
1243
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD (MAI)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
a)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBI T:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: i/I
1/1 TAL: 1/1
3/3 AOA: 1/1
3/3 ATO: i/i
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0074-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS LINE TRANSPORTS L02 FROM THE GROUND TO THE ET LO2 TANK
(PRELAUNCH) AND FROM THE ET L02 TANK TO THE SSMES (LIFTOFF).
THE LEAKING LO2 IS A POTENTIAL FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. THE WORST
CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-99
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/14/86
MPS
1244
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD (MA1)
LOSS OF INSULATION
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0074-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS LINE TRANSPORTS LO2 FROM THE GROUND TO THE ET LO2 TANK
(PRELAUNCH) AND FROM THE ET L02 TANK TO THE SSMES (LIFTOFF).
THE FAILURE OF INSULATION ON THIS LINE WILL PREVENT THE PRELAUNCH
PROPELLENT THERMAL CONDITIONING. THIS FAILURE WILL DELAY THE
LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-100
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/1:/86
MPS
1251
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/nmc
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FILL & DRAIN LINE (_i)
BLOC_D FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
L02 FILL & DRAIN LINE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
/NA AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0076-0002,0012
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS LINE TRANSPORTS LO2 FROM THE GROUND TO THE ET LO2 TANK. IT
IS NOT IN USE DURING FLIGHT.
THE L02 WILL NOT BE LOADED INTO THE ET LO2 TANK IF THIS LINE IS
BLOCKED. THIS FAILURE WILL DELAY THE LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-101
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/14/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 1252
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
/NA
ITEM: LO2 FILL & DRAIN LINE (FHI)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
LO2 FILL & DRAIN LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0076-0002,0012
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS LINE TRANSPORTS LO2 FROM THE GROUND TO THE ET LO2 TANK. IT
IS NOT IN USE DURING FLIGHT.
LO2 FROM THIS RUPTURED LINE IS A POTENTIAL FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-I02
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/14/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 1253
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
/NA
ITEM: LO2 FILL & DRAIN LINE (FHI)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
LO2 FILL & DRAIN LINE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
i/1 RTLS: /NA
/NA TAL: /NA
/NA AOA: /NA
/NA ATO: /NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC27 i-0076-0002,0012
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS LINE TRANSPORTS L02 FROM THE GROUND TO THE ET LO2 TANK. IT
IS NOT IN USE DURING FLIGHT.
THE LEAKING L02 IS A POTENTIAL FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. THE WORST
CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-103
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
1254 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FILL & DRAIN LINE (FHI)
LOSS OF INSULATION
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 FILL & DRAIN
LO2 FILL & DRAIN LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0076-0002,0012
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS LINE TRANSPORTS LO2 FROM THE GROUND TO THE ET LO2 TANK. IT
IS NOT IN USE DURING FLIGHT.
THE FAILURE OF INSULATION ON THIS LINE WILL PREVENT THE PRELAUNCH
THERMAL CONDITIONING OF THE PROPELLENT. THIS FAILURE WILL DELAY
THE LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-I04
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/1"//86
MPS
1261
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 17 INCH FEEDLINE (_2)
BLOC_D FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
S)
9)
1) MPS
2) 02 SUBSYSTEM
3) LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 17 INCH FEEDLINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC274-0074-0001, 0201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS LINE TRANSPORTS LO2 FROM THE GROUND TO THE ET L02 TANK
(PRELAUNCH) AND FROM THE ET LO2 TANK TO THE SSMES (LIFTOFF).
THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF BLOCKED FLOW INCLUDE PREMATURE SSME
SHUTDOWN, UNCONTAINED SSME DAMAGE AND FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST
CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-I05
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/17/86
MPS
1262
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
LO2 17 INCH FEEDLINE (FH2)
RUPTURE
K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 17 INCH FEEDLINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC274-0074-0001, 0201
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS LINE TRANSPORTS L02 FROM THE GROUND TO THE ET L02 TANK
(PRELAUNCH) AND FROM THE ET LO2 TANK TO THE SSMES (LIFTOFF).
THE SSMES WILL BE SHUT DOWN. LO2 FROM THIS RUPTURED LINE IS A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. BOILING OF THE LO2 CAN OVERPRESSURIZE AND
THUS DESTROY THE AFT FUSELAGE. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-I06
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86
MPS
1263
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 17 INCH FEEDLINE (FH2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
S)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 17 INCH FEEDLINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC274-0074-0001, 0201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS LINE TRANSPORTS L02 FROM THE GROUND TO THE ET LO2 TANK
(PRELAUNCH) AND FROM THE ET LO2 TANK TO THE SSMES (LIFTOFF).
THE LEAKING L02 IS A POTENTIAL FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. THE WORST
CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-107
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86
MPS
1264
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 17 INCH FEEDLINE (FH2)
LOSS OF INSULATION
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 17 INCH FEEDLINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC274-0074-0001, 0201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS LINE TRANSPORTS LO2 FROM THE GROUND TO THE ET LO2 TANK
(PRELAUNCH) AND FROM THE ET LO2 TANK TO THE SSMES (LIFTOFF).
THE FAILURE OF INSULATION ON THIS LINE WILL PREVENT THE PRELAUNCH
PROPELLENT THERMAL CONDITIONING. THIS FAILURE WILL DELAY THE
LAUNCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.II; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-I08
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86
MPS
1271
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH3, 4, 5)
BLOC_D FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
L02 12 INCH FEEDLINE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: I/I
i/I TAL: i/I
3/3 AOA: i/i
3/3 ATO: i/i
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC274-0074-0202,0302
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS LINE TRANSPORTS LO2 FROM THE 17 INCH FEEDLINE TO A SSME.
THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF BLOCKED FLOW IN THIS LINE INCLUDE
PREMATURE SSME SHUTDOWN, UNCONTAINED SSME DAMAGEAND
FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-109
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 1272
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM: L02 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH3, 4, 5)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 12 INCH FEEDLINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/I
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC274-0074-0202,0302
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS LINE TRANSPORTS L02 FROM THE 17 INCH FEEDLINE TO A SSME.
A SSME WILL BE SHUTDOWN. LO2 FROM THIS RUPTURED LINE IS A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. BOILING OF THE L02 CAN OVERPRESSURIZE AND
THUS DESTROY THE AFT FUSELAGE. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-110
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/1 /86
MPS
1273
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH3, 4, 5)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
L02 PROP FEED
LO2 12 INCH FEEDLINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC274-0074-0202,0302
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS LINE TRANSPORTS LO2 FROM THE 17 INCH FEEDLINE TO A SSME.
THE LEAKING LO2 IS A POTENTIAL FIRE/EXPLOSIONHAZARD. THE WORST
CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-111
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/18/86
MPS
1281
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEED MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE (RV5)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 FEED MANIFOLDRELIEF VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0501-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THIS VALVE WILL SPRAY LO2 INTO THE AFT
FUSELAGE. THIS LO2 IS A POTENTIAL FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD DURING
ASCENT.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-112
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/18/86
MPS
1282
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEED MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE (RVS)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
312R
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
LO2 FEED MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2 R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0501-0001
B [ F] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING ASCENT WILL ALLOW THE VENTING
OF LO2 THROUGH THIS VALVE. POSSIBLY THERE WILL NOT BE ENOUGH
PROPELLENT TO REACH ORBIT.
THE MISSION WILL BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE MAY BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.II; OMRSDI BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-i13
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/18/86
MPS
1283
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FtrNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 FEED MANIFOLDRELIEF VALVE (RVS)
FAILS TO RELIEVE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
S)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 DUMP & PURGE
LO2 FEED MANIFOLDRELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0501-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS VALVE RELIEVES PRESSURE IN THE LO2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD AFTER
MECO. THE L02 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD WILL RUPTURE IF ALL REDUNDANCY
IS LOST.
THE AFT FUSELAGE IS OVERPRESSURIZED. THE MISSION IS LOST IN THE
ONORBIT MISSION PHASE (OUTGASSING GO2 CAN INTERFERE WITH SOME
PAYLOAD). THE VEHICLE COULD BE DESTROYED IN THE DEORBIT PHASE
(LOSS OF VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG I0.Ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-I14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/19/86
MPS
1291
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURE MANIFOLD REPRESS ORIFICE (RPI)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
31
4)
61
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 DUMP & PURGE
GO2 PRESSURE MANIFOLD REPRESS ORIFICE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-415552-001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS ORIFICE PASSES HELIUM FROM THE PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY
SYSTEM INTO THE GO2 LINES TO REPRESSURIZE THESE LINES PRIOR TO
REENTRY.
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL ALLOW THE CONTAMINATION OF THE MPS
BY THE ATMOSPHERE DURING REENTRY. THIS WILL NOT CAUSE THE LOSS
OF THE VEHICLE OR OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-115
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
1292 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURE MANIFOLD REPRESS ORIFICE (RP1)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN SUBSYS LEAD: A.J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
02 SUBSYSTEM
LO2 PROP FEED
GO2 PRESSURE MANIFOLD REPRESS ORIFICE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: VO70-415552-001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ORIFICE (AND CHECK VALVE CVI2) PREVENTS THE BLEEDING OF LO2
FROM THE 17 INCH LO2 FEEDLINE INTO THE GO2 (ET LO2 TANK ULLAGE
PRESSURE) SYSTEM.
THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL NOT CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE
OR OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X; SSSH DWG i0.ii; OMRSD; BOOSTER SYSTEM
BRIEFS JSC-19041; MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM WORKBOOK MPS 2102;
SHUTTLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL JSC-12770
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-I16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2001 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI2)
FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0015
CAUSES:
FAILURE
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO FILL LH2 TANK WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. FAILURE
DURING TANK FILL MAY CAUSE RUPTURE OF FILL LINE, RELEASING LH2
AND CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. INABILITY TO DUMP RESIDUAL
LH2 WOULD ALLOW HYDROGEN TO MIX WITH ATMOSPHERIC OXYGEN DURING
ENTRY OR ON THE GROUND, FORMING AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE. VALVE IS
NOT REQUIRED TO OPEN DURING RTLS. VACUUM INERTING PROCEDURE
SERVES AS A REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: JSC-19041, BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS; VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-117
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10107186
MPS
2002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI2)
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/i RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0015
CAUSES:
FAILURE
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREIGNITION FAILURE WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY, OR, IF ALL
REDUNDANCY FAILS, THE VEHICLE CAN BE DESTROYED BY FIRE/EXPLOSION
OF ESCAPING LH2. FAILURE AFTER ENGINE START WILL ALLOW A GAS
POCKET TO ENTER THE FEEDLINE, RESULTING IN ENGINE PUMP CAVITATION
AND EXPLOSION OF THE ENGINE(S). IF THE O/B VALVE ALSO FAILS, LH2
WILL ESCAPE THE VEHICLE, RESULTING IN A LOW LEVEL SHUTDOWN BEFORE
GUIDANCE INITIATED MECO AND/OR CREATION OF AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE
OF H2 AND ATMOSPHERIC 02 OUTSIDE THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-I18
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2003 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV12)
FAIL TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: /NA
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
 IZR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0397-0015
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BINDING, PEICE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO FILL TANKWILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. NO REDUNDANCY
FOR PRELAUNCH PHASE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD MAKE DUMPING
LH2 RESIDUALS IMPOSSIBLE. VENTING H2 GAS COULD CREATE AN
EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE WITH ATMOSPHERIC 02 DURING DEORBITAND
LANDING. THE VALVE IS NOT REQUIRED TO OPEN DURING RTLS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-119
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
2004 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV12)
FAIL TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAD_CH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0015
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BINDING, PEICE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAIL TO CLOSE PRELAUNCH WOULD CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. FAILURE TO
CLOSE 6 SEC AFTER MPS DUMP START WOULD ALLOW H2 TO FREEZE IN THE
FILLAND DRAIN LINE, PREVENTING A NORMAL DUMP. NO REDUNDANCY TO
PREVENT FREEZE-UP, BUT ALTERNATE PATHS EXIST TO DUMP
REMAINING LIQUID H2. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WOULD TRAP H2, WHICH
COULD ESCAPE DURING ENTRY AND LANDING TO CREATE AN EXPLOSIVE
MIXTURE WITH ATMOSPHERIC OXYGEN.
REFERENCES: JSC-19041; BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS, VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-120
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
2005 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV12)
FAIL TO RELIEVE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0397-0015
CAUSES_ CONTAMINATION, BINDING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO RELIEVE WILL ALLOW PRESSURE BUILDUP FROM BOILOFF OF
RESIDUAL LH2. EFFECT OF THIS FAILURE IS POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF LH2
FILL LINE. MPS DUMP WILL RELIEVE ANY PRESSURE BUILDUP. FAILURE
MODE IS NA AFTER MPS INERTING SINCE THE VALVE IS THEN LEFT
OPEN FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLIGHT. NO REDUNDANCY FOR THIS
MODE.
REFERENCES: JSC-19041; BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS; MC271-0076
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-121
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
2006 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI2)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LH2 SYSTEM
2) LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
3) LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
4)
S)
6)
V)
a)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
313 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0015
CAUSES:
FAILURE
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LAUNCH MAY BE DELAYED IF INDICATOR FAILS PRELAUNCH. FAILURE
AFTER LIFTOFF IS CRIT 3. LH2 MANIFOLD PRESSURE TRANSDUCER COULD
BE CONSIDERED REDUNDANT FOR SOME PORTIONS OF FLIGHT SUCH AS MPS
VACUUM INERTING. LEVEL SENSORS ARE A REDUNDANCY FOR
PRELAUNCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-122
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2007
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV12)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0015
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PROCEDURAL ERROR, PIECE-
PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD ON THE PAD AND WHILE
STILL IN THE ATMOSPHERE DURING POWERED FLIGHT. NO HAZARD AFTER
MPS DUMP AND PURGE.
REFERENCES: V070-415702
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-123
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
MPS
2011
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)
FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
i/1 RTLS: /NA
3/3 TAL: i/I
3/3 AOA: 1/1
i/1 ATO: i/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0397-0015
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO FILL TANK WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. FAILURE DURING
TANK FILL MAY CAUSE RUPTURE OF FILL LINE, RELEASING LH2 AND
CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. INABILITY TO DUMP RESIDUAL LH2
WOULD ALLOW VENTING GH2 TO COMBINE WITH ATMOSPHERIC OXYGEN AND
CREATE AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE DURING ENTRY AND LANDING.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-124
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/Oe/Se
MPS
2012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV11)
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0015
CAUSES:
FAILURE
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY
DURING PRELAUNCH WILL ALLOW LH2 TO FLOW OUT THE FILL LINE,
CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. SECOND FAILURE DURING POWERED
FLIGHT (LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY) WILL ALLOW LH2 TO ESCAPE,
CAUSING ENGINE SHUTDOWN PRIOR TO GUIDANCE INITIATED MECO.
INBOARD VALVE HAS POSITION INDICATOR SO LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IS
READILY DETECTABLE.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-125
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o6/8 
MPS
2013
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/I
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVII)
FAIL TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C CNA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0015
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BINDING, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO FILL TANK WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. INABILITY TO
DUMP RESIDUAL LH2 WOULD ALLOW GH2 VENTING DURING ENTRY AND
LANDING TO CREATE AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE WITH ATMOSPHERIC 02. THE
VALVE IS NOT REQUIRED TO OPEN DURING AN RTLS.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-126
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o6/86
MPS
2014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/F_C
3/3
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
I._2 OUTBOARD FILLAND DRAIN VALVE (PV11)
FAIL TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICQLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) LH2 SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: /NA
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0015
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BINDING, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY OR
SECOND FAILURE DURING TAL WILL ALLOW H2 TO CONTINUE ESCAPING THE
VEHICLE, COMBINE WITH ATMOSPHERIC OXYGEN AND CREATE A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. NORMAL TAL DUMP IS ONLY A PARTIAL ONE.
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IS READILY DETECTABLE VIA VALVE POSITION
INDICATORS. THE VALVE DOES NOT OPEN DURING RTLS.
REFERENCES: JSC-19041
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-127
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
MPS
2015
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0015
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. THIS FUNCTION CAN BE
CONSIDERED TO HAVE REDUNDANCY FOR SOME FLIGHT PHASES OR EVENTS.
IF THE LEVEL SENSORS INDICATE THE LH2 TANK IS FILLING, THE VALVE
IS SURELY OPEN. IF LH2 MANIFOLD PRESSURE DROPS DURING
SCHEDULED TIME FOR LH2 DUMP, THE VALVE MUST BE OPEN. NO
REDUNDANCY FOR MAIN ENGINE ASCENT PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-128
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
2016 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI1)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
LEAD ANALYST- W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) LH2 SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
s)
9)
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING- 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0397-0015
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PROCEDURAL ERROR, PIECE-
PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LEAKAGE OF H2 CAN LEAD TO A FIRE OR EXPLOSION DURING POWERED
FLIGHT OR WHILE STILL ON THE PAD. NO HAZARD AFTER MPS DUMP AND
PURGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-129
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o8/86
MPS
2021
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN LINE (FH6)
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: i/I
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0076-0021
CAUSES: OVERPRESSURIZATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY TO PREVENT OR LIMIT DAMAGE TO OTHER SYSTEM
COMPONENTS FROM CATASTROPHIC FAILURE. DAMAGE TO OTHER SYSTEMS
CAN DESTROY THE VEHICLE. THE FAILURE COULD ONLY OCCUR AS A
RESULT OF A PREVIOUS FAILURE OF THE RELIEF VALVE BUILT INTO
THE I/B FILL AND DRAIN VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-130
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/23/86
MPS
2022
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
_2 FILL AND DRAIN LINE (FH6)
_S_ICTEDFLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 FILLAND DRAIN LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0076-0021
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE WILL PREVENT TANK FILL AT SCHEDULED RATES.
LAUNCH DELAY TO CLEAR LINE WILL BE NECESSARY.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-131
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/19/86
MPS
2023
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN LINE (FH6)
LOSS OF INSULATING VACUUM
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC271-0076-0021
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES:
FAILURE
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL ALLOW LH2 TEMPERATURE TO INCREASE DURING LOADING.
IF LH2 TEMPERATURE IS TOO HIGH, ENGINE START WILL BE PREVENTED
AND LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-132
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: i/1
2031 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
(ORBITER HALF)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 GROUND FILL AND DRAIN (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT
(PDZZ)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) LH2 SYSTEM
2) LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
3) LH2 GROUND FILL AND DRAIN (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (ORBITER
HALF)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC276-0005-004 I,-0021
C [NA ]
CAUSES:
FAILURE
CONTAMINATION, PROCEDURAL ERROR, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. LEAKING LH2 CAN DAMAGE
TPS TILES AND CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY. LEAKAGE WILL
ONLY OCCUR PRELAUNCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X, JSC-19041, BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-133
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: i/1
2041 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
(PDI7)
FAILURE MODE:
_2 HI POINT BLEED (ORB/GND)DISCO_ECT (ORB HALF)
E_E_ALLEAK
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 HI POINT BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (ORBITER HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0004-0003
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LEAKAGE OF LH2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. LEAKING RESIDUAL
HYDROGEN DURING POWERED ASCENT CAN COMBINE WITH ATMOSPHERIC
OXYGEN AND CREATE AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE. LEAKING LH2 DURING
PRELAUNCH CAN DAMAGE TPS TILES AND CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-134
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2042
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
211R
ITEM:
(PDIT)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 HI POINT BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (ORB HALF)
FAIL TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 HI POINT BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (ORBITER HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 R RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0004-0003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
VALVE IS EXPECTED TO CLOSE PRELAUNCH AND REMAIN CLOSED. FAILURE
SHOULD CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WILL ALLOW LH2 TO
ESCAPE THE VEHICLE DURING ASCENT RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE.
IF NOMINAL ORBIT IS ACHIEVED, REMAINING H2 WILL BE VENTED
AND BE OF NO FURTHER CONSEQUENCE.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X, VO70-415610
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-135
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2043
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
(PDI7)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 HI POINT BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (ORB HALF)
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 HI POINT BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (ORBITER HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0004-0003
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE SHOULD CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. SECOND FAILURE, OR
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL ALLOW ESCAPE OF LH2 FROM THE MAIN
FEEDLINE DURING ASCENT. ENGINES COULD CUTOFF EARLY OR EXPLODE
BECAUSE OF LOW PUMP INLET PRESSURE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-136
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
2044 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
(PDI7)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 HI POINT BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (ORB HALF)
FAIL TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 HI POINT BLEED (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (ORBITER HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0004-0003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO OPEN PRELAUNCH WILL PRECLUDE LIFTOFF.
OPEN IN ANY OTHER PHASE.
NOT REQUIRED TO
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-137
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10115186
MPS
2051
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PVI3)
FAIL TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LH2 SYSTEM
2) LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
3) LH2 REPLENISH VALVE
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: /NA
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/1R
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-002 i,-003 i,-0041,-0051
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE PRELAUNCH WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL PRECLUDE LH2 DUMP. HYDROGEN COULD THEN ESCAPE
THE VEHICLE THROUGH THE RELIEF VALVE DURING ENTRY AND LANDING,
CREATING AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE WITH ATMOSPHERIC OXYGEN.
THE VALVE IS NOT REQUIRED TO OPEN DURING RTLS.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-138
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/15/86
MPS
2052
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PV13)
FAIL TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
/NA
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-0021,-0031,-0041,-0051
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE PRELAUNCH WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. FAILURE TO CLOSE
AFTER MPS DUMP AND PURGE IS OF NO CONSEQUENCE. NO REDUNDANCY FOR
THIS FAILURE MODE. THE VALVE IS NOT REQUIRED TO CLOSE DURING AN
RTLS.
REFERENCES: JSC-19041, BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS; VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-139
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lOlls186
MPS
2O53
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PV13)
FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: /NA
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-0021,-0031,-004 I,-0051
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WIL PREVENT LH2 DUMP. RESIDUAL H2 WILL ESCAPE THROUGH
THE RELIEF VALVE THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THE FLIGHT. THIS IS
A HAZARD DURING ENTRY AND LANDING, WHEN THE H2 CAN
COMBINE WITH ATMOSPHERIC OXYGEN.
REFERENCES: JSC-19041, BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS; VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-140
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
2054 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PVI3)
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-0021, -0031,-0041,-0051
c[p]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, OR SECOND FAILURE, WILL ALLOW LH2 TO DUMP OVERBOARD
DURING POWERED FLIGHT, RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH; VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-141
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10115186
MPS
2055
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
1/1
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PVI3)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: I/i TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-002 i,-003 i,-0041,-0051
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
PRELAUNCH FAILURE IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. LEAKAGE OF
RESIDUAL H2 DURING POWERED FLIGHT CAN CREATE AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE
WITH ATMOSPHERIC OXYGEN. NO REDUNDANCY FOR THIS MODE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-142
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86
MPS
2061
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
_.J'I2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE (PV22)
FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN, FAIL TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA 3
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-0023,-0033,-0043,-0053
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
THIS FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HARMFUL EFFECTS.
THIS FAILURE MODE.
IF LAUNCH OCCURS,
NO REDUNDANCY FOR
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-143
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/16/s6
MPS
2062
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE (PV22)
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAIL TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/ 1R RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDWIFUNC
211R
211R
211R
211R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-0023,-0033,-0043,-0053
C[F]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. SECOND FAILURE, OR
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WOULD ALLOW LH2 TO ESCAPE THROUGH THE
BLEED DISCONNECT AND CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE, ON THE PAD OR DURING
POWERED ASCENT, BY FIRE OR EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-144
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/16/86
MPS
2063
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE (PV22)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: i/i RTLS:
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-0023,-0033,-0043,-0053
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 CAN CREATE AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE WITH ATMOSPHERIC 02
BEFORE LAUNCH OR DURING POWERED ASCENT. POSSIBLE DESTRUCTION OF
THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-145
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86
MPS
2071
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 SYSTEM DELTA-P TRANSDUCER (MT44, MT50)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 SYSTEM DELTA-P TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC449-0164-0002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKING HYDROGEN IS A(N) FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
DESTRUCTION OF THE VEHICLE.
POSSIBLE
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/l
REFERENCES: VS70-415007
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-146
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10117186
MPS
2072
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 SYSTEM DELTA-P TRANSDUCER (MT44, MT50)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) LH2 SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 SYSTEM DELTA-P TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC449-0164-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TRANSDUCER IS ONLY USED DURING PRELAUNCH. FAILURE CAN CAUSE
LAUNCH DELAY. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
IF LAUNCH OCCURS, FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON OTHER PHASES.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-147
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2081
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/I
ITEM: LH2 HI POINT BLEED LINE (FHIg)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 HI POINT BLEED LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0075-0010
CAUSES: OVERPRESSURI ZATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RUPTURE OF THE LINE CAN CAUSE DAMAGE TO OTHER COMPONENTS LEADING
TO THE POSSIBLE DESTRUCTION OF THE VEHICLE. ESCAPING HYDROGEN IS
ALSO A HAZARD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-148
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/23/s6
MPS
2082
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 HI POINT BLEED LINE (FHI9)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYSTz W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8_
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM
LH2 HI POINT BLEED LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC271-0075-0010
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-149
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
2083 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 HI POINT BLEED LINE (FH19)
LOSS OF INSULATING VACUUM
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 HI POINT BLEED LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0075-0010
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD SPEED UP BOILOFF OF RESIDUAL LH2 IN THE LINE. THE
INCREASING PRESSURE MAY CAUSE THE LINE TO BURST, RESULTING IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE. NO HAZARD AFTER MPS DUMP & PURGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-150
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/1"I/86
MPS
2091
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
FAIL TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNET VALVE (ORB HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0390-0005, -0006, -0016, -0026
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE WOULD NOT ALLOW RECIRCULATION TO BEGIN AND
WOULD FORCE A LAUNCH DELAY. THE VALVE IS NOT COMMANDED TO OPEN
IN ANY OTHER PHASE. NO REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-151
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
2092 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNET VALVE (ORB HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0390-0005,-0006,-0016,-0026
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE BEFORE LAUNCH WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. IF LH2
RECIRCULATION AND TOPPING ARE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE THE FAILURE, IT
WILL HAVE NO IMPACT ON THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/8.7 C-152
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO11 186
MPS
2093
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
111
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNET VALVE (ORB HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING- 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0390-0005, -0006, -0016, -0026
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE VALVE IS NOT CLOSED AT ET SEP, THE THRUST OF ESCAPING LH2
CAN CAUSE RECONTACT WITH THE ET AND LOSS OF THE ORBITER. IF
RECONTACT DAMAGE IS LIMITED TO TPS TILES, THE ORBITER CAN BE
DESTROYED DURING ENTRY. AERO FORCES WILL PREVENT RECONTACT AFTER
A RTLS ET SEP.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-153
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2094
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
KDW/  n C
i/i
i/I
ITEM: LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LH2 SYSTEM
2) LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
3) LH2 RECIRCULATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNET VALVE (ORB HALF)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0390-0005, -0006, -0016, -0026
C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, ON THE PAD OR IN
POWERED ASCENT. LEAKING LH2 CAN DAMAGE TPS TILES AND CAUSE LOSS
OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-154
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
2101 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE (PVI4, PVlS, PV16)
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0395-002 i, -0031, -0041, -0051
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. IF LAUNCH OCCURS,
THIS FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-155
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
2102 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE (PVI4, PVIS, PVI6)
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-0021,-0031,-0041,-0051
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE CAN CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HARMFUL EFFECT.
IF LAUNCH OCCURS, THIS
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-156
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: i/1
2103 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE (PVI4, PVI5, PVI6)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) LH2 SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0395-002 I, -0031, -0041, -0051
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD PRELAUNCH AND DURING
POWERED ASCENT WHEN THE VEHICLE IS STILL IN THE ATMOSPHERE. NO
HAZARD AFTER MPS DUMP AND PURGE.
REFERENCES: VA70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-157
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/2o/86
MPS
2111
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING MANIFOLD (MA3)
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING MANIFOLD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0075-0017
CAUSES: OVERPRESSURIZATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BURST OF A LINE CAN POTENTIALLY DAMAGE OTHER COMPONENTS AND LEAD
TO DESTRUCTION OF THE VEHICLE OR LOSS OF LIFE. ESCAPING HYDROGEN
IS ALSO A HAZARD.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-158
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/2o/86
MPS
2112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING MANIFOLD (MA3)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
_)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING MANIFOLD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL" i/1
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0075-0017
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD ON THE PAD AND WHILE
STILL IN THE ATMOSPHERE DURING POWERED FLIGHT. NO HAZARD AFTER
MPS DUMP AND PURGE.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-159
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
io123186
MPS
2113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING MANIFOLD (MA3)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING MANIFOLD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0075-0017
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-160
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/19/86
MPS
2114
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING MANIFOLD (MA3)
LOSS OF INSULATING VACUUM
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING MANIFOLD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0075-0017
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD ALLOW LH2 TEMPERATURE TO INCREASE DURING PRESTART
CONDITIONING. IF LH2 TEMPERATURE IS TOO HIGH, ENGINE START WILL
BE PREVENTED, AND LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-161
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: i/1
2121 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
FH15)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING PUMP LINE (FHII, FHI3,
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING PUMP LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0075-0011,-0012,-0013
CAUSES: OVERPRESSURI ZATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BURST OF THE LINE CAN DAMAGE OTHER COMPONENTS AND LEAD TO LOSS OF
LIFE OR VEHICLE. ESCAPING HYDROGEN IS ALSO A HAZARD.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-162
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
2122 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FHIS)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING PUMP LINE (FHII, FHI3,
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING PUMP LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC271-0075-0011,-0012,-0013
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [NA ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-163
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
2123 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
n_15)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING PUMP LINE (FHII, FHI3,
LOSS OF INSULATING VACUUM
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING PUMP LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC27 i-0075-00 ii, -0012, -0013
CAUSES :
FAILURE
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD ALLOW LH2 TEMPERATURE TO INCREASE DURING PRESTART
CONDITIONING. IF LH2 TEMPERATURE IS TOO HIGH, ENGINE START WILL
BE PREVENTED, AND LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-164
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: I/1
2131 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FH16)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING RETURN LINE (FHI2, FHI4,
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
S)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING RETURN LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/I
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC27 i-0075-0015, -0016, -0024
CAUSES: OVERPRESSURI ZATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RUPTURE OF THE LINE CAN DAMAGE OTHER COMPONENTS AND LEAD TO LOSS
OF LIFE OR VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE. ESCAPING H2 WOULD BE A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD DURING PRELAUNCH OR MPS ASCENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-165
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10121186
MPS
2132
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM:
n_16)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING RETURN LINE (FHI2,
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FHI4,
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING RETURN LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC271-0075-0015,-0016,-0024
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD ON THE PAD OR DURING
POWERED FLIGHT. NO HAZARD AFTER MPS DUMP AND PURGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-166
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
2133 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FHI6)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING RETURN LINE (FHI2, FHI4,
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING RETURN LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC27 I-0075-0015, -0016, -0024
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [NA ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-167
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
2134 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FH16)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING RETURN LINE (FHI2, FHI4,
LOSS OF INSULATING VACUUM
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING RETURN LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/nmc
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC271-0075-0015,-0016,-0024
C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD ALLOW LH2 TEMPERATURE TO INCREASE DURING PRESTART
CONDITIONING. IF LH2 TEMPERATURE IS TOO HIGH, ENGINE START WILL
BE PREVENTED, AND LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-168
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: I/1
2141 ABORT: i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING REPLENISH LINE (FHIT)
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) LH2 SYSTEM
2) LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
3) LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING REPLENISH LINE
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0075-0019
CAUSES: OVERPRESSURI ZATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RUPTURE OF THE LINE CAN DAMAGE OTHER PARTS AND CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE
OR VEHICLE. ESCAPING HYDROGEN IS ALSO A HAZARD.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-169
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
2142 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING REPLENISH LINE (FHI7)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
S)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING REPLENISH LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC271-0075-0019
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES- CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE MAY CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-170
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
2143 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING REPLENISH LINE (FHI7)
LOSS OF INSULATING VACUUM
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING REPLENISH LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0075-0019
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD ALLOW LH2 TEMPERATURE TO INCREASE DURING
REPLENISHMENT. IF LH2 TEMPERATURE IS TOO HIGH, ENGINE START WILL
BE PREVENTED, AND LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-171
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/21/86
MPS
2151
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/nmC
1/i
i/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING RETURN LINE (FHI8)
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
S)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING RETURN LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0075-0018
CAUSES: OVERPRESSURIZATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RUPTURE OF THE LINE CAN CAUSE DAMAGE TO OTHER PARTS THAT COULD
LEAD TO LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE. ESCAPING HYDROGEN IS ALSO A
HAZARD.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-172
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/23/86
MPS
2152
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING RETURN LINE (FHI8)
RESTRICTED FLOW
SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINOLEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING RETURN LINE
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
B [NA ] C [NA ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC271-0075-0018
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-173
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/19/s6
MPS
2153
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING RETURN LINE (FHI8)
LOSS OF INSULATING VACUUM
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING RETURN LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0075-0018
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD ALLOW LH2 TEMPERATURE TO INCREASE DURING PRESTART
CONDITIONING. IF LH2 TEMPERATURE IS TOO HIGH, ENGINE START WILL
BE PREVENTED, AND LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-174
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/21/86
MPS
2161
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
I_2 RECIRCULATIONMANIFOLDRELIEF VALVE (RV7)
FAIL TO OPEN (RELIEVE)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0474-0002, -0003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD ALLOW RUPTURE OF LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING RETURN
LINES, REPLENISH LINE OR MANIFOLD DURING THE PERIOD FROM MECO + 2
SEC (CLOSING OF LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE) TO OMS-I
IGNITION + 6 SEC (OPENING OF TOPPING VALVE) WHEN THESE LINES
ARE ISOLATED.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-17S
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
2162 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRCULATIONMANIFOLDRELIEF VALVE (RV7)
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
e)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0474-0002, -0003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-176
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86
MPS
2163
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
Y._-I2 RECIRCULATION MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE (RV7)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
11
5)
7)
s)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0474-0002, -0003
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD WHEN THE VEHICLE IS IN
THE ATMOSPHERE. NO HAZARD AFTER MPS DUMP & PURGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-177
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86
MPS
2164
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRCULATIONMANIFOLDRELIEF VALVE (RV7)
FAIL TO CLOSE (RESEAT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0474-0002, -0003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-178
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/21/e6
MPS
2171
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (PPI, PP2, PP3)
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC281-0030-0001
CAUSES: INADVERTENT ACTIVATION, PROCEDURAL ERROR, IMPROPER INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE MAY CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
FLIGHT PHASES IS NOT HAZARDOUS.
FAILURE IN OTHER
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-179
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
2172 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (PP1, PP2, PP3)
INTERMITTENT OPERATION, ERRATIC OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC281-0030-0001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE DURING PRELAUNCH RECIRCULATION COULD CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
NO EFFECT ON OTHER PHASES.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-180
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
2173 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (PPI, PP2, PP3)
FAIL TO START
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC281-0030-0001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PUMP IS USED ONLY DURING PRELAUNCH. FAILURE WILL CAUSE LAUNCH
DELAY. IF ONE PUMP FAILS, THE REMAINING PUMPS COULD PROVIDE
ADEQUATE CONDITIONING IF THE PREVALVE CORRESPONDING TO THE FAILED
PUMP IS OPENED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS POSSIBLE BECAUSE ALL
THREE PUMPS ARE CONTAINED IN A SINGLE PACKAGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-181
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2174
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (PPI, PP2, PP3)
FAIL TO STOP
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/nmC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC281-0030-0001
CAUSES:
FAILURE
PROCEDURAL ERROR, IMPROPER INPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-182
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/21/86
MPS
2175
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (PP1, PP2, PP3)
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HOW/ru-NC
:3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC281-0030-0001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PROCEDURAL ERROR, INADVERTENT ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE COULD CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-183
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86
MPS
2176
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (PPI, PP2, PP3)
DELAYED OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC281-0030-0001
CAUSES: PROCEDURAL ERROR, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE COULD CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-184
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/22/86
MPS
2177
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (PPI, PP2, PP3)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC281-0030-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
DUMP & PURGE.
NO HAZARD AFTER MPS
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-185
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/22/86
MPS
2181
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
LH2 PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI7)
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
LH2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PRE-PRESSURIZE THE LH2 TANK WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
THE VALVE IS NOT NORMALLY OPEN IN ANY OTHER PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-186
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
2182 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CVlT)
FAIL TO CLOSE (RESEAT), FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) LH2 SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
LH2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0005
B [ F] C [ F]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE WILL ALLOW ULLAGE PRESSURE TO BE LOST, RESULTING
IN LAUNCH DELAY DURING PRELAUNCH OR LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING
POWERED FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-187
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10123186
NPS
2183
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CV17)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
LH2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0005
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
DUMP & PURGE.
NO HAZARD AFTER MPS
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-188
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/23/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2191
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
I/IR
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION ISOLATION CHECK VALVE
(CV21,CV22,CV23)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
I/1R
Z/ZR
1/1R
I/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0479-0002, -0012
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
PRELAUNCH FAILURE MAY CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. SECOND FAILURE, OR
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOW ULLAGE PRESSURE AND
MULTIPLE ENGINE SHUTDOWN DURING ASCENT. FAILURE DURING ABORT
WILL CAUSE SHUTDOWN OF REMAINING ENGINES AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-189
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/24/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2192
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
i/i
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION ISOLATION CHECK VALVE
(CV21,CV22,CV23 AND TEST PORTS TPS,TP6,TP7)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/I RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0479-0002, -0012
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD, DURING PRELAUNCH OR
POWERED FLIGHT. NO HAZARD AFTER MPS DUMP & PURGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-190
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/27/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
I/IR
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE
(LV56,LV57,LV58)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/1R
1/1R
1/1R
I/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC280-0017-0015, -0361
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
LOW ULLAGE PRESSURE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LAUNCH
DELAY OR LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING POWEREDASCENT. LOW ULLAGE
PRESSURE DURING ABORTS CAN CAUSE SHUTDOWN OF REMAINING ENGINES
AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-191
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/27/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2202
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/iS
1/IR
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE
(LV56,LV57,LV58)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 1/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 1/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: I/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC280-0017-0015, -0361
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL ALLOW OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANK
AND RELIEVING OF GH2 AT LOW ALTITUDE, CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION
HAZARD. LH2 TANK TPS FIRE CAN CAUSE ET STRUCTURAL FAILURE. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANK.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-192
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/27/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2203 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOWCONTROL VALVE
(LV56,LV57,LV58)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINo
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
I/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC280-0017-0015, -0361
C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LEAKING H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
& PURGE.
NO HAZARD AFTER MPS DUMP
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-193
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/27/86
MPS
2211
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GH2 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT (PD5)
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (ORBITER HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0391-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. FAILURE DURING
POWERED ASCENT WILL CUT OFF GH2 FLOW TO THE LH2 TANK. SUBSEQUENT
LOSS OF ULLAGE PRESSURE WILL CAUSE MULTIPLE ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND
LOSS OF VEHICLE. NO REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-194
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/28/86
MPS
2212
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GH2 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT (PDS)
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i>
2_
3)
4}
5_
6_
7}
8_
9_
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (ORBITER HALF)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS : 3/ 3
1/1 TAL: 1/1
3/3 AOA" i/I
1/1 ATO: 1/1
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0391-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THRUST FROM ESCAPING H2 AT ET SEP CAN CAUSE RECONTACT WITH ET AND
DESTRUCTION OF VEHICLE. VEHICLE CAN BE DESTROYED ON ENTRY IF TPS
TILES ARE DAMAGED IN RECONTACT WITH ET. RECONTACT WITH ET CAN
DESTROY VEHICLE IN ABORTS, EXCEPT RTLS WHERE AERO FORCES
WILL PREVENT RECONTACT. FAILURE NA FOR PRELAUNCH, DISCONNECT IS
NOT REQUIRED TO CLOSE. NO REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-195
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/28/86
MPS
2213
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/I
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GH2 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT (PD5)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (ORBITER HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0391-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE WILL ALLOWHELIUM LEAKAGE AND WILLCAUSE LAUNCH
DELAY. FAILURE DURING ASCENT WILL ALLOW LEAKAGE OF H2 AND CREATE
A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. NO HAZARD AFTER MPS DUMP & PURGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-196
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/28/86
MPS
2221
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 TANK GROUND PRE-PRESS DISCONNECT (PDI0)
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) LH2 SYSTEM
2) LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
3) LH2 TANK GROUND PRE-PRESSURIZATION (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT
(ORBITER HALF)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0003-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCR FAILURE WILL PREVENT PREPRESSURIZATION OF LH2 TANKAND
CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. FAILURE DOES NOT APPLY TO OTHER PHASES SINCE
THE DISCONNECT/CHECK VALVE IS ONLY REQUIRED TO OPEN DURING
PRELAUNCH. NO REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-197
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/28/86
MPS
2222
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/nmC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 TANK GROUND PRE-PRESS DISCONNECT (PDI0)
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED, EXTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) LH2 SYSTEM
2) LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
3) LH2 TANK GROUND PRE-PRESSURIZATION (ORB/GND) DISCONNECT
(ORBITER HALF)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0003-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL ALLOW GH2 TO ESCAPE OVERBOARD.
VEHICLE CAN BE DESTROYED BY FIRE OR EXPLOSION OF ESCAPING GH2 OR
STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF LH2 TANK FROM LOSS OF ULLAGE PRESSURE.
ONLY ONE REDUNDANT COMPONENT, SO LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY SIMILARLY
CAUSES LOSS OF VEHICLE. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IS NOT READILY
DETECTABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-198
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: i/1
2231 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
(PDI6)
FAILURE MODE:
GH2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) LH2 SYSTEM
2) LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
3) GH2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: ' 1/1 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME276-0032-0017
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PROCEDURAL ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD DURING PRELAUNCH OR
POWERED FLIGHT. NO HAZARD AFTER MPS DUMP & PURGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-199
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PORT (TPI0)
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/1R
2241 ABORT: 2/IR
LH2 PREPRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT CHECK VALVE TEST
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
W.J. MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
LH2 PREPRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT CHECK VALVE TEST PORT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/ 1R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ F]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
V070-415446-001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PROCEDURAL ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL ALLOW LEAKAGE OF H2, CREATING A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD DURING PRELAUNCH OF POWERED FLIGHT.
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-200
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/29/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2251
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/I
1/l
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION DUAL CHECK VALVE TEST PORT
(TP21,TP22,TP23)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION DUAL CHECK VALVE (INLET) TEST PORT (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
V070-415448-001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PROCEDURAL ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
DUMP & PURGE.
NO HAZARD AFTER MPS
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-201
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/29/86
MPS
2261
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT VALVE (ORB HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/i
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0389-0051, -0411, -0431
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREIGNITION FAILURE WILL PREVENT TANK FILL AND/ORLH2
RECIRCULATION AND THEREBY DELAY LAUNCH. FAILURE DURING TANK FILL
MAY CAUSE RUPTURE OF FEEDLINE MANIFOLD, RELEASING LH2 AND
CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. FAILURE DURING ENGINE BURN
WILL CUT OFF FUEL FLOW TO THE ENGINES, RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE. NO REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-202
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10129/86
MPS
2262
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
a)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT VALVE (ORBITER HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0389-0051, -0411, -0431
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL ALLOW THRUST FROM ESCAPING H2 TO ROTATE THE VEHICLE
AFTER ET SEPARATION AND CAUSE RECONTACT WITH THE ET. IMPACT
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DIRECTLY OR DAMAGE TO TPS TILES
CAUSED BY IMPACT MAY DESTROY THE VEHICLE DURING ENTRY.
RECONTACT AFTER RTLS ET SEP IS PREVENTED BY AERO FORCES.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-203
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/29/86
MPS
2263
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT VALVE (ORBITER HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0389-0051, -0411, -0431
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. LEAKING LH2 CAN DAMAGE
TPS TILES AND CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-204
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/29/86
MPS
2271
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PREVALVE (PV4,PVS,PV6)
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4_
5_
6)
8)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVE (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0396-0006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREIGNITION FAILURE WILL PREVENT ENGINE START. FAILURE AFTER
ENGINE START WILL DEPRIVE THE ENGINE OF LH2 AND CAUSE IT TO
EXPLODE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-205
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/3o/s6
MPS
2272
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PREVALVE (PV4,PVS,PV6)
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVE (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0396-0006
S [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE OPENING DURING PRELAUNCH MAY CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-206
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
Zo/3o/86
MPS
2273
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT"
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PREVALVE (PV4,PVS,PV6)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVE (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0396-0006
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
DUMP & PURGE.
NO HAZARD AFTER MPS
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-207
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2274
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PREVALVE (PV4,PVS,PV6)
FAIL TO RELIEVE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVE (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0396-0006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE COULD ALLOW PROPELLANT FEEDLINE TO RUPTURE, CAUSING
DAMAGE TO OTHER COMPONENTS AND POSSIBLE DESTRUCTION OF THE
VEHICLE. NO HAZARD DURING PERIODS WHEN THE VALVE IS OPEN.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-208
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/3o/86
MPS
2275
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PREVALVE (PV4,PVS,PV6)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVE (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0396-0006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-209
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/3O/86
MPS
2281
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
(TPII,TPI2)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 17 INCH ORBITER DISCONNECT TEST PORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 17 INCH ORBITER DISCONNECT TEST PORT (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0389-0401, -0431
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PROCEDURAL ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
DUMP & PURGE.
NO HAZARD AFTER MPS
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-210
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2291
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD (MA2)
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
S)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: I/I
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0073-0005
CAUSES: OVERPRES SURI ZATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RUPTURE OF THE LINE DURING PRELAUNCH WILL ALLOW LH2 TO ESCAPE,
CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. RUPTURE DURING POWERED FLIGHT
WILL CAUSE MULTIPLE ENGINE SHUTDOWN OR EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE. ONORBIT FAILURE CAN CAUSE OUTRIGHT DESTRUCTION OF THE
VEHICLE OR DAMAGE THAT COULD DESTROY THE VEHICLE ON ATTEMPTING TO
LAND.
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-211
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/3 i/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2292
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/I
ITEM: LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD (MA2)
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC271-0073-0005
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE DURING PRELAUNCH WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. FAILURE DURING
POWERED FLIGHT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE BECAUSE OF INCORRECT
PUMP INLET FLOW CONDITIONS. ENGINES MAY SHUT DOWN OR EXPLODE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-212
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1i/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2293
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD (MA2)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF INSULATING VACUUM
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0073-0005
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD ALLOW LH2 TEMPERATURE TO INCREASE DURING PRESTART
CONDITIONING. IF LH2 TEMPERATURE IS TOO HIGH, ENGINE START WILL
BE PREVENTED AND LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-213
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/30/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2301
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM: LH2 17 INCH FEEDLINE (FH7)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 17 INCH FEEDLINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAF ING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0073-0001
CAUSES: OVERPRESSURIZATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RUPTURE OF THE LINE DURING PRELAUNCH WILL ALLOW LH2 TO ESCAPE,
CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. RUPTURE DURING POWERED FLIGHT
WILL CAUSE MULTIPLE ENGINE SHUTDOWN OR EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE. ONORBIT FAILURE CAN CAUSE OUTRIGHT DESTRUCTION OF THE
VEHICLE OR DAMAGE THAT COULD DESTROY THE VEHICLE ON ATTEMPTING TO
LAND.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-214
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10131186
MPS
2302
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 17 INCH FEEDLINE (FH7)
RESTRICTED FLOW
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/i
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) LH2 SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 17 INCH FEEDLINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0073-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. FAILURE DURING
POWERED FLIGHT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE FROM ENGINE EXPLOSION
OR SHUTDOWN DUE TO VIOLATION OF TURBOPUMP INLET FLOW CONDITION
REQUIREMENTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-215
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/19/s6
MPS
2303
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 17 INCH FEEDLINE (FH7)
LOSS OF INSULATING VACUUM
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 17 INCH FEEDLINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC271-0073-0001
CAUSES:
FAILURE
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE WOULD ALLOW LH2 TEMPERATURE TO INCREASE DURING PRESTART
CONDITIONING. IF LH2 TEMPERATURE IS TOO HIGH, ENGINE START WILL
BE PREVENTED AND LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-216
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/30/86
MPS
2311
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH8,FHg,FHI0)
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST" W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 12 INCH FEEDLINE (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC271-0073-0202,-0203,-0204,-0302,-0303-,0304
CAUSES: OVERPRESSURIZATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RUPTURE DURING PRELAUNCH CAN DESTROY THE VEHICLE. ESCAPING LH2
IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. FAILURE DURING POWERED FLIGHT WILL
CAUSE ENGINE SHUTDOWN OR EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE. ONORBIT
FAILURE CAN DESTROY THE VEHICLE OUTRIGHT ORCAUSE DAMAGE THAT
WILL MAKE A SAFE LANDING IMPOSSIBLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-217
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
2312 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH8,FHg,FHI0)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 12 INCH FEEDLINE (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC271-0073-0202,-0203,-0204,-0302,-0303-,0304
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. FAILURE DURING
POWERED FLIGHT COULD CAUSE ENGINE SHUTDDOWN OR ENGINE EXPLOSION
AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-218
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/19/se
MPS
2313
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FHS,FHg,FHI0)
LOSS OF INSULATING VACUUM
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
e)
S)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 12 INCH FEEDLINE (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF; 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC271-0073-0202,-0203,-0204,-0302,-0303-,0304
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD ALLOW LH2 TEMPERATURE TO INCREASE DURING PRESTART
CONDITIONING. IF LH2 TEMPERATURE IS TOO HIGH, ENGINE START WILL
BE PREVENTED AND LAUNCH WILL BE DELAYED.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-219
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11105186
MPS
2321
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
I/I
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV8)
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/ 1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0406-0002
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO OPEN AT MECO WILL ALLOW PRESSURE IN THE PROPELLANT
MANIFOLD AND LINES TO INCREASE AND CAUSE THE LINE TO BURST AND
DESTROY THE VEHICLE.
VALVE IS NOT REQUIRED TO OPEN PRELAUNCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-220
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
2322 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEEDLINERELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV8)
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0406-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL ALLOW LH2 TO ESCAPE THE VEHICLE THROUGH THE FEEDLINE
RELIEF VALVE AFTER MAIN ENGINE START, CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION
HAZARD.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-221
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o5/86
MPS
2323
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
_2 FEEDLI_ RELIEF S_TOFF V_VE (PVS)
E_E_AL _A_GE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0406-0002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LEAKAGE OF LH2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
HDWIFUNC
i/i
i/1
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-222
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o5/86
MPS
2331
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF LINE TEST PORT (TP25)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF LINE TEST PORT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: I/1
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-415426-001
CAUSES:
ERROR
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, PROCEDURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SINCE MPS DUMP IS ONLY A PARTIAL ONE FOR RTLS AND TAL ABORTS, THE
FAILURE WILL ALLOW LEAKAGE OF LH2/GH2 AND CREATE A FIRE/EXPLOSION
HAZARD DURING RTLS AND TAL ENTRY, LANDING AND POST-LANDING.
SINCE THE FEEDLINE RELIEF VALVE IS OPENED AT MECO, THERE
IS NO DANGER PRIOR TO MECO. NO DANGER AFTER A COMPLETE MPS DUMP
& PURGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-223
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111os186
MPS
2341
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE (RV6)
FAIL TO OPEN (RELIEVE)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
s)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0501-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL ALLOW PRESSURE TO INCREASE IN THE FEEDLINE MANIFOLD
UNTIL IT BURSTS AND THE VEHICLE WILL BE DESTROYED.
REFERENCES: VS 70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-224
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
2342 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CLOSE (RESEAT)
LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE (RV6)
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL LEAKAGE, FAIL TO
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0501-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE IS NOT A HAZARD. THE RELIEF VALVE HAS NO HYDROGEN
PRESSURE ON IT UNTIL THE ISOLATION VALVE IS OPENED AT MECO.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-225
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/os/86
MPS
2343
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE (RV6)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0501-0002
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE IS NOT A HAZARD. THE RELIEF VALVE HAS NO HYDROGEN
PRESSURE ON IT UNTIL THE ISOLATION VALVE IS OPENED AT MECO.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-226
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1i/07/86
SUBS YS TEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 2351
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: LH2 DUMP PRESSURIZATION ORIFICE (RPI0)
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 DUMP PRESSURIZATION ORIFICE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-415135-001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE IS NOT A HAZARD, BUT MAY FORCE A SECOND VACUUM INERTING
OF MPS LINES DURING ORBITAL OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-227
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111ov186
MPS
2352
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
1/42 DUMP PRESSURIZATION ORIFICE (RPI0)
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 DUMP PRESSURIZATION ORIFICE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
V070-415135-001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LEAKAGE OF HYDROGEN WILL CREATE A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/i
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-228
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111o 186
MPS
2361
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF FLAME ARRESTOR (FL1)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF FLAME ARRESTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
V070-451430-004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE IS NOT A HAZARD.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-229
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/ov/86
MPS
2371
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESSURIZATION LINE VENT VALVE (LV52)
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
HYDROGEN VACUUM INERTING SYSTEM
LH2 PRESSURIZATION LINE VENT VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0403-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE DOES NOT CREATE A HAZARDOUS CONDITION. GASEOUS HYDROGEN
WILL BE TRAPPED IN THE ET PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-230
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111o7186
MPS
2372
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESSURIZATION LINE VENT VALVE (LV52)
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
HYDROGEN VACUUM INERTING SYSTEM
LH2 PRESSURIZATION LINE VENT VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0403-0002
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE DOES NOT CREATE A HAZARDOUS CONDITION.
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: VST0-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-231
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
2373 ABORT:
HDWlFUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PRESSURIZATION LINE VENT VALVE (LV52)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
HYDROGEN VACUUM INERTING SYSTEM
LH2 PRESSURIZATION LINE VENT VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0403-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF H2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
DUMP & PURGE.
NO HAZARD AFTER MPS
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-232
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11107186
MPS
2381
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PVI7)
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0395-0023, -0033, -0043, -0053
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL PREVENT DUMP OF LH2 DURING RTLS. HYDROGEN WILL VENT
THROUGH THE RELIEF VALVE DURING DESCENT AND LANDING, CREATING A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. NO HAZARD IN ANY OTHER PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-233
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111o 186
MPS
2382
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PVI7)
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ F ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-0023,-0033,-0043,-0053
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A REDUNDANT COMPONENT (OUTBOARD VALVE) WILL ALLOW LH2
TO ESCAPE THE VEHICLE CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. LOSS OF
LH2 WILL CAUSE ENGINES TO SHUT DOWN EARLY, RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-234
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/ov/e6
MPS
2383
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PVI7)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) LH2 SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
s)
9)
LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-0023,-0033,-0043,-0053
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
C [NA ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF LH2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-235
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o7/86
MPS
2391
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE (PVI8)
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING" 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/I
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-0024,-0034, -0044,-0054
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE WILL PREVENT DUMP OF LH2 DURING RTLS. HYDROGEN WILL VENT
THROUGH THE RELIEF VALVE DURING DESCENT AND LANDING, CREATING A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. NO HAZARD IN ANY OTHER PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-236
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o7/86
MPS
2392
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE (PVI8)
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/ 1R RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF z 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ F ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-0024,-0034,-0044,-0054
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A REDUNDANT COMPONENT (INBOARD VALVE) WILL ALLOW LH2
TO ESCAPE THE VEHICLE AND CREATE A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. LOSS
OF LH2 WILL CAUSE ENGINES TO SHUT DOWN EARLY, RESULTING IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-237
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111o 186
MPS
2393
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE (PVI8)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
LH2 SYSTEM
LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0395-0024,-0034,-0044,-0054
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF LH2 IS A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
HDW/FUNC
I/l
1/l
REFERENCES: VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-238
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O8/86
MPS
3010
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
I/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE (CVl, CV2,CV3)
FAILS TO CLOSE, OR REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
El, 2, 3 HELIUM SUPPLY
CHECK VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAF!NG:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
3/2R TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0002
CAUSES: POPPET SEAT FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, SPRING BREAKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
TWO SEPARATE FAILURES OF UNLIKE PARTS MUST OCCUR FOR LOSS OF
HELIUM TO AN ENGINE FROM THE SUPPLY VIA THIS PATH. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY RESULT IN THE LOSS OF HELIUM TO AN ENGINE CAUSING
SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM SCHEMATICS, VS70-415001,
006, 007 & 008. BOOSTER SYS'S. BRIEFS, JSC-19401, I-OCT.1984; RI
SPEC DWG FOR ME284-0472 PARTS.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-239
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o8/86
MPS
3011
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE (CVI,CV2,CV3)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
El, 2, 3 HELIUM SUPPLY
CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME284-0472-0002
CAUSES: BLOCKAGE (GROSS CONTAMINATION)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO OPEN PREVENTS PRESSURIZATION OF AN ENGINE HELIUM
SUPPLY TANK WHICH IS EASILY DETECTABLE DURING PRELAUNCH. FAILURE
TO OPEN AT ANY OTHER TIME HAS NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM SCHEMATICS, VS70-415001,
006, 007 & 008. BOOSTER SYS'S. BRIEFS, JSC-19401, I-OCT.1984; RI
SPEC DWG FOR ME284-0472 PARTS.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-240
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/2R
3020 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HELIUM SUPPLY DISCONNECT(ORB/GND, ORB HALF), (PD8)
FAILS TO CLOSE, OR REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HELIUM SUPPLY
2) INLET BOTTLE SUPPLY FROM GSE
3) ORBITER HALF DISCONNECT
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBI T:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/2R TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LEFT T-O UMBILICAL PANEL
MC276-0003-0006 (TYPE I)
CAUSES: POPPET SEAT FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, SPRING BREAKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TWO SEPARATE FAILURES OF UNLIKE PARTS MUST OCCUR (CVI-3 AND PD-8
POPPET SEAT) FOR LOSS OF HELIUM FROM THE SUPPLY TANK THROUGH THE
DISCONNECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
HELIUM TO AN ENGINE CAUSING SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYS. SCHEMATIC, VST0-41500X; RI
SPEC DWG FOR MC276-0003 PARTS; BOOSTER SYSTEM BRIEFS, JSC19401,
I-OCT.1984.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-241
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O8/8 
MPS
3021
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
(PD8)
FAILURE MODE:
HELIUM SUPPLY DISCONNECT (ORB/GND,
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
ORB HALF),
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
INLET BOTTLE SUPPLY FROM GSE
ORBITER HALF DISCONNECT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
3/2R TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] c[p]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC276-0003-0006 (TYPE 1)
CAUSES: SWIVEL SEAL FAILURE; SCRATCHED OR GOUGED SWIVEL AT SEAL
INTERFACE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
TWO SEPARATE FAILURES OF UNLIKE PARTS MUST OCCUR (CVl-3 AND PD-8
SWIVEL SEAL) FOR LOSS OF HELIUM FROM THE SUPPLY TANK THROUGH THE
DISCONNECT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
HELIUM TO AN ENGINE CAUSING SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYS. SCHEMATIC, VS70-41500X; RI
SPEC DWG FOR MC276-0003 PARTS; BOOSTER SYSTEM BRIEFS, JSC19401,
I-OCT. 1984.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-242
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/09/86
MPS
3030
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEST PORT (TP8)
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HELIUM SYSTEM
2) HELIUM FILL LINE
3) TEST PORT
4)
5)
6)
?)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: V070-415585-002
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE SEAL AT THE TEST PORT (TPS) PLUG IS FUNCTIONALLY
THE SAME AS THE QD (PD8) POPPET OR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURES.
TWO SEPARATE FAILURES OF UNLIKE PARTS MUST OCCUR (CVl-3 AND THE
TP-8 SEAL) FOR LOSS OF HELIUM FROM THE SUPPLY TANK. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY TO AN ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
415585-002
RI MPS SCHEMATICS, VS70-41500X; RI SPEC DWG V070-
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-243
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O9/86
MPS
3040
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
17.3 CU. FT. HELIUM SUPPLY TANK (TK6, 8, I0)
RAPID LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) HELIUM SUPPLY
2) HELIUM SUPPLY TANKS
3) 17.3 FT3 TANK
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DE ORB IT: 3/ 3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY; UNDER PLB LINER
MC282-0082-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, FATIGUE AT WELD JOINT, SEAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RAPID LOSS OF HELIUM MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF AN ENGINE DURING ASCENT.
TANKS INSTALLED UNDER PAYLOAD BAY LINER. MAY REQUIRE REMOVAL OF
PAYLOADS FOR ACCESS IF LEAKAGE IS ISOLATED BEFORE FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: RI MPS SCHEMATIC VST041500X; RI SPEC DWG MC284-0082
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-244
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/2
3050 ABORT: I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
4.7 CU. FT. HELIUM SUPPLY TANK (TKI, 2,3,7,9,11)
RAPID LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) HELIUM
2) HELIUM SUPPLY TANKS
3) 4.7 CU. FT. SIZE
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: UNDER PAYLOAD BAY LINER &AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC282-0082-0010
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, FATIGUE AT WELD JOINT, SEAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RAPID LOSS OF HELIUM MAY LEAD TO LOSS OF ANSSME ENGINE DURING
POWERED FLIGHT. TANKS 7, 9, ii LOCATED UNDER PAYLOAD BAY LINER.
MAY REQUIRE PAYLOAD REMOVAL FOR ACCESS IF LEAKAGE IS ISOLATED
BEFORE FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: RI MPS SCHEMATIC VST0-41500X, RI SPEC DWG MC282-0082
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-245
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O9/86
MPS
3060
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE TAP PORT (TP26,27,28)
RAPID LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SYSTEM
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY
TEST PORT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ S
LIFTOFF: 2/2
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 1/1
TAL: 1/1
AOA: 1/1
ATO: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: V070-415790-001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE SEAL AT THE TEST PORT (TP26, 27 OR 28) IS
FUNCTIONALLY THE SAME AS A RAPID LEAK IN A HELIUM SUPPLY TANK.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY TO AN
ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
415790-001
RI MPS SCHEMATIC, VS70-41500X; RI SPEC DWG V070-
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-246
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/09/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 3070
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
(CV25,26;36,37;41,42)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, OR REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SYSTEM
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY REG INLET
CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME284-0472-0002
CAUSES: POPPET SEAT FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, SPRING BREAKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CHECK VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN DURING ENGINE OPERATION. FAILING TO
CLOSE IS A MODE ONLY CONSIDERED AFTER LOSS OF HELIUM IN ONE
SYSTEM FOLLOWED BY AN ATTEMPT TO INTERCONNECT FROM ANOTHER
SUPPLY.
REFERENCES: RI MPS SCHEMATIC VS70-41500X; RI SPEC DWG MC284-
0472; BOOSTER SYS. BRIEFS, JSC 19401, I-OCT.1984.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-247
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/09/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 3071
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM: ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
(CV25,26;36,37;41,42)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, OR REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HELIUM SYSTEM
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY REG INLET
CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0002
CAUSES: GROSS CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE OF EITHER CHECK VALVE IN THE REDUNDANT REG PATHS IS NOT
DETECTABLE DURING THE HELIUM USAGE PERIOD. ONLY WHEN BOTH FAIL
IS THE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY APPARENT.
REFERENCES: RI MPS SCHEMATIC VS70-41500X; RI SPEC DWG MC284-
0472; BOOSTER SYS. BRIEFS, JSC 19401, I-OCT.1984.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-248
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/09/86
MPS
3080
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWlnn C
312R
2/IR
ITEM:
(FL2,6;3,7;4,8)
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY FILTER - PANEL A;B
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
FILTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME286-0056-0001
CAUSES: GROSS CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESTRICTED FLOW OR BLOCKAGE MAY BE INDICATED BY REG OUT PRESSURE
V41PI(X)54, (PANEL A), V41PI(X)53, (PANEL B) DEGRADED OR ZERO.
HOWEVER, REG PRESSURE AS STATED IS NOT DEFINITIVE FOR THIS FILTER
FAILURE MODE.
REFERENCES:
0056.
RI MPS SCHEMATIC, VST041500X; RI SPEC DWG ME286-
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-249
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10110186
MPS
3081
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
(FL2,6;3,7;4,8)
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY FILTER - PANEL A;B
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A, B
FILTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME286-0056-0001
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TWO SEPARATE SEALS (PER FILTER) MUST FAIL FOR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE TO
OCCUR. LEAKAGE AT THIS POINT CANNOT BE DISTINGUISHED FROM
LEAKAGE ABOVE THE PANEL A INLET CHECK VALVE (CV26,37,42), OR
PANEL B (CV25,36,41).
REFERENCES:
0056.
RI MPS SCHEMATIC, VS7041500X; RI SPEC DWG ME286-
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-250
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10110186
MPS
3082
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/i
ITEM:
(FL2,6;3,7;4,8)
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY FILTER - PANEL A;B
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (ELEMENT COLLAPSE)
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) HELIUM SUPPLY
2) ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A, B
3) FILTER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: i/1
2/2 TAL: I/1
3/3 AOA: 1/1
3/3 ATO: I/1
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME286-0056-0001
CAUSES: HIGH DELTA P ACROSS THE ELEMENT CAUSED BY GROSS
CONTAMINATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE CONTAMINATION OF ALL DOWNSTREAM COMPONENTS. WORST CASE
EFFECTS CAUSE ENGINE SHUTDOWN. ELEMENT DESIGN DELTA P
REQUIREMENT IS 25% OF THE OPERATING PRESSURE (MINIMUM) OR 1125
PSID. WORST CASE DELTA P COULD BE AS HIGH AS 4500 PSID.
REFERENCES:
0056.
RI MPS SCHEMATIC, VS7041500X; RI SPEC DWG ME286-
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-251
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
MPS
3090
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT :
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
311R
ITEM:
(LVI,2;3,4;5,6)
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN, OR REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0403-0017 (099,103&i04); -0007 (102) (TYPE V)
CAUSES: FAILURE TO VENT CLOSING PRESSURE THRU PILOT BALL & UPPER
SEAT; FAILURE TO SEAL INLET PRESSURE FROM REFERENCE CAVITY; LOSS
OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL; LOSS OF COMMAND SIGNAL (ENTRY PURGE)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO OPEN OR REMAIN OPEN IS EASILY RECOGNIZABLE. SHOULD
THE VALVE FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN DURING ENGINE OPERATION A REDUNDANT
SUPPLY ROUTE IS AVAILABLE, BUT ONLY ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF
AN ENGINE FROM LOSS OF HELIUM (MISSION FAILURE). DURING
ABORTS, SHOULD THIS SCENARIO OCCUR, LOSS OF THE 2ND ENGINE (SEE
MPS GRs) RESULTS IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: RI MPS SCHEMATIC, VS70-415001 (102); VST0-41500X.
RI SPEC DWG MC284-0403. BOOSTER SYSTEM BRIEFS, JSC 19041, 1-OCT-
84.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-252
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/1O/86
MPS
3091
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
(LVI,2;3,4;5,6)
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE, GROSS INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCR: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0403-0017 (099,103&I04); -0007 (102) (TYPE V)
CAUSES: PLUGGED INTERNAL FILTER; PUSH ROD PIN BROKEN; MAIN PILOT
SPRING OR MAIN POPPET SPRING BROKEN; DAMAGED MAIN POPPET SEAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO CLOSE HAS NO EFFECT UNLESS FOLLOWED BY A FAILURE
DOWNSTREAM DUE TO LEAKAGE OF OTHER PARTS.
REFERENCES: RI MPS SCHEMATIC, VS70-415001 (102); VS70-41500X.
RI SPEC DWG MC284-0403. BOOSTER SYSTEM BRIEFS, JSC 19041, I-OCT-
84.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-253
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 3092
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/i
ITEM:
(LVI,2;3,4;5,6)
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0403-0017 (099,103&I04) ; -0007 (102) (TYPE V)
CAUSES: FAILURE OF METAL 'V' SEALS OR SOLENOID ASSEMBLY SEALS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GROSS LEAKAGE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY TO A GIVEN
ENGINE. WORST CASE LEAKAGE MAY RESULT IN ENGINE SHUTDOWN DUE TO
LOSS OF HELIUM PURGE. CROSSOVER OF OTHER ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLIES
OR PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY VIA INLET/OUTLET PATH ONLY FEEDS
THE LEAK. CROSSOVER (LVI0) FROM THE PNEUMATIC SUPPLY TO ENGINE
#2 DOWNSTREAM OF THE LEAK IS A SOLUTION, BUT ONLY FOR #2 ENGINE.
HOWEVER, LOCATION OF ANY LEAK IS IMPOSSIBLE DURING POWERED
FLIGHT.
REFERENCES: RI MPS SCHEMATIC, VS70-415001 (102); VS70-41500X.
RI SPEC DWG MC284-0403. BOOSTER SYSTEM BRIEFS, JSC 19041, 1-OCT-
84.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-254
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/2 R
3110 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
(LO)
ENGINE HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR (PRI,7;2,8;3,9)
FAILS TO OPEN, REMAIN OPEN, FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
PRESSURE REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0533-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION OF THE PILOT POPPET ASSEMBLY
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REG OUTLET PRESSURE AT ZERO OR DEGRADED BELOW 715 PSI IS EASILY
DETECTED. NO ACTION IS NECESSARY AS A REDUNDANT PATH IS
AVAILABLE. ENGINE #2 IS UNIQUE IN THAT AN ADDITIONAL PATH IS
AVAILABLE DOWNSTREAM OF THE FAILED REGULATOR, HOWEVER, THE
CRITICALITY FOR ENGINE #2 IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM ENGINES #i AND
#3.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYS SCHEMATIC V270-41500X;
BOOSTER SYSTEM BRIEFS, JSC-19401, I-OCT-84; RI SPEC DWG FOR
MC284-0533.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-255
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/2
3111 ABORT: i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR (PR1,7;2,8;3,9)
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE (HIGH)
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
PRESSURE REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC284-0533-0004
CAUSES: REFERENCE PRESSURE AND PILOT FAIL TO SENSE DOWNSTREAM
DEMAND CHANGES; CONTAMINATION OF PILOT ASSEMBLY.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REGULATOR OUTLET PRESSURE PERMANENTLY RISES ABOVE DOWNSTREAM
RELIEF VALVE SETTING. FAILURE MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF ENGINE
HELIUM THROUGH THE OPEN RELIEF VALVE.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYS SCHEMATIC V270-41500X;
BOOSTER SYSTEM BRIEFS, JSC-19401, I-OCT-84; RI SPEC DWG FOR
MC284-0533.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-256
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 3112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR (PRI, 7;2,8;3,9)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
S)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
PRESSURE REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 2/9 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC284-0533-0004
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE INTERNALLY OR AT REGULATOR PORTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
GROSS LEAKAGE MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF ENGINE HELIUM.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYS SCHEMATIC V270-41500X;
BOOSTER SYSTEM BRIEFS, JSC-19401, I-OCT-84; RI SPEC DWG FOR
MC284-0533.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-257
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/2
3120 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HE RELIEF VALVE PANEL A;B (RVI,8;2,9;3,10)
FAILS TO CLOSE (RESEAT), OR REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0398-0005 (0V099,103,104); -0004 (OVI02)
CAUSES: MAIN POPPET SEAT FAILURE; PILOT POPPET, MAIN POPPET OR
POPPET SEAT PISTON SPRING FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO CLOSE OR RESEAT FIRST REQUIRES A FAILURE (OPEN) OF THE
UPSTREAM REGULATOR ALLOWING THE RELIEF SETTING TO BE REACHED.
FAILURE TO RESEAT MAY THEN RESULT IN DUMPING HELIUM OVERBOARD
CAUSING ENGINE SHUTDOWN SHOULD THE HELIUM SUPPLY BE DEPLETED
PRIOR TO MECO. FAILURE TO REMAIN CLOSED RESULTS IN THE SAME
EFFECT.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM SCHEMATIC, VS70-41500X,
BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS, JSC-19401, I-OCT-84; RI SPEC DWG FOR
MC284-0398; SSSH REV C, DWG 10.8 MPS HELIUM SUPPLY
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-258
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/2
3121 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HE RELIEF VALVE PANEL A;B (RVI,8;2,9;3,10)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0398-005 (0V099,103,104); -004 (OVI02)
CAUSES: MAIN POPPET SEAT FAILURE; PILOT POPPET SEAT FAILURE,
SPRING BREAKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE AT VALVE EXCEPT DURING CHECKOUT.
OCCURANCE DURING POWERED FLIGHT IS MANIFESTED BY HIGHER THAN
USUAL HELIUM CONSUMPTION FOR A GIVEN ENGINE SUPPLY. WORST CASE
LEAKAGE MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY TO AN OPERATING
ENGINE CAUSING SHUTDOWN. THIS FAILURE IS FUNCTIONALLY SAME AS
MDAC 3120 EXCEPT IS NOT A RESULT OF FAILURE OF ANOTHER COMPONENT.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM SCHEMATIC, VS70-41500X,
BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS, JSC-19401, I-OCT-84; RI SPEC DWG FOR
MC284-0398; SSSH REV C, DWG 10.8 MPS HELIUM SUPPLY
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-259
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/2
3122 ABORT: i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HE RELIEF VALVE PANEL A;B (RVI,8;2,9;3,10)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0398-005 (OV099,103,104); -004 (OVI02)
CAUSES: PLUGGED SENSE LINE; CONTAMINATION OF FILTER IN SENSE
PORT; OR SENSE LINE OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MAY EXCEED BURST PRESSURE SPEC VALUE CAUSING RUPTURE OF VALVE OR
DOWNSTREAM COMPONENTS. FAILURE TO OPEN IS A MODE ONLY CONSIDERED
IF UPSTREAM REGULATOR FAILS HIGH. MAY BE DETECTABLE BY REG OUT
PRESSURE MEASUREMENT V41PI153/54;1253/54;1353/54, GOING
OFFSCALE HIGH.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM SCHEMATIC, VS70-41500X,
BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS, JSC-19401, I-OCT-84; RI SPEC DWG FOR
MC284-0398; SSSH REV C, DWG 10.8 MPS HELIUM SUPPLY
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-260
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/2
3123 ABORT: I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HE RELIEF VALVE PANEL A;B (RV1,8;2,9;3,10)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
3>
4)
8)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0398-005 (OV099,103,104); -004 (OVI02)
CAUSES: SEAL LEAKAGE AT VALVE INLET OR THRU INTERNAL SEALS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE LEAKAGE MAY RESULT IN DEPLETION OF ENGINE HELIUM
SUPPLY CAUSING SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM SCHEMATIC, VS70-41500X,
BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS, JSC-19401, I-OCT-84; RI SPEC DWG FOR
MC284-0398; SSSH REV C, DWG 10.8 MPS HELIUM SUPPLY
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-261
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/23/86
MPS
3130
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
F LIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY RELIEF VALVE SENSE LINE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
RELIEF VALVE
SENSE LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: UNKNOWN
CAUSES: CRACKED LINE, LOOSE OR BROKEN B-NUT
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
FAILURE COMPROMISES THE ABILITY OF THE RELIEF VALVE TO SENSE AN
OVERPRESSUR_ CAUSED BY A FAILED (OPEN) REGULATOR. LOSS OF ALL
ABILITY TO SENSE DOWNSTREAM PRESSURE DISABLES THE RELIEF VALVE
(SEE MDAC #3122). GROSS LEAKAGE OF THE LINE MAY RESULT IN LOSS
OF ENGINE HELIUM CAUSING ENGINE SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM SCHEMATIC, VS70-41500X
BOOSTER SYSTEM BRIEFS, JSC-19401, I-OCT-84.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-262
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10124186
MPS
3140
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE REG OUTLET CHECK VLV (CV5,29;6,40;7,45)
FAILS TO CLOSE, OR REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
REG OUTLET CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0034 (099,103,104); -0014 (OVI02)
CAUSES: POPPET SEAT FAILURE; CONTAMINATION; SPRING BREAKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT UNLESS ACCOMPANIED BYANOTHER PARTICULAR
FAILURE IN THE SAME FLOW PATH. IF THE PATH HAS BEEN ISOLATED AND
A "LEAK" EXISTS BETWEEN THE ISOLATION VALVE (LVl-6) AND THE CHECK
VALVE (OPEN RELIEF VALVE), LOSS OF HELIUM COULDRESULT IN
ENGINE SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYS. SCHEMATIC, VS70-41500X;
BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS, JSC-19401, I-OCT-84; RI SPEC DWG FOR
ME284-0472
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-263
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10124186
MPS
3141
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE REG OUTLET CHECK VLV (CV5,29;6,40;7,45)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
REG OUTLET CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0034 (099,103,104); -0014 (OVI02)
CAUSES: BLOCKAGE (GROSS CONTAMINATION)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO OPEN PREVENTS HELIUM FLOW THROUGH 1 LEG OF REDUNDANT
PATHS PROVIDED TO EACH ENGINE. FAILURE IS FAIRLY EASY TO DETECT
BY REG OUT PRESSURE REACHING LOCKUP VALVE. MEASUREMENT IS
UPSTREAM OF THE CHECK VALVE. FAILURE OF BOTH FLOW PATHS
(FOR ENGINE l&3) WOULD CAUSE ENGINE SHUTDOWN. THREE FLOW PATHS
ARE AVAILABLE FOR ENGINE 2.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYS. SCHEMATIC, VST0-41500X;
BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS, JSC-19401, I-OCT-84; RI SPEC DWG FOR
ME284-0472
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-264
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111os186
MPS
3150
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
2/2
I/I
ITEM:
(LV59,61,63)
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN OR REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
ENGINE INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0403-0017 (OV099,103,104); -0007 TYPE V (102)
CAUSES: FAILURE TO VENT CLOSING PRESSURE THRU PILOT BALL AND
UPPER SEAT; FAILURE TO SEAL INLET PRESSURE FROM REFERENCE CAVITY;
LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT UNLESS IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM TO ANENGINEHELIUM PURGE SYSTEM. THE LEFT
ENGINE INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE (LV61) IS ALSO CRITICAL TO AFT
COMPARTMENT PURGES DURING RTLS AND TAL ABORT LANDING PHASES.
REFERENCES: RI MPS SCHEMATIC, VS70-415001 (102); VS70-41500X.
RI SPEC DWG MC284-0403. BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS, JSC19041, 1-OCT-
84.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-265
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/27/86
MPS
3151
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
(LV59,61,63)
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE; GROSS INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
ENGINE INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 313
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0403-0017 (0V099,103,104); -0007 TYPE V (102)
CAUSES: PLUGGED INTERNAL FILTER; PUSH ROD PIN BROKEN; MAIN PILOT
SPRING OR MAIN POPPET SPRING BROKEN; DAMAGED MAIN POPPET SEAT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO CLOSE HAS NO EFFECT. FLOW FROM AN ENGINE SYSTEM IS
PREVENTED BY A CHECK VALVE; UNDESIRED FLOW TOAN ENGINE SYSTEM IS
PREVENTED BY AN ISOLATION VALVE.
REFERENCES: RI MPS SCHEMATIC, VS70-415001 (102); VST0-41500X.
RI SPEC DWG MC284-0403. BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS, JSC19041, I-OCT-
84.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-266
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111o51s6
MPS
3152
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
(LV59,61,63)
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
ENGINE INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0403-0017 (OV099,103,104); -0007 TYPE V (102)
CAUSES: FAILURE OF METAL 'V' SEALS OR SOLENOID ASSEMBLY SEALS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GROSS LEAKAGE RESULTS IN LOSS OF PNEUMATIC VALVE HELIUM SUPPLY.
WORST CASE LEAKAGE MAY DEPLETE PNEUMATIC SUPPLY. HOWEVER,
ACCUMULATORS PROVIDE VALVE CLOSING CAPABILITY AFTER MECO.
REFERENCES: RI MPS SCHEMATIC, VS70-415001 (102); VST0-41500X.
RI SPEC DWG MC284-0403. BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS, JSC19041, 1-OCT-
84.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-267
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE •
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/27/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
3160 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(LV60,62,64)
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY INTERCONNECT OUTLET VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN, OR REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
e)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
ENGINE INTERCONNECT OUTLET VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0403-0011 (OV099,103,104); -0001 (102)
CAUSES: FAILURE TO VENT CLOSING PRESSURE THRU PILOT BALL AND
UPPER SEAT; FAILURE TO SEAL INLET PRESSURE FROM REFERENCE CAVITY;
LOSS OF ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT DURING POWERED FLIGHT AS FLIGHT RULES
PREVENT OPENING OUTLET VALVES TO SUPPLY ENGINE HELIUM TO ANOTHER
ENGINE OR TO THE PNEUMATIC SUPPLY SYSTEM DURING THIS PERIOD.
REDUNDANT PATHS ARE AVAILABLE FOR FAILURE TO OPEN DURING MPS DUMP
AND ENTRY.
REFERENCES: RI MPS SCHEMATIC, VS70-415001 (102); VS70-41500X.
RI SPEC DWG MC284-0403. BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS, JSC19041, I-OCT-
84.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-268
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
3161 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(LV60,62,64)
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY INTERCONNECT OUTLET VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LRAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
•8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
ENGINE INTERCONNECT OUTLET VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PLUGGED INTERNAL FILTER; SOLENOID ACTUATOR PIN BROKEN,
MAIN OR PILOT POPPET SEAT FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO CLOSE HAS NO EFFECT. UNDESIRED FLOW TO ANOTHER ENGINE
SYSTEM IS PREVENTED BY THE INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE. UNDESIRED
REVERSE FLOW IS PREVENTED BY A CHECK VALVE. HELIUM FLOW TO THE
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM WILL OCCUR IF THE PNEUMATIC SYSTEM PRESSURE
IS BELOW THAT OF THE ENGINE SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: RI MPS SCHEMATIC, VS70-415001 (102); VS70-41500X.
RI SPEC DWG MC284-0403. BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS, JSC19041, 1-OCT-
84.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-269
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o5/86
MPS
3162
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/l
ITEM:
(LV60,62,64)
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY INTERCONNECT OUTLET VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
M.L.MCNEELY suBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
ENGINE INTERCONNECT OUTLET VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 1/1
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0403-0017 (0V099,103,104); -007 TYPE V (102)
CAUSES: FAILURE OF METAL 'V' SEALS OR SOLENOID ASSEMBLY SEALS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GROSS LEAKAGE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY TO A GIVEN
ENGINE. WORST CASE LEAKAGE MAY RESULT IN ENGINE SHUTDOWN DUE TO
LOSS OF HELIUM PURGE. THE PROBABILITY OF METALLIC TYPE SEAL
FAILURE IS UNKNOWN.
REFERENCES: RI MPS SCHEMATIC, VS70-415001 (102); VS70-41500X.
RI SPEC DWG MC284-0403. BOOSTER SYSTEMS BRIEFS, JSC19041, I-OCT-
84.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-270
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBS YSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 3170
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: ENGINE HELIUM INTERCONNECT CHECK VALVE-PANEL
OUTLET (CV28,39,44)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
ENGINE HE INTERCONNECT CHECK VALVE- OUTLET
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC284-0472-0002
CAUSES: POPPET SEAT FAILURE; CONTAMINATION; SPRING BREAKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. OUTLET INTERCONNECT VALVE PREVENTS
UNDESIRABLE REVERSE FLOW.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM SCHEMATICS, VS70-415001,
006, 007 & 008. BOOSTER SYS'S. BRIEFS, JSC-19401, I-OCT.1984; RI
SPEC DWG FOR ME284-0472 PARTS.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-271
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/05/86
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 3171
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/ . C
3/3
3/3
ITEM: ENGINE HELIUM INTERCONNECT CHECK VALVE-PANEL
OUTLET (CV28,39,44)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, OR REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
ENGINE HE INTERCONNECT CHECK VALVE- OUTLET
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC284-0472-0002
CAUSES: GROSS CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
CHECK VALVE IS NORMALLY CLOSED DURING POWERED FLIGHT. FLOW
THROUGH VALVE IS ONLY REQUIRED DURING MPS DUMP AND ENTRY PURGE
DURING WHICH OTHER FLOW PATHS ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM SCHEMATICS, VS70-415001,
006, 007 & 008. BOOSTER SYS'S. BRIEFS, JSC-19401, I-OCT.1984; RI
SPEC DWG FOR ME284-0472 PARTS.
REPORT DATE o111618_ c-2v2
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBS YS TEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
3180 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(CV27,38,43)
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM INTERCONNECT CHECK VALVE-PANEL INLET
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
ENGINE HELIUM INTERCONNECT CHECK VALVE- INLET
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC284-0472-0002
CAUSES: POPPET SEAT FAILURE; CONTAMINATION; SPRING BREAKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. INLET INTERCONNECT VALVE PREVENTS
UNDESIRABLE REVERSE FLOW.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM SCHEMATICS, VS70-415001,
006, 007 & 008. BOOSTER SYS'S. BRIEFS, JSC-19401, I-OCT.1984; RI
SPEC DWG FOR ME284-0472 PARTS.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-273
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/2
3181 ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
(CV27,38,43)
FAILURE MODE:
ENGINE HELIUM INTERCONNECT CHECK VALVE-PANEL INLET
FAILS TO OPEN, OR REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
ENGINE HELIUM REG PANEL A,B
ENGINE HELIUM INTERCONNECT CHECK VALVE- INLET
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0472-0002
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: GROSS CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CHECK VALVE IS NORMALLY CLOSED DURING POWERED FLIGHT. FLOW
THROUGH CHECK VALVE IS REQUIRED NOMINALLY AT ET SEP (AUTO
SEQUENCE) AND DURING PURGE PREP/PURGE (CV38 ONLY) DURING ENTRY
(MANUAL SEQUENCE). OFF NOMINAL FLOW IS NECESSARY ONLY WHEN
PNEUMATIC HELIUM IS SUPPLED TO SUPPLEMENT ENGINE HELIUM PURGE
REQUIREMENTS VIA INLET INTERCONNECT VALVE.
REFERENCES: RI MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM SCHEMATICS, VS70-415001,
006, 007 & 008. BOOSTER SYS'S. BRIEFS, JSC-19401, I-OCT.1984; RI
SPEC DWG FOR ME284-0472 PARTS.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-274
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
3190 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MAIN ENGINE GN2 PURGE DISCONNECT (ORB HALF) (PDI4)
FAILS TO CLOSE OR REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
GN2 SUPPLY
INLET ENGINE GN2 PURGE SUPPLY FROM GSE
ORBITER HALF DISCONNECT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAITNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: LEFT T-0 UMBILICAL PANEL
PART NUMBER: MC276-0003-0017 (OVI03); -0007 (099,102,104)
CAUSES: POPPET SEAT FAILURE; CONTAMINATION; SPRING BREAKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. GN2 PURGE CEASES PRIOR TO L/OFF.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-275
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ii/13186
MPS
320O
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FACILITY PORTS
GROSS LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
e)
9)
HELIUM SYSTEM
ENGINE 1,2,3 HELIUM REG PANELS A;B
FACILITY PORTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: UNKNOWN
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE FROM ANY PANEL FACILITY PORT, WHETHER THE HIGH PRESSURE
SIDE OR LOW PRESSURE SIDE MAY DEPLETE AN ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY.
REFERENCES: RI MPS SCHEMATICS, VS70-41500X
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-276
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/2R
4010 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY CHECK VALVE (CV4)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
3/2R TAL: 3/2R
3/3 AOA: 3/2R
3/3 ATO: 3/2R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PNEUMATIC HELIUM WILL NOT BE USABLE FOR LAUNCH-LAUNCH DELAY OR
MISSION SCRUB. PNEUMATIC HELIUM WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR MPS
VALVE ACTUATION. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT
IN LOSS OF HELIUM OVERBOARD. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
CHECK VALVE FUNCTION. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF VALVE
ACTUATION CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-277
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4011 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY CHECK VALVE (CV4)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0002
CAUSES:
FAILURE
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PNEUMATIC HELIUM WILL NOT BE USABLE FOR LAUNCH-LAUNCH DELAY OR
MISSION SCRUB. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN
INABILITY TO LOAD PNEUMATIC HELIUM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-278
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
4020 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
PNEU VALVE HE REG OUTLET CHECK VALVE (CV8)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEUMATIC HE REG OUTLET CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0024
CAUSES:
FAILURE
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF HELIUM
OVERBOARD. LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF MPS VALVE
ACTUATION CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-279
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
MPS
4021
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEU VALVE HE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CV8)
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEUMATIC HE REG OUTLET CHECK VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
2/1R ATO: 2/1R
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0013
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE BECAUSE PNEUMATIC HELIUM WILL NOT BE
AVAILABLE FOR MPS VALVE ACTUATION AND AFT COMPARTMENT PURGE.
LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF CHECK
VALVE FUNCTION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-280
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/S6
MPS
4030
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/Ia
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEU VALVE HE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (cvg)
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEUMATIC HE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
211R TAL: 211R
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
2/1R ATO: 2/1R
211R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0013
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE BECAUSE PNEUMATIC HELIUM WILL NOT BE
AVAILABLE FOR MPS DUMP VALVE ACTUATION AND AFT COMPARTMENT PURGE.
LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF CHECK
VALVE FUNCTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-281
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10110186
MPS
4031
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
PNEUVALVE HE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (cvg)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEUMATIC HE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0013
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF CHECK
VALVE FUNCTION. LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF MPS VALVE
ACTUATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-282
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4040 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
GO2 PRESS MANIFREPRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI0)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
1) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
GO2 PRESS MANIF. REPRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0011
B ENA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CHECK BACKFLOW DURING MPS GO2 MANIFOLD
DUMP. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-283
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
MPS
4041
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESS MANIFREPRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI0)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
GO2 PRESS MANIF. REPRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0011
CAUSES:
FAILURE
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HELIUM WILL NOT BE FED INTO THE GO2 PRESSURE MANIFOLD FOR DUMP
AND REPRESS. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-284
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4050 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 FEED MANIF REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI2)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 FEED MANIF REPRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0013
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CHECK BACKFLOW DURING MPS LO2 MANIFOLD
DUMP. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-285
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86
MPS
4051
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEED MANIFREPRESS CHECK VALVE (CV12)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
V)
9)
1) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 FEED MANIF REPRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0013
CAUSES:
FAILURE
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF MPS LO2 MANIFOLD DUMP
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROL DUE TO EXCESSIVE AFT CG.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-286
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4060 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
GH2 PRESS MANIFREPRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI3)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
GH2 PRESS MANIF REPRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LA/_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0011
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CHECK BACKFLOW DURING MPS GH2 MANIFOLD
DUMP. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-287
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4061 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GH2 PRESS MANIF REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI3)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
GH2 PRESS MANIF REPRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0011
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DUMP AND REPRESS GH2 MANIFOLD.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-288
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4070 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 RECIRC MANIF REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI4)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 RECIRC MANIF REPRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PKA_E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0011
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CHECK BACKFLOW DURING MPS LH2 RECIRC
MANIFOLD DUMP. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-289
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ii/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4071 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRC MANIFREPRESS CHECKVALVE (CV14)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 RECIRC MANIF REPRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0011
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DUMP AND REPRESS THE MPS LH2 RECIRC
MANIFOLD. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-290
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4080 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 FEED MANIF NOM REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI5)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED MANIF NOM REPRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0024
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CHECK BACKFLOW DURING MPS LH2 FEED MANIFOLD
DUMP. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-291
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4081 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED MANIF NOMREPRESS CHECK VALVE (CVl5)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED MANIF NOM REPRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0024
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DUMP AND REPRESS THE MPS LH2 FEED MANIFOLD.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-292
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4090 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
L02 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI6)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0005
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ULLAGE PRESSURE RESULTS IN ALL THREE MAIN ENGINES
SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-293
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4091 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CV16)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0005
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO HELIUM PREPRESS PRELAUNCH.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-294
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4100 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI7)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0005
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ULLAGE PRESSURE RESULTS IN ALL THREE MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN
AND LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-295
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4101 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (DV17)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0005
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO HELIUM PREPRESS PRELAUNCH.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-296
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4110 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
GH2 PRESS MANIFOLD REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CV24)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
GH2 PRESS MANIFOLD REPRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBITz 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0011
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CHECK BACKFLOW DURING MPS GH2 PRESS
MANIFOLD DUMP AND REPRESS. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-297
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4111 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GH2 PRESS MANIFOLD REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CV24)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
1) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
GH2 PRESS MANIFOLD REPRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0472-0011
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DUMP AND REPRESS GH2 PRESS MANIFOLD.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-298
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4120 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 FEED MANIF RTLS REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CV30)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED MANIF RTLS REPRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0024
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES:
FAILURE
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CHECK BACKFLOW DURING MPS LH2 FEED MANIFOLD
DUMP & REPRESS. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-299
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4121 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE: LH2 FEED MANIF RTLS REPRESSCHECKVALVE (CV30)FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MPS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED MANIF RTLS REPRESS CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0472-0024
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DUMP AND REPRESS LH2 RTLS MANIFOLD.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-300
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4130 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY-ISOLATION VALVE (LV7,LV8)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY-ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAF!NG: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0403-0011
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO USE PNEUMATIC HELIUM FOR MPS VALVE
ACTUATION. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-301
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4131 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY-ISOLATION VALVE (LVT,LV8)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY-ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0403-0011
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO USE PNEUMATIC HELIUM FOR MPS VALVE
ACTUATION. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-302
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4132 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY-ISOLATION VALVE (LVT,LVS)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY-ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0403-0011
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO USE PNEUMATIC HELIUM FOR MPS DUMP AND
PURGE. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-303
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4140 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEU HE CROSSOVER SOLENOID (LVI0)
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
_)
4)
S)
6)
S)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEU HE CROSSOVER SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TA.L: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0403-0003
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF MPS HELIUM AFT COMPARTMENT
PURGE RESULTING IN LH2 AND LO2 MIXING WITH EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-304
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4141 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEU HE CROSSOVER SOLENOID (LVI0)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEU HE CROSSOVER SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0403-0003
B [ F] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF MPS AFT COMPARTMENT PURGE
RESULTING IN LO2 AND LH2 MIXING WITH EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-305
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4142 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
PNEU HE CROSSOVER SOLENOID (LVI0)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEU HE CROSSOVER SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0403-0003
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ISOLATE THE HELIUM CROSSOVER.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-306
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4150 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVI2,LV14,LV16)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE SOLENOID VALVE. SYSTEM
DEGRADATION. LO2 PREVALVE REMAINS OPEN WITHOUT HELIUM PRESSURE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-307
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4151 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVI2,LVI4,LVI6)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE SOLENOID VALVE OPEN. SYSTEM
DEGRADATION. LO2 PREVALVE REMAINS OPEN WITHOUT HELIUM PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-308
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4152 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
L02 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV12,LVI4,LVI6)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE OF LO2 PREVALVE TO CLOSE AT
MECO RESULTING IN SSME PUMP OVERSPEED AND EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-309
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4160 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVI3,LVI5,LVI7)
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAYING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0404-0021
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE OF LO2 PREVALVE TO CLOSE AT
MECO RESULTING IN SSME PUMP OVERSPEEDAND EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-310
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4161 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LVI3,LVI5,LVI7)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
91
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0404-0021
B [ F] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE OF LO2 PREVALVE TO CLOSE AT
MECO RESULTING IN SSME PUMP OVERSPEED AND EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-311
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4162 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LVI3,LV15,LVI7)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE SOLENOID CLOSED.
DEGRADATION. LO2 PREVALVE REMAINS CLOSED.
SYSTEM
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-312
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4164 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVI8,LV20,LV22)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING" 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION"
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE SOLENOID VALVE. SYSTEM
DEGRADATION. LH2 PREVALVE REMAINS OPEN WITHOUT HELIUM PRESSURE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-313
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 4165
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVI8,LV20,LV22)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE SOLENOID VALVE OPEN. SYSTEM
DEGRADATION. LH2 PREVALVE REMAINS OPEN WITHOUT HELIUM PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-314
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/1R
4166 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVlS,LV20,LV22)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
s)
9)
MPS
HELIUM
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 9 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE OF LH2 PREVALVE TO CLOSE AT
MECO RESULTING IN MIXING OF LH2 WITH LO2 IN THE SSME WITH AN
EXPLOS ION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-315
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/1R
4167 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LVI9,LV21,LV23)
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE OF LH2 PREVALVE TO CLOSE
RESULTING IN LH2 MIXING WITH LO2 WITH AN SSME EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-316
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4168 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LVIg,LV21,LV23)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0001
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE OF LH2 PREVALVE TO CLOSE AT
MECO RESULTING IN LH2 MIXING WITH LO2 WITH AN SSME EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-317
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4169 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV19,LV21,LV23)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE SOLENOID.
LH2 PREVALVE REMAINS CLOSED.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-318
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4170 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
(LV24)
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] SiP] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF LO2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD
PRESSURE RELIEF WITH L02 MANIFOLD RUPTURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-319
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4171 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
(LV24)
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DE ORBIT: 2/ IR ATO: 2/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF LO2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD
PRESSURE RELIEF WITH LO2 MANIFOLD RUPTURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-320
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12101186 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4172 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
(LV24)
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF L02 OVERBOARD
DURING LAUNCH, DUE TO LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-321
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4180 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
(LV25)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
4)
5)
6)
S)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD
PRESSURE RELIEF WITH LH2 MANIFOLD RUPTURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-322
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4181 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
(LV25)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD
PRESSURE RELIEF WITH LH2 MANIFOLD PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-323
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4182 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
(LV25)
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF LH2 OVERBOARD
DURING LAUNCH, DUE TO LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-324
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4190 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE SUPPLY BLOWDOWNVALVE (LV26,LV27)
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
HE SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0404-0002
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF AFT COMPARTMENT PURGE.
_DW/nm¢
2/1R
2/1R
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-325
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4191 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HE SUPPLY BLOWDOWNVALVE (LV26,LV27)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
HDW/FUNC
3/3
2/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
HE SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TA.L: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0404-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF AFT COMPARTMENT PURGE
RESULTING IN L02 AND LH2 MIXING WITH EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-326
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4192 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
HE SUPPLY BLOWDOWNVALVE (LV26,LV27)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MPS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
HE SUPPLY BLOWDOWNVALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B CF] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME284-0404-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF HELIUM FOR MPS LO2 DUMP.
LOSS OF MPS LO2 DUMP RESULTS IN LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-327
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 4200 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: LO2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV28)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE L02 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE SOLENOID.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-328
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4201 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV28)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE LO2 FILL VALVE SOLENOID OPEN.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-329
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4202 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV28)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TOREMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 2/ IR
DEORB IT: 2/ 1R ATO: 2/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF LO2 OVERBOARD RESULTING IN
EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-330
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 4210 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: LO2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV29)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE LO2 FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION. FILL VALVE REMAINS CLOSED WITH NO HELIUM
PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-331
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4211 ABORT: 3/3
FAILURE MODE:
L02 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV29)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE LO2 FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
OPEN. SYSTEM DEGRADATION. FILL VALVE REMAINS CLOSED WITH NO
HELIUM PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-332
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4212 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
L02 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV29)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2_
3_
41
Sl
6_
7)
81
91
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE L02 FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CLOSED. SYSTEM DEGRADATION. FILL VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-333
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4220 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE LO2 FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-334
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4221 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
i) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE LO2 FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
OPEN. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-335
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4222 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TOREMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LO2 FILL VALVE OPENINGAND LO2
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE WITH LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-336
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4223 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 INBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV31)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 INBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE L02 FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-337
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4224 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 INBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV31)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 INBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LO2 FILL VALVE OPENING AND LO2
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE WITH LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-338
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4225 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 INBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV31)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MPS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 INBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE LO2 FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-339
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4226 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV32)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE SOLENOID.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-340
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4227 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV32)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE LH2 FILL VALVE SOLENOID OPEN.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-341
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 4228
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/IR
ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV32)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF LH2 OVERBOARD RESULTING IN
EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-342
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 4229 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV33)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE LH2 FILL VALVE SOLENOID. SYSTEM
DEGRADATION. FILL VALVE REMAINS CLOSED WITH NO HELIUM PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-343
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4230 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV33)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
i) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE LH2 FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
OPEN. SYSTEM DEGRADATION. FILL VALVE REMAINS CLOSED WITH NO
HELIUM PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-344
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4231 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV33)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PP_ELA_CH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE LH2 FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CLOSED. SYSTEM DEGRADATION. FILL VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-345
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4232 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV34)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE LH2 FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-346
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4233 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV34)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP OPEN THE LH2 FILL VALVE OPENING
SOLENOID. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-347
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4234 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV34)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LH2 FILL VALVE OPENING AND LH2
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE WITH LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-348
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4235 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV35)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE LH2 FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-349
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4236 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV35)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LH2 FILL VALVE OPENING AND LH2
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE WITH LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-350
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4237 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV35)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE LH2 FILL VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-351
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4240 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRC PUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV36)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MPS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 RECIRC PUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE LH2 RECIRC VALVES.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-352
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4241 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRC PUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV36)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MPS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 RECIRC PUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP OPEN THE LH2 RECIRC VALVES.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-353
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4242 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 RECIRC PUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV36)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 RECIRC PUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE LH2 RECIRC VALVES.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-354
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4250 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE OPENINGSOLENOID(LV39)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE LH2 REPLENISH VALVE.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-355
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4251 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE OPENING SOLENOID(LV39)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES:
FAILURE
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP OPEN THE LH2 REPLENISH VALVE.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-356
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4252 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE OPENING SOLENOID(LV39)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE TO CLOSE THE LH2 REPLENISH
VALVE RESULTING IN LH2 LEAK OVERBOARD WITH EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF
ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-357
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4260 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE (LV40,LV41)
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBI T: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0403-0003
B [ P ] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF LO2 MPS DUMP RESULTING IN
LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-358
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4261 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE (LV40,LV41)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0403-0003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF MPS LO2 DUMP RESULTING IN
LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-359
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/2R
4262 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE (LV40,LV41)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0403-0003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE LO2 REPRESS VALVE CLOSED RESULTING
IN SSME SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-360
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4270 ABORT:
ITEM: LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE (LV42,LV43)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0403-0003
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE LH2 REPRESS VALVE.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-361
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4271 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE (LV42,LV43)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
57
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0403-0003
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE LH2 REPRESS VALVE OPEN.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-362
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
4272 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE (LV42,LV43)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 MANIFOLDREPRESS VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/1R TAL:
3/3 AOA:
ATO:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
311R
311R
311R
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0403-0003
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE LH2 REPRESS VALVE CLOSED RESULTING
IN HELIUM INGESTION INTO ALL THREE MAIN ENGINES WITH EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-363
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4280 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE
PRELAUNCH. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-364
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4281 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
L02 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0021
B [ F] C [ P ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE OF LO2 FEED DISCONNECT
OPENING SOLENOID TO REMAIN OPEN AND LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL
REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-365
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4282 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
L02 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
v)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0021
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-366
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 4290 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING
SOLENOID. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-367
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4291 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING
SOLENOID OPEN. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-368
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4292 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING
SOLENOID CLOSED. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-369
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4300 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV48)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0021
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-370
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4301 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV48)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0021
B IF] C [P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE OF LH2 FEED DISCONNECT
OPENING SOLENOID TO REMAIN OPEN AND LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL
REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-371
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4302 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 FEED DISCONNECTVALVE OPENINGSOLENOID (LV48)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-372
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4310 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV49)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0021
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING
SOLENOID. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-373
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4311 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV49)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING
SOLENOID OPEN. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-374
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4312 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV49)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
s)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING
SOLENOID CLOSED. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-375
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4320 ABORT:
ITEM:
(LV50)
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
FAILS TO OPEN
SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINOLEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
47
S)
6)
77
87
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
B [NA ] C [NA ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-376
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4321 ABORT:
ITEM:
(LV50)
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINOLEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MPS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
B [NA ] C [NA ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE
OPENING SOLENOID OPEN. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-377
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: i/I
4322 ABORT: i/I
ITEM:
(LV50)
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE OF LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT
VALVE OPENING SOLENOID TO CLOSE RESULTING IN LH2 LEAK OVERBOARD
WITH EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-378
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4330 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/i
ITEM:
(LV51)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE OF LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT
VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID TO OPEN RESULTING IN LH2 LEAK OVERBOARD
WITH EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-379
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4331 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/I
ITEM:
(LV51)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 1/1
TAL: i/1
AOA: 1/1
ATO: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAI LURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE TO KEEP LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT
VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID OPEN RESULTING IN LH2 LEAK OVERBOARD WITH
EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-380
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4332 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(LV51)
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE
CLOSING SOLENOID CLOSED. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-381
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4340 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
(LV72)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
1) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LH2 RTLS FEEDLINE DUMP FAILURE AND
LH2 LEAKAGE OVERBOARD THROUGH FEEDLINE RELIEF WITH EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-382
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4341 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
(LV72)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LH2 RTLS FEEDLINE DUMP FAILURE AND
LH2 LEAKAGE OVERBOARD THROUGH FEEDLINE RELIEF WITH EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-383
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LV72)
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4342 ABORT: 2/IR
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LH2 RTLS FEEDLINE DUMP VALVES FAIL
OPEN AND LH2 LEAKAGE OVERBOARD WITH EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-384
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4350 ABORT: I/1
ITEM:
(LV73)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LH2 RTLS FEEDLINE DUMP FAILURE AND
LH2 LEAKAGE OVERBOARD THROUGH FEEDLINE RELIEF WITH EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-385
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4351 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
(LV73)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LH2 RTLS FEEDLINE DUMP FAILURE AND
LH2 LEAKAGE OVERBOARD THROUGH FEEDLINE RELIEF WITH EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-386
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4352 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
(LV73)
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 2/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] siP] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LH2 RTLS FEEDLINE DUMP VALVES FAIL
OPEN AND LH2 LEAKAGE OVERBOARD WITH EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-387
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4360 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVE (LV74,LV75)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0403-0002
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS
VALVE. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-388
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4361 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVE (LV74,LV75)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0403-0002
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVE
SOLENOID OPEN. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-389
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4362 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVE (LV74,LV75)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LI FTO FF: 2/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 2/1R
TAL: 2/IR
AOA: 2/ 1R
ATO: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0403-0002
B CF] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAI LURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO HELIUM INGESTION INTO ALL THREE MAIN
ENGINES RESULTING IN EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-390
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/1R
4370 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV76)
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
B [ P ] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAI LURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE OPENING
RESULTING IN LO2 LEAKAGE OVERBOARD WITH EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-391
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4371 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV76)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE OPENING
RESULTING IN LO2 LEAKAGE OVERBOARD WITH EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-392
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4372 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV76)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING
SOLENOID. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-393
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4380 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
(LV77,LV78)
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 POGO ACCUM RECIRC VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 POGO ACCUM RECIR VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE LO2 POGO ACCUM RECIRC VALVE.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-394
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4381 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
(LV77,LV78)
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 POGO ACCUM RECIRC VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MPS
2)
3)
4)
s)
v)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 POGO ACCUM RECIR VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE LO2 POGO ACCUM RECIRC VALVE.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-395
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4382 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
(LV77,LV78)
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LO2 POGO ACCUM RECIRC VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 POGO ACCUM RECIR VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE OF LO2 POGO SUPPRESSION
RESULTING IN VEHICLE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AND LOSS OF FLIGHT
CONTROL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-396
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4390 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV79)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE OPENING
SOLENOID. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-397
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4391 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV79)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP OPEN THE LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE
OPENING SOLENOID. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-398
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4392 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV79)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MPS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE TO CLOSE THE LH2 HI POINT
BLEED VALVE OPENING SOLENOID RESULTING IN LH2 LEAK OVERBOARD WITH
LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-399
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4400 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT CLOSING SOLENOID
(LVS0, LV81, LV82 )
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE OF LO2 PREVALVE TO CLOSE AT
MECO RESULTING IN SSME PUMP OVERSPEED AND EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-400
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4401 ABORT:
ITEM: L02 PREVALVE REDUNDANT CLOSING SOLENOID
(LV80,LVSI,LV82)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
HDW/FUNC
a/1R
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0021
CAUS ES:
FAI LURE
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE OF LO2 PREVALVE TO CLOSE AT
MECO RESULTING IN SSME PUMP OVERSPEEDAND EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-401
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 4402 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT CLOSING SOLENOID
(LVS0, LV81, LV82 )
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT CLOSING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAF ING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE •
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO KEEP THE SOLENOID CLOSED.
DEGRADATION. LO2 PREVALVE REMAINS CLOSED.
SYSTEM
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-402
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4410 ABORT:
ITEM: LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT OPENING SOLENOID
(LV83,LV84,LV85)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE SOLENOID VALVE. SYSTEM
DEGRADATION. LO2 PREVALVE REMAINS OPEN WITHOUT HELIUM PRESSURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-403
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4411 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT OPENING SOLENOID
(LV83, LV84, LV85)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0021
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE SOLENOID VALVE. SYSTEM
DEGRADATION. LO2 PREVALVE REMAINS OPEN WITHOUT HELIUM PRESSURE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-404
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4412 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: L02 PREVALVE REDUNDANT OPENING SOLENOID
(LV83 ,LV84, LVS5)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT OPENING SOLENOID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0404-0021
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE OF LO2 PREVALVE TO CLOSE AT
MECO. RESULTING IN SSME PUMP OVERSPEED AND EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-405
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4420 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
(PD9)
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
L02 TANK GND PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 TANK GND PRE-PASS (ORB/GND) DISC (ORB HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC276-0003-0007
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LO2 ULLAGE PRESSURE RESULTS IN ALL THREE MAIN ENGINES
SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-406
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4421 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(PD9)
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 TANK GND PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 TANK GND PRE-PASS (ORB/GND) DISC (ORB HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC276-0003-0007
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO HELIUM PREPRESS DURING PRELAUNCH.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-407
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4422 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
(PD9)
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 TANK GND PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 TANK GND PRE-PASS (ORB/GND) DISC (ORB HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0003-0007
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LO2 ULLAGE PRESSURE RESULTS IN ALL THREE MAIN ENGINES
SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-408
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4430 ABORT: 2/ 1R
ITEM:
(PDI0)
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
LH2 TANK GND PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 TANK GND PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC (ORB HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC276-0003-0007
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAI LURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE RESULTS IN ALL THREE MAIN ENGINES
SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-409
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4431 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(PDl0)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 TANK GND PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 TANK GND PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC (ORB HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0003-0007
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO HELIUM PREPRESS DURING PRELAUNCH.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-410
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4432 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
(PDI0)
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 TANK GND PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC.
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
(ORB HALF)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 TANK GND PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC (ORB HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0003-0007
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LH2 ULLAGE RESULTS IN ALL THREE MAIN ENGINES SHUTDOWN AND
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-411
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4460 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/1
ITEM: TEST PORT, PNEU HE OUTLET (TPI)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
TEST PORT, PNEU HE OUTLET
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DE ORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
VO70-415756-002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE BECAUSE PNEUMATIC HELIUM WILL NOT BE
AVAILABLE FOR MPS DUMP VALVE ACTUATION AND AFT COMPARTMENT PURGE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-412
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4470 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE: TEST PORT, LH2 REPRESSREG OUTLET (TP3)EXTERNALLEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
4) TEST PORT, LH2 REPRESS REG OUTLET
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
VO70-415532-001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DUMP AND REPRESS THE LH2 REPRESS MANIFOLD.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-413
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4480 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEST PORT, LO2 REPRESS REG OUTLET (TP4)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
TEST PORT, LO2 REPRESS REG OUTLET
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
VO70-415532-001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DUMP AN REPRESS THE LO2 REPRESS MANIFOLD.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-414
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4490 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEST PORT, LO2 PREPRESS DISC. CHECK VALVE (TP9)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
TEST PORT, LO2 PREPRESS DISC. CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
VO70-415446-001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LO2 ULLAGE PRESSURE RESULTS IN ALL THREE MAIN ENGINES
SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-415
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4500 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: TEST PORT, LH2 PREPRESS DISC. CHECK VALVE (TPI0)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
TEST PORT, LH2 PREPRESS DISC. CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: VO70-415446-001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE RESULTS IN ALL THREE MAIN ENGINES
SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-416
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4510 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM: TEST PORT, PNEU SUPPLY HELIUM (TP29)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
TEST PORT, PNEU SUPPLY HELIUM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/2
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-415790-001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF PNEUMATIC HELIUM FOR MPS VALVE
ACTUATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-417
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4520 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: TEST PORT, CHECK VALVE CV24 LEAKAGE (TP36)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
4) TEST PORT, CHECK VALVE CV24 LEAKAGE
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
V070-415133-001
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DUMP AND REPRESS THE GH2 PRESS MANIFOLD.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-418
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4530 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY REGULATOR (PR4)
RESTRICTED FLOW, FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0399-004
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAI LURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY FOR MPS VALVE
ACTUATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-419
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4531 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY REGULATOR (PR4)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS MID-TRAVEL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
I2%NDING/S_ING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0399-004
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO REGULATE PNEUMATIC HELIUM FLOW FOR MPS
VALVE ACTUATION AND MPS DUMP ANDREPRESS. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-420
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4540 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 MANIF REPRESS REGULATOR (PR5)
RESTRICTED FLOW, FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 MANIF REPRESS REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/ 1R ATO: 2/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0399-004
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DUMP THE LO2 MANIFOLD RESULTS IN LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-421
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4541 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 MANIF REPRESS REGULATOR (PRS)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS MID-TRAVEL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
_)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 MANIF REPRESS REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0399-004
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO REGULATE HELIUM PRESSURE DURING MPS LO2
MANIFOLD DUMP AND REPRESS. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-422
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
4550 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 MANIF REPRESS REGULATOR (PR6)
RESTRICTED FLOW, FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MPS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 MANIF REPRESS REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0399-004
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS LIFE/VEHICLE DUE TO FAILURE TO REPRESS THE LH2 MANIFOLD
RESULTING IN RUPTURE AND LH2 LEAK.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-423
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4551 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 MANIF REPRESS REGULATOR (PR6)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS MID-TRAVEL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
i) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 MANIF REPRESS REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: /NA AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC284-0399-004
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO REGULATE HELIUM DURING LH2 MANIFOLD DUMP
AND REPRESS. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-424
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4560 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY RELIEF VALVE (RV4)
FAILS TO OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MPS
2) HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM
4) PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY RELIEF VALVE
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0398-0005
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO REGULATE PNEUMATIC HELIUM FOR MPS VALVE
ACTUATION AND MPS DUMP AND REPRESS. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-425
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4561 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY RELIEF VALVE (RV4)
FAILS TO CLOSE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
v)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB I T: / NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC284-0398-0005
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO USE PNEUMATIC HELIUM FOR MPS VALVE
ACTUATION. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-426
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4570 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY TANK (TK4)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY TANK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ NA]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC282-0082-0010
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PNEUMATIC HELIUM FOR MPS VALVE ACTUATORAND MPS DUMP AND
REPRESS. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO FEED PNEUMATIC HELIUM TO AN
ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-427
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4580 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 PREVALVE PNEU ACCUMULATOR (AU5)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
_)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LO2 PREVALVE PNEU ACCUMULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] SIP] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC282-0070-0001
CAUSES: VIBRATION OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DUMP LO2 MANIFOLD RESULTS IN LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-428
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4590 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 PREVALVE PNEU ACCUMULATOR (AU6)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 PREVALVE PNEU ACCUMULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC282-0070-0001
CAUSES: VIBRATION OR PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DUMP L02 MANIFOLD RESULTS IN LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-429
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4600 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED MANIF RTLS REPRESS ORIFICE (RPg)
RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
LH2 FEED MANIF RTLS REPRESS ORIFICE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
VO70-415545-001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DUMP LH2 RTLS MANIFOLD.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-430
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1 i/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4610 ABORT:
ITEM: PNEU HE SUPPLY FILTER (FL5)
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEU HE SUPPLY FILTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: /NA AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
ME286-0056-0001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO USE PNEUMATIC HELIUM FOR MPS VALVE
ACTUATOR. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-431
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4620 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEUMATIC HE FILL LINE (.50",.375",.625" DIA)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEUMATIC HELIUM FILL LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO USE PNEUMATIC HELIUM FOR MPS VALVE
ACTUATION. SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-432
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4630 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE LINE (.50" DIA)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MPS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DUMP LO2 MANIFOLD RESULTS IN LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.
HDW/FUNC
I/i
I/i
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-433
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: i/1
4640 ABORT: I/i
ITEM:
DIA)
FAILURE MODE:
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE (.25",.38"
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DUMP LO2 MANIFOLD RESULTS IN LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-434
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4650 ABORT:
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM INTERCONNECT LINE
(.63",1.00",.50" DIA)
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
HDW/FUNC
1/1
I/1
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MPS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
PNEUMATIC HE INTERCONNECT LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORB IT: /NA AOA: i/1
DEORBI T: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DUMP THE LO2 MANIFOLD RESULTS IN LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-435
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
4660 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKAGE
GN2 PURGE (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF) (PDI4)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
GN2 PURGE (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB I T: / NA AOA: / NA
DEORBI T: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0003-0007
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE GN2 PURGE DISCONNECT VALVE.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-436
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4662 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 PURGE (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF) (PD14)
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
GN2 PURGE (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0003-0007
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PURGE THE SSME'S PRELAUNCH.
DEGRADATION.
SYSTEM
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-437
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MPS FLIGHT:
4664 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 PURGE (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF) (PDI4)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
GN2 PURGE (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0003-0007
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PURGE SSME'S WITH NITROGEN PRELAUNCH.
SYSTEM DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-438
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 4666 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: GN2 PURGE (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF) (PDI4)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, FAILS TO CLOSE,
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM
GN2 PURGE (ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBI T: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
MC276-0003-0007
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CLOSE GN2 DISCONNECT VALVE. SYSTEM
DEGRADATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-439
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
5000 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 PREVALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
ALL CREDIBLE MODES: OPENS, SHORTS, LOSS OF POWER
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (1 PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
6) AFT LCA l, 2 & 3
7) LO2 PREVALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE CIRCUITS PROVIDE POWER, CONTROL AND MONITORING FOR THE LO2
PREVALVES.
THE CRITICALITY 3 ITEMS REFERENCED ON THIS SHEET INCLUDE 78
RESISTORS AND 72 DIODES. THE ITEMS WITH A CRITICALITY OTHER THAN
3 ARE LISTED SEPERATELY UNDER MDAC ID 5001 THROUGH 5076.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS I0, I0.i, ii,
ii.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-440
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87
EPD&C/MPS
5001
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 PREVALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
FAILS (SHORTS) (FALSE OPEN COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (I PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
6) AFT LCA I, 2 & 3
7) PANEL R4
8) LO2 PREVALVE TOGGLE SWITCH (3) ($11, S12 & S13)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT STATION
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7456
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.i, Ii,
11.1, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-441
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87
EPD&C/MPS
5002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
3/ZR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 PREVALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
FAILS (SHORTS) (FALSE CLOSE COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (I PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
6) AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
7) PANEL R4
8) LO2 PREVALVE TOGGLE SWITCH (3) (SII, S12 & S13)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT STATION
ME452-0102-7456
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL ALLOW ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVI,
PV2 & PV3) TO CLOSE PREMATURELY (FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN).
THE RESULTING SYSTEM PRESSURE SURGE COULD CAUSE A RUPTURE OF THE
UPSTREAM FEEDLINE, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND/OR
FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS I0, i0.i, ii,
II.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-442
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87
EPD&C/MPS
5003
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE (IA) (4 PER CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN (INHIBIT CLOSE COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (I PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
6) AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
7) PANEL R4
8) FUSE (IA) (12) (FI6 THROUGH F24, F49, FS0, F51)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B C F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT STATION
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, CHEMICAL DEGRADATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.i, II,
ii.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-443
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87
EPD&C/MPS
5004
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE (IA) (4 PER CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN (INHIBIT OPEN COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME)
AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
PANEL R4
(PVl, PV2 & PV3)
FUSE (IA) (12) (FI6 THROUGH F24, F49, F50, F51)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/ IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: FLIGHT STATION
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS, CHEMICAL DEGRADATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL ALLOW ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVI,
PV2 & PV3) TO CLOSE PREMATURELY (FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN).
THE RESULTING SYSTEM PRESSURE SURGE COULD CAUSE A RUPTURE OF THE
UPSTREAM FEEDLINE, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND/OR
FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.i, ii,
ii.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-444
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87
EPD&C/MPS
5011
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOIDS)
MDM (FA1)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBITS CLOSING
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 PREVALVE (I PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
AVIONICS BAY 4
LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
MDM (FAI) (54V72A7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 4
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVl, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.i, ii,
ii.I, 12 & 12.1
REPORTDATE01/16/8 c-445 C
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i12Ole7
EPD&C/MPS
5012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOIDS)
MDM (FA2)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBITS CLOSING
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
V)
S)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVl, PV2 & PV3)
AVIONICS BAY 5
LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
MDM (FA2) (55V72AS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORB I T: 3/ 3 AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 5
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS I0, i0.i, ii,
II.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-446
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/2o/s 
EPD&C/MPS
5013
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/iR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOIDS )
MDM (FA3)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBITS CLOSING
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
_)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
AVIONICS BAY 6
LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
MDM (FA3) (56V72A9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/ 1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVl, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET •
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS I0, 10.1, 11,
11.1, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-447
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/2o/87
EPD&C/MPS
5014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOIDS)
MDM (FA4)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBITS CLOSING
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 PREVALVE (I PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
AVIONICS BAY 6
LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
MDM (FA4) (56V72AI0)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.i, ii,
II.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-448
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5015
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: MDM (FAI)
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBITS ACTIVATING
OPENING SOLENOIDS)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
AVIONICS BAY 4
LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
MDM (FAI) (54V72A7)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/1R RTLS: 3/1R
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 4
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL ALLOW ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVI,
PV2 & PV3) TO CLOSE PREMATURELY (FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN).
THE RESULTING SYSTEM PRESSURE SURGE COULD CAUSE A RUPTURE OF THE
UPSTREAM FEEDLINE, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND/OR
FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.i, ii,
ii.I, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-449
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5016
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: MDM (FA2)
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBITS ACTIVATING
OPENING SOLENOIDS)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 PREVALVE (I PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
AVIONICS BAY 5
LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
MDM (FA2) (55V72A8)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 5
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL ALLOW ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVI,
PV2 & PV3) TO CLOSE PREMATURELY (FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN).
THE RESULTING SYSTEM PRESSURE SURGE COULD CAUSE A RUPTURE OF THE
UPSTREAM FEEDLINE, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND/OR
FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, I0.i, Ii,
ii.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-450
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/22 / 87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5017
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: MDM (FA3)
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBITS ACTIVATING
OPENING SOLENOIDS)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
AVIONICS BAY 6
LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
MDM (FA3) (56V72Ag)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL ALLOW ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVI,
PV2 & PV3) TO CLOSE PREMATURELY (FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN).
THE RESULTING SYSTEM PRESSURE SURGE COULD CAUSE A RUPTURE OF THE
UPSTREAM FEEDLINE, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND/OR
FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.I, ii,
Ii.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-451
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5018
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: MDM (FA4)
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBITS ACTIVATING
OPENING SOLENOIDS)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
O2
LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVl, PV2 & PV3)
AVIONICS BAY 6
LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
MDM (FA4) (56V72AI0)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORB I T: 3/ 2 R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL ALLOW ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVI,
PV2 & PV3) TO CLOSE PREMATURELY (FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN).
THE RESULTING SYSTEM PRESSURE SURGE COULD CAUSE A RUPTURE OF THE
UPSTREAM FEEDLINE, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND/OR
FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, I0.I, ii,
ii.I, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-452
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5019
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: MDM (FA1)
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON (PREMATURELY ACTIVATES
OPENING SOLENOIDS)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 PREVALVE (1 PER SSME) (PVl, PV2 & PV3)
AVIONICS BAY 4
LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
MDM (FAI) (54V72A7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 4
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS I0, i0.i, ii,
11.1, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-453
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5020
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: MDM (FA2)
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON (PREMATURELY ACTIVATES
OPENING SOLENOIDS)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
AVIONICS BAY 5
LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
MDM (FA2) (55V72A8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 5
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS I0, i0.i, II,
ii.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-454
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5021
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: MDM (FA3)
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON (PREMATURELY ACTIVATES
OPENING SOLENOIDS)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 PREVALVE (I PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
AVIONICS BAY 6
LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
MDM (FA3) (56V72A9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, 10.1, Ii,
11.1, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-455
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5022
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: MDM (FA4)
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON (PREMATURELY ACTIVATES
OPENING SOLENOIDS)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
AVIONICS BAY 6
LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
MDM (FA4) (56V72AI0)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.I, Ii,
ii.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-456
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 2/1R
5031 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LVI6)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2 PER CIRCUIT)
FAIL ON (FALSE OPEN COMMAND, ACTIVATE LVI2, LVI4,
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT LCA I, 2 & 3
6) LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVI2, LVI4 & LVI6) CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (6) (54V76AI21(2), 55V76AI22(2),
56V76A123 (2))
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVl, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS I0, i0.i, ii,
11.1, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-457
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87
EPD&C/MPS
5032
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2 PER CIRCUIT)
FUSE FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LVI2, LV14 & LVI6)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (I PER SSME) (PVl, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
6) LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVI2, LVI4 & LVI6) CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (6) (54V76AI21(2), 55V76AI22(2),
56V76A123 (2))
8)
s)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL ALLOW ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVI,
PV2 & PV3) TO CLOSE PREMATURELY (FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN).
THE RESULTING SYSTEM PRESSURE SURGE COULD CAUSE A RUPTURE OF THE
UPSTREAM FEEDLINE, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND/OR
FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.I, II,
ii.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-458
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87
EPD&C/MPS
5033
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
FAIL OFF (INHIBIT LVI2, LVI4, LVI6)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (1 PER SSME) (PVl, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT LCA l, 2 & 3
6) LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVl2, LVl4 & LVl6) CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1 (54V76AI21, 55V76A122, 56V76A123)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL ALLOW ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVI,
PV2 & PV3) TO CLOSE PREMATURELY (FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN).
THE RESULTING SYSTEM PRESSURE SURGE COULD CAUSE A RUPTURE OF THE
UPSTREAM FEEDLINE, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND/OR
FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS I0, i0.i, ii,
ii.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-459
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5034
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (2 PER CIRCUIT)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON (FALSE OPEN COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVl, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
6) LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVl2, LVI4 & LVI6) CIRCUIT
7) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (6) (RPC38 (3), RPC42 (3))
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
MC450-0017-I030
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURES DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS 10, i0.i, II,
ii.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-460
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87
EPD&C/MPS
5035
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION (12A) (2 PER CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT POWER
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 PREVALVE (I PER SSME)
AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
(PVl, PV2 & PV3)
LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVI2, LVI4 & LVI6) CIRCUIT
DIODE, ISOLATION (12A) (6) (A2CR30(3), A2CR34(3))
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL ALLOW ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVI,
PV2 & PV3) TO CLOSE PREMATURELY (FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN).
THE RESULTING SYSTEM PRESSURE SURGE COULD CAUSE A RUPTURE OF THE
UPSTREAM FEEDLINE, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND/OR
FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.i, II,
Ii.I, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-461
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSiS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/2o/8'7
EPD&C/MPS
5041
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2 PER CIRCUIT)
FUSE FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LVI3, LVIS, LVI7)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
6) LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LVI3, LVI5 & LVI7) CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (6) (54V76AI21(2), 55V76AI22(2),
56V76A123 (2))
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA I, 2 & 3
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET •
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.I, ii,
ii.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-462
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/2o/8 
EPD&C/MPS
5042
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
FAIL OFF (INHIBIT LVI3, LVI5, LVI7)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (I PER SSME) (PVl, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT LCA I, 2 & 3
6) LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LVI3, LVI5 & LVI7) CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1 (3) (54V76AI21, 55V76AI22, 56V76AI23)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT LCA I, 2 & 3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS I0, i0.i, ii,
ii.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-463
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
5043 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (2 PER CIRCUIT)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBIT LVl3, LVlS, LVl7)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (I PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
6) LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LVI3, LVI5 & LVI7) CIRCUIT
7) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (6) (RPC37(3), RPC41(3))
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT PCA l, 2 & 3
MC450-0017-1030
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVl, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS 10, lO.1, ll,
ll.1, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-464
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
5044 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LV15, LV17)
DIODE, ISOLATION (12A) (2 PER CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT POWER (INHIBIT LVI3,
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (1 PER SSME) (PVl, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
6) LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LVI3, LVl5 & LVl7) CIRCUIT
7) DIODE, ISOLATION (12A) (6) (A2CR29(3), A2CR33(3))
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVl, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS 10, I0.i, II,
Ii.I, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-465
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
z/2o/87
EPD&C/MPS
5051
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2 PER CIRCUIT)
FUSE FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LVS0, LV81, LV82)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
6) LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT CLOSING SOLENOID (LV80, LV81 & LV82)
CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (6) (54V76AI21(2), 55V76AI22(2),
56V76AI23 (2))
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, I0.i, ii,
ll.l, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-466
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 2/1R
5052 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (2 PER CIRCUIT)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF(INHIBIT LVS0, LV81, LV82)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
6) LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT CLOSING SOLENOID (LV80, LV81 & LV82)
CIRCUIT
7) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (6) (RPC27(3), RPC28(3))
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I030
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVl, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, I0.i, II,
ll.l, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-467
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
5053 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LV81, LV82)
DIODE, ISOLATION (12A) (2 PER CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT POWER (INHIBIT LVS0,
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
6) LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT CLOSING SOLENOID (LV80, LV81 & LV82)
CIRCUIT
7) DIODE, ISOLATION (12A) (6) (A2CRI9(3), A2CR20(3))
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, I0.i, Ii,
11.1, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-468
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1120187 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDWIFUNC
EPD& C/MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
5061 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LV85)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2 PER CIRCUIT)
FAIL ON (FALSE OPEN COMMAND, ACTIVATE LV83, LV84,
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (I PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
6) LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT OPENING SOLENOID (LV83, LV84 & LV85)
CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (6) (54V76AI21(2), 55V76AI22(2),
56V76A123 (2))
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 2/IR
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA I, 2 & 3
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVl, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE LO2 PUMP
INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.i, ii,
ii.I, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-469
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87
EPD&C/MPS
5062
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2 PER CIRCUIT)
FUSE FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV83, LV84 & LV85)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
CIRCUIT
EPD&C/MPS
02
L02 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
L02 PREVALVE REDUNDANT OPENING SOLENOID (LV83, LV84 & LV85)
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (6) (54V76AI21(2),
56V76AI23 (2))
s)
9)
55V76AI22 (2) ,
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT LCA I, 2 & 3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL ALLOW ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVI,
PV2 & PV3) TO CLOSE PREMATURELY (FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN).
THE RESULTING SYSTEM PRESSURE SURGE COULD CAUSE A RUPTURE OF THE
UPSTREAM FEEDLINE, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND/OR
FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, I0.i, ii,
Ii.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-470
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5063
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
311R
311R
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (2 PER CIRCUIT)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON (FALSE OPEN COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (I PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
6) LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT OPENING SOLENOID (LV83, LV84 & LV85)
CIRCUIT
7) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (6) (RPCI3(3), RPC44(3))
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
MC450-0017-I030
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE
PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3)o IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING THE
MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE L02 PUMP
INLET •
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE •
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.I, ii,
II.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-471
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87
EPDaC/MPS
5064
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION (12A) (2 PER CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT POWER
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
CIRCUIT
7) DIODE,
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
L02 PREVALVE REDUNDANT OPENING SOLENOID (LV83, LV84 & LV85)
ISOLATION (12A) (6) (A2CR35(3), A2CR36(3))
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THIS PART WILL ALLOW ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVI,
PV2 & PV3) TO CLOSE PREMATURELY (FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN).
THE RESULTING SYSTEM PRESSURE SURGE COULD CAUSE A RUPTURE OF THE
UPSTREAM FEEDLINE, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND/OR
FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS I0, I0.i, ii,
ii.I, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-472
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1126187
EPDaC/MPS
5071
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
311R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOIDS)
DIODE (i0 PER CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN (INHIBIT OPEN COMMAND TO OPENING
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) DIODE BOARDS 56V76A207, 208 & 209
6) LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
7) DIODE (30)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 31 IR RTLS: 31 IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBI T: 3/ IR ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: DIODE BOARDS 56V76A207, 208 & 209
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF ONE OF THESE DIODES WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE
OPEN COMMAND. ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVl, PV2 & PV3) WILL CLOSE
PREMATURELY (FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN) IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
THE RESULTING SYSTEM PRESSURE SURGE COULD CAUSE A RUPTURE OF THE
UPSTREAM FEEDLINE, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND/OR
FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.I, Ii,
ii.I, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01116/87 C-473
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87
EPD&C/MPS
5072
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
311R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOIDS)
DIODE (2 PER CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN (INHIBIT OPEN COMMAND TO OPENING
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME)
AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
(PVI, PV2 & PV3)
LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
DIODE (6) (AICR29(3), AICR46(3))
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF ONE OF THESE DIODES WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE
OPEN COMMAND. ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3) WILL CLOSE
PREMATURELY (FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN) IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
THE RESULTING SYSTEM PRESSURE SURGE COULD CAUSE A RUPTURE OF THE
UPSTREAM FEEDLINE, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND/OR
FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.i, Ii,
ii.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-474
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87
EPD&C/MPS
5073
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOIDS)
DIODE (3 PER CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN (INHIBIT OPEN COMMAND TO OPENING
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME)
AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
(PVl, PV2 & PV3)
LO2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
DIODE (9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE OF ONE OF THESE DIODES WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE
OPEN COMMAND. ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3) WILL CLOSE
PREMATURELY (FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN) IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
THE RESULTING SYSTEM PRESSURE SURGE COULD CAUSE A RUPTURE OF THE
UPSTREAM FEEDLINE, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND/OR
FIRE/EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.i, ii,
ii.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-475
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87
EPD&C/MPS
5074
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOIDS)
DIODE (I0 PER CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN (INHIBIT CLOSE COMMAND TO CLOSING
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPD C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVl, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) DIODE BOARDS 56V76A207, 208 & 209
6) LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
7) DIODE (30)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DIODE BOARDS 56V76A207, 208 & 209
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF ONE OF THESE DIODES WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF
ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVl, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS
DURING THE MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE
LO2 PUMP INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.i, ii,
II.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-476
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/8"I
EPD&C/MPS
5075
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOIDS)
DIODE (6 PER CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN (INHIBIT CLOSE COMMAND TO CLOSING
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (I PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) PCA 4, 5 & 6
6) L02 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
7) DIODE (18) (AICR20(3), AICR27(3), AICR28(3),
AICR44(3), AICR45(3))
8)
9)
AlCR37 (3),
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT PCA 4, 5 & 6
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF ONE OF THESE DIODES WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF
ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS
DURING THE MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE
LO2 PUMP INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, I0.I, ii,
ii.i, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-477
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/8 
EPD&C/MPS
5076
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLENOIDS )
DIODE (7 PER CIRCUIT)
FAILS OPEN (INHIBIT CLOSE COMMAND TO CLOSING
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 PREVALVE (i PER SSME) (PVI, PV2 & PV3)
4) AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5 & 6
5) AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
6) LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID CIRCUITS
7) DIODE (21)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF ONE OF THESE DIODES WILL PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF
ONE OF THE PREVALVES (PVI, PV2 & PV3). IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS
DURING THE MECO SEQUENCE, THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE
LO2 PUMP INLET.
THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE A PUMP OVERSPEED, UNCONTAINED ENGINE
DAMAGE AND/OR EXPLOSION. THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF THE
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEETS i0, i0.I, Ii,
ii.I, 12 & 12.1
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-478
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
5120 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
ALL CREDIBLE MODES: OPENS, SHORTS, LOSS OF POWER
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PVT)
MID PCA 1 & 3
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT PROVIDES POWER, CONTROL AND MONITORING FOR THE LO2
FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE.
THE CRITICALITY 3 ITEMS REFERENCED ON THIS SHEET INCLUDE 12
RESISTORS AND 5 DIODES. THE ITEMS WITH A CRITICALITY OTHER THAN
3 ARE LISTED SEPERATELY UNDER MDAC ID 5121 THROUGH 5139.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-479
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 5121 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL SHORTED OPEN TO BUS (ACTIVATE LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
PANEL R4
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH (S17)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT STATION
ME452-0102-7354
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL ACTIVATE THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV24). THE LO2
FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7) WILL CLOSE. THE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY AFTER MECO WILL CAUSE THE RUPTURE OF THE FEEDLINE
MANIFOLD. THE AFT FUSELAGE WILL BE OVERPRESSURIZED.
THE MISSION IS LOST IN THE ONORBIT MISSION PHASE (OUTGASSING GO2
CAN INTERFER WITH SOME PAYLOADS). THE VEHICLE COULD BE DESTROYED
IN THE DEORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-480
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/12/87
EPD&C/MPS
5122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
FAIL PREMATURE OPEN-TO-BUS (ACTIVATE LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
PANEL R4
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH (S17)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT STATION
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7354
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL ACTIVATE THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV24). THE LO2
FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7) WILL CLOSE. THE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY AFTER MECO WILL CAUSE THE RUPTURE OF THE FEEDLINE
MANIFOLD. THE AFT FUSELAGE WILL BE OVERPRESSURIZED.
THE MISSION IS LOST IN THE ONORBIT MISSION PHASE (OUTGASSING GO2
CAN INTERFER WITH SOME PAYLOADS). THE VEHICLE COULD BE DESTROYED
IN THE DEORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-481
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/12/s7
EPD&C/MPS
5123
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/nmC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTER, LIMIT (I.2K)
FAILS OPEN, SHORTS (INHIBIT LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
PANEL R4
RESISTOR, LIMIT (1.2 K) (3)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/2R TAL: 3/1R
3/3 AOA: 311R
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT STATION
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI2 IIFR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS FAILURE WILL STOP THE OPERATION OF THE HELIUM SOLENOID
(LV24). THE FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7) WILL OPEN.
PROPELLENT WILL BE VENTED OVERBOARD IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
THE MISSION WILL BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE MAY BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-482
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/12/8 
EPD&C/MPS
5124
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (AR42)
FUSE FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
4) MID PCA 1
5) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
CIRCUIT
6) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (AR42)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID PCA 1
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL STOP THE OPERATION OF THE HELIUM SOLENOID
(LV24). THE L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7) WILL OPEN.
PROPELLENT WILL BE VENTED OVERBOARD IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
THE MISSION WILL BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE MAY BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-483
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/12/8 
EPD&C/MPS
5125
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (AR42)
FUSE FAIL ON (ACTIVATE LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
4) MID PCA 1
5) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
CIRCUIT
6) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (AR42)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBI T: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID PCA 1
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL ACTIVATE THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV24). THE LO2
FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7) WILL CLOSE. THE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY AFTER MECO WILL CAUSE THE RUPTURE OF THE FEEDLINE
MANIFOLD. THE AFT FUSELAGE WILL BE OVERPRESSURIZED.
THE MISSION IS LOST IN THE ONORBIT MISSION PHASE (OUTGASSING GO2
CAN INTERFER WITH SOME PAYLOADS). THE VEHICLE COULD BE DESTROYED
IN THE DEORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/15/87 C-484
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/12/8G
EPD&ClMPS
5126
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
312R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (AR30)
FUSE FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
4) MID PCA 3
5) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
CIRCUIT
6) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (AR30)
v)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID PCA 3
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL STOP THE OPERATION OF THE HELIUM SOLENOID
(LV24), THE LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7) WILL OPEN.
PROPELLENT WILL BE VENTED OVERBOARD IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
THE MISSION WILL BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE MAY BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-485
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5127
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (AR30)
FAILURE MODE: FUSE FAIL ON (ACTIVATE LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
4) MID PCA 3
5) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
CIRCUIT
6) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (A/_30)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID PCA 3
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL ACTIVATE THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV24). THE LO2
FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PVT) WILL CLOSE. THE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY AFTER MECO WILL CAUSE THE RUPTURE OF THE FEEDLINE
MANIFOLD. THE AFT FUSELAGE WILL BE OVERPRESSURIZED.
THE MISSION IS LOST IN THE ONORBIT MISSION PHASE (OUTGASSING GO2
CAN INTERFER WITH SOME PAYLOADS). THE VEHICLE COULD BE DESTROYED
IN THE DEORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-486
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/12/8 
EPD&C/MPS
5128
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC28)
FAIL ON/CLOSED (ACTIVATE LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PVV)
4) MID PCA 1
5) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
CIRCUIT
6) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC28)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID PCA 1
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I030
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL ACTIVATE THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV24). THE LO2
FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7) WILL CLOSE. THE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY AFTER MECO WILL CAUSE THE RUPTURE OF THE FEEDLINE
MANIFOLD. THE AFT FUSELAGE WILL BE OVERPRESSURIZED.
THE MISSION IS LOST IN THE ONORBIT MISSION PHASE (OUTGASSING GO2
CAN INTERFER WITH SOME PAYLOADS). THE VEHICLE COULD BE DESTROYED
IN THE DEORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-487
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5129
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC32)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON/CLOSED (ACTIVATE LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
4) MID PCA 3
5) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
CIRCUIT
6) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC32)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID PCA 3
MC450-0017-I030
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL ACTIVATE THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV24). THE LO2
FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7) WILL CLOSE. THE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY AFTER MECO WILL CAUSE THE RUPTURE OF THE FEEDLINE
MANIFOLD. THE AFT FUSELAGE WILL BE OVERPRESSURIZED.
THE MISSION IS LOST IN THE ONORBIT MISSION PHASE (OUTGASSING GO2
CAN INTERFER WITH SOME PAYLOADS). THE VEHICLE COULD BE DESTROYED
IN THE DEORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-488
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/lS/87
EPD&C/MPS
5130
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC32)
FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
4) MID PCA 3
5) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
CIRCUIT
6) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC32)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 311R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MID PCA 3
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I030
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL STOP THE OPERATION OF THE HELIUM SOLENOID
(LV24), THE L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7) WILL OPEN.
PROPELLENT WILL BE VENTED OVERBOARD IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
THE MISSION WILL BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE MAY BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-489
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/16/8 
EPD&C/MPS
5131
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC28)
FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
4) MID PCA 1
5) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
CIRCUIT
6) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC28)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID PCA 1
MC450-0017-I030
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL STOP THE OPERATION OF THE HELIUM SOLENOID
(LV24), THE LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7) WILL OPEN.
PROPELLENT WILL BE VENTED OVERBOARD IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
THE MISSION WILL BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE MAY BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-490
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/12/8 
EPD&C/MPS
5132
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FA3)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON (ACTIVATE LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (FA3) (56V72A9)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING" 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS FAILURE WILL ACTIVATE THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV24). THE LO2
FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7) WILL CLOSE. THE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY AFTER MECO WILL CAUSE THE RUPTURE OF THE FEEDLINE
MANIFOLD. THE AFT FUSELAGE WILL BE OVERPRESSURIZED.
THE MISSION IS LOST IN THE ONORBIT MISSION PHASE (OUTGASSING GO2
CAN INTERFER WITH SOME PAYLOADS). THE VEHICLE COULD BE DESTROYED
IN THE DEORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-491
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/12/87
EPD&C/MPS
5133
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/aR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FA3)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBIT LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 FEEDLIN_ RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (FA3) (56V72A9)
7)
s)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/1R
3/3 AOA: 3/1R
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL ACTIVATE THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV24). THE LO2
FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PVT) WILL CLOSE. THE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY AFTER MECO WILL CAUSE THE RUPTURE OF THE FEEDLINE
MANIFOLD. THE AFT FUSELAGE WILL BE OVERPRESSURIZED.
THE MISSION WILL BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE MAY BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-492
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111218 
EPD C/MPS
5134
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FAI)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON (ACTIVATE LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PVT)
4) AVIONICS BAY 4
5) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (FAI) (54V72A7)
8)
91
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 4
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS FAILURE WILL ACTIVATE THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV24). THE LO2
FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7) WILL CLOSE. THE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY AFTER MECO WILL CAUSE THE RUPTURE OF THE FEEDLINE
MANIFOLD. THE AFT FUSELAGE WILL BE OVERPRESSURIZED.
THE MISSION IS LOST IN THE ONORBIT MISSION PHASE (OUTGASSING GO2
CAN INTERFER WITH SOME PAYLOADS). THE VEHICLE COULD BE DESTROYED
IN THE DEORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-493
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5135
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM: MDM (FAI)
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBIT LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
4) AVIONICS BAY 4
5) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (FAI) (54V72A7)
7)
s)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 4
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS FAILURE WILL STOP THE OPERATION OF THE HELIUM SOLENOID
(LV24). THE FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PVT) WILL OPEN.
PROPELLENT WILL BE VENTED OVERBOARD IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
THE MISSION WILL BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE MAY BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-494
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1112187
EPD&C/MPS
5136
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FA2)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON (ACTIVATE LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
4) AVIONICS SAY 5
5) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (FA2) (55V72A8)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBI T: 2/ IR ATO: 2/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS SAY 5
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
B [ P ] C [ P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL ACTIVATE THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV24). THE LO2
FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7) WILL CLOSE. THE LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY AFTER MECO WILL CAUSE THE RUPTURE OF THE FEEDLINE
MANIFOLD. THE AFT FUSELAGE WILL BE OVERPRESSURIZED.
THE MISSION IS LOST IN THE ONORBIT MISSION PHASE (OUTGASSING GO2
CAN INTERFER WITH SOME PAYLOADS). THE VEHICLE COULD BE DESTROYED
IN THE DEORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-495
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5137
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM: MDM (FA2)
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBIT LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (FA2) (55V72A8)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRBLAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/1R
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 5
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL STOP THE OPERATION OF THE HELIUM SOLENOID
(LV24). THE LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7) WILL OPEN.
PROPELLENT WILL BE VENTED OVERBOARD IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
THE MISSION WILL BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE MAY BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-496
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111618 
EPD&C/MPS
5138
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION (IA, 12A)
FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) _2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
4) MID PCA 1
5) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
CIRCUIT
6) DIODE, ISOLATION (IA, 12A) (4) (A2CR8, A5CRI, A5CR2, A5CR4)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/1R
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: MID PCA 1
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246, JANTINI204RA
c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL STOP THE OPERATION OF THE HELIUM SOLENOID
(LV24). THE LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7) WILL OPEN.
PROPELLENT WILL BE VENTED OVERBOARD IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
THE MISSION WILL BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE MAY BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-497
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/16/8v
EPD&C/MPS
5139
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION (IA, 12A)
FAIL OPEN/SHORT (INHIBIT LV24)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
4) MID PCA 3
5) LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
CIRCUIT
6) DIODE, ISOLATION (IA, 12A) (6) (AICR32, AICR36, AICR37,
AICR39, A4CR3, A4CR4)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID PCA 3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246, JANTINI204RA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL STOP THE OPERATION OF THE HELIUM SOLENOID
(LV24). THE L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7) WILL OPEN.
PROPELLENT WILL BE VENTED OVERBOARD IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
THE MISSION WILL BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE MAY BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-498
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1113187
EPD C/MPS
5141
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWlFUNC
2/2
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L02 PROPELLENT DUMP SEQUENCE TOGGLE SWITCH
SHORTS (PREMATURE DUMP START)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
PANEL R2
LO2 PROPELLENT DUMP SEQUENCE TOGGLE SWITCH (SI)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: I/i
2/2 TAL: i/I
3/3 AOA: i/i
3/3 ATO: I/i
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT STATION
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7203
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILLGIVE A PREMATURE MPS DUMP COMMAND. IF THIS
COMMAND IS EXECUTED, PROPELLENT WILL BE LOST OVERBOARD. THE
WORST CASE IS THE VEHICLE WILL NOT REACH ORBIT.
THE MISSION MAY BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE MAY BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-499
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/s7
EPD&C/MPS
5142
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 PROPELLENT DUMP SEQUENCE TOGGLE SWITCH
FAIL OPEN (DUMP IS NOT STARTED)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
PANEL R2
LO2 PROPELLENT DUMP SEQUENCE TOGGLE SWITCH (SI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT STATION
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7203
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THE MPS DUMP WILL LEAVE L02 TRAPPED IN THE LINES
AND IN THE SSMES. THE OUTGASSING OF 02 DURING THE ONORBIT
MISSION PHASE COULD INTERFER WITH SOME PAYLOADS. THE WEIGHT OF
THIS TRAPPED LO2 WILL MOVE THE VEHICLE CG PAST THE AFT CG LIMIT.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE LOSS
OF THE VEHICLE DURING THE DEORBIT MISSION PHASE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-500
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/8v
EPD&C/MPS
5143
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE (F31, F32)
FAIL OPEN (DUMP IS NOT STARTED)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
EPDaC/MPS
02
PANEL R2
LO2 PROPELLENT DUMP SEQUENCE TOGGLE SWITCH (SI)
FUSE (2) (F31, F32)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT STATION
MC451-0018-0100
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THE MPS DUMP WILL LEAVE LO2 TRAPPED IN THE LINES
AND IN THE SSMES. THE OUTGASSING OF 02 DURING THE ONORBIT
MISSION PHASE COULD INTERFER WITH SOME PAYLOADS. THE WEIGHT OF
THIS TRAPPED LO2 WILL MOVE THE VEHICLE CG PAST THE AFT CG LIMIT.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE LOSS
OF THE VEHICLE DURING THE DEORBIT MISSION PHASE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-501
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
5160 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
ALL CREDIBLE MODES: OPENS, SHORTS, LOSS OF POWER
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
AVIONICS BAY 6
AFT LCA 3
L02 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRBLAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT PROVIDES POWER, CONTROL AND MONITORING FOR THE
OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE.
THE CRITICALITY 3 ITEMS REFERENCED ON THIS SHEET INCLUDE 8
RESISTORS AND 3 DIODES. THE ITEMS WITH A CRITICALITY OTHER THAN
3 ARE LISTED SEPERATELY UNDER MDAC ID 5161 THROUGH 5176.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-502
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/24/s6
EPD&C/MPS
5161
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN TOGGLE SWITCH
FAIL SHORTED OPEN-TO-BUS
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"1)
S)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
AVIONICS BAY 6
AFT LCA 3
PANEL R4
L02 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH ($6)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/1R
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: FLIGHT STATION
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7153
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV28). IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, THE OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE (PVg) WILL OPEN. LO2 WILL BE VENTED OVERBOARD.
THE MISSION COULD BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE COULD BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-503
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/24/s6
EPD&C/MPS
5162
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN TOGGLE SWITCH
FAIL PREMATURE OPEN-TO-BUS
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVg)
AVIONICS BAY 6
AFT LCA 3
PANEL R4
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH ($6)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT STATION
ME452-0102-7153
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV28). IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, THE OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE (PV9) WILL OPEN. LO2 WILL BE VENTED OVERBOARD.
THE MISSION COULD BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE COULD BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-504
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87
EPD&C/MPS
5163
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN TOGGLE SWITCH
FAIL OPEN (PREMATURE DEACTIVATE LV28)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
AVIONICS BAY 6
AFT LCA 3
PANEL R4
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH (S6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT STATION
ME452-0102-7153
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL DISABLE THE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV28). IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, THE OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE (PVg) WILL CLOSE. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST
FILL, THERE WILL BE A SUDDEN PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINE.
THE WORST CASE IS A RUPTURE OF THE ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-505
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5164 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN TOGGLE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL SHORTED/PREMATURE (FALSE ACTIVATION OF LV29)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
AVIONICS BAY 6
AFT LCA 3
PANEL R4
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH ($6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT STATION
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7153
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A FALSE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LV29). IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, THE OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE (PVg) WILL CLOSE. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST
FILL, THERE WILL BE A SUDDEN PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINE.
THE WORST CASE IS A RUPTURE OF THE ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-506
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i/2s/s 
EPDaC/MPS
5165
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWlFUNC
211R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE
FAIL OPEN (PREMATURE DEACTIVATE LV28)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVg)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT LCA 3
6) PANEL R4
7) FUSE (IA) (F8)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT STATION
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
B [ P ] C [ P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL DISABLE THE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV28). IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, THE OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE (PVg) WILL CLOSE. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST
FILL, THERE WILL BE A SUDDEN PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINE.
THE WORST CASE IS A RUPTURE OF THE ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-507
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/24/86
EPD&C/MPS
5166
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
FAIL ON THE OPEN COMMAND
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT LCA 3
6) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV28)
CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (56V76AI23)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/2R TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 3
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV28). IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, THE OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE (PVg) WILL OPEN. L02 WILL BE VENTED OVERBOARD.
THE MISSION COULD BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE COULD BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-508
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/24/86
EPD&C/MPS
5167
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
FAIL PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OPEN COMMAND
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT LCA 3
6) L02 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV28)
CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (56V76A123)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
3/2R TAL: 2/1R
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 3
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV28). IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, THE OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE (PV9) WILL OPEN. L02 WILL BE VENTED OVERBOARD.
THE MISSION COULD BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE COULD BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-509
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1126187
EPD&C/MPS
5168
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
FAIL OFF (PREMATURE DEACTIVATION LV28)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT LCA 3
6) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV28)
CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (56V76AI23)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
2/IR RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT LCA 3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL DISABLE THE OPEN COMMAND TOTHE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV28). IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, THE OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE (PVg) WILL CLOSE. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST
FILL, THERE WILL BE A SUDDEN PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINE.
THE WORST CASE IS A RUPTURE OF THE ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITERAND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-510
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/s7
EPD&C/MPS
5169
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
FAIL ON (PREMATURE ACTIVATION OF LV29)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT LCA 3
6) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV29)
CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (56V76A209)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
2/IR RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 3
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A FALSE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LV29). IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, THE OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE (PV9) WILL CLOSE. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST
FILL, THERE WILL BE A SUDDEN PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINE.
THE WORST CASE IS A RUPTURE OF THE ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-511
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11261s 
EPD&C/MPS
5170
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
FAIL OFF (PREMATURE DEACTIVATION LV28)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT LCA 3
6) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV28)
CIRCUIT
7) DIODE (2)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 3
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL DISABLE THE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV28). IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, THE OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE (PV9) WILL CLOSE. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST
FILL, THERE WILL BE A SUDDEN PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINE.
THE WORST CASE IS A RUPTURE OF THE ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-512
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87
EPD&C/MPS
5171
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, ISOLATION
FAIL OFF (PREMATURE DEACTIVATION LV28)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) DIODE BOARD 55V76A209
6) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV28)
CIRCUIT
7) DIODE (3A) (2) (CRI7, CRI8)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DIODE BOARD 55V76A209
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL DISABLE THE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV28). IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, THE OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE (PV9) WILL CLOSE. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST
FILL, THERE WILL BE A SUDDEN PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINE.
THE WORST CASE IS A RUPTURE OF THE ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-513
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/24/86
EPD&C/MPS
5172
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FA4)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON COMMAND
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV28)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (FA4) (56V72AI0)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
3/2R TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV28). IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, THE OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE (PVg) WILL OPEN. LO2 WILL BE VENTED OVERBOARD.
THE MISSION COULD BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE COULD BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-514
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/26/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5173
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM: MDM (FA4)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF (PREMATURE DEACTIVATION LV28)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVg)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV28)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (FA4) (56V72AI0)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
SIP] c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL DISABLE THE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV28). IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, THE OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE (PV9) WILL CLOSE. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST
FILL, THERE WILL BE A SUDDEN PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINE.
THE WORST CASE IS A RUPTURE OF THE ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-515
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5174
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM: MDM (FA4)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON (PREMATURE ACTIVATE LV29)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV29)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (FA4) (56V72AI0)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A FALSE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LV29). IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, THE OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE (PV9) WILL CLOSE. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST
FILL, THERE WILL BE A SUDDEN PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINE.
THE WORST CASE IS A RUPTURE OF THE ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-516
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87
EPD&C/MPS
5175
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (LAI)
FAIL OFF (PREMATURE DEACTIVATION LV28)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV28)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (LAI) (56V72A33)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3 / 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL DISABLE THE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV28). IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, THE OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE (PVg) WILL CLOSE. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST
FILL, THERE WILL BE A SUDDEN PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINE.
THE WORST CASE IS A RUPTURE OF THE ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-517
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87
EPD&C/MPS
5176
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (LAI)
FAIL ON (PREMATURE ACTIVATE LV28)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV28)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (LAI) (56V72A33)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/1R
3/3 AOA: 3/1R
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV28). IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST, THE OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE (PVg) WILL OPEN. LO2 WILL BE VENTED OVERBOARD.
THE MISSION COULD BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING ASCENT.
THE VEHICLE COULD BE LOST IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING AN ABORT.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-518
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5500 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: L02 INBOARDFILL & DRAIN VALVE CONTROLCIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES: OPENS, SHORTS, LOSS OF POWER
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
AVIONICS BAY 5
AFT LCA 2
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORB IT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 313
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS CIRCUIT PROVIDES POWER, CONTROL AND MONITORING FOR THE LO2
INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE.
THE CRITICALITY 3 ITEMS REFERENCED ON THIS SHEET INCLUDE 8
RESISTORS AND 4 DIODES. THE ITEMS WITH A CRITICALITY OTHER THAN
3 ARE LISTED SEPERATELY UNDER MDAC ID 5501 THROUGH 5533.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-519
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/o6/sv
EPD&C/MPS
5501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN TOGGLE SWITCH
FAIL SHORTED OPEN-TO-BUS
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
AVIONICS BAY 5
AFT LCA 2
PANEL R4
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH ($7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT STATION
ME452-0102-7257
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV30). THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVIO) WILL OPEN
IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
GAS TRAPPED IN THE LINE WOULD ENTER THE FEEDLINES RESULTING IN
POTENTIAL CAVITATION OF PUMPS ON ONE OR MORE SSMES. THE POSSIBLE
RESULTS INCLUDE MULTIPLE SSME SHUTDOWN, PUMP DAMAGE, FIRE AND
EXPLOSION (LOSS OF VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-520
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/28/87
EPD&C/MPS
5502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN TOGGLE SWITCH
FAIL PREMATURE OPEN-TO-BUS
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
L02 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
AVIONICS BAY 5
AFT LCA 2
PANEL R4
L02 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH ($7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT STATION
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7257
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV30). THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVl0) WILL OPEN
IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
GAS TRAPPED IN THE LINE WOULD ENTER THE FEEDLINES RESULTING IN
POTENTIAL CAVITATION OF PUMPS ON ONE OR MORE SSMES. THE POSSIBLE
RESULTS INCLUDE MULTIPLE SSME SHUTDOWN, PUMP DAMAGE, FIRE AND
EXPLOSION (LOSS OF VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: SSWN DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-521
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5503
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM: LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN TOGGLE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL PREMATURE OFF (INHIBIT LV30)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV10)
AVIONICS BAY 5
AFT LCA 2
PANEL R4
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH ($7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DE ORB IT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT STATION
ME452-0102-7257
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30) OPEN
COMMAND. THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL CLOSE IF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS LOST. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST FILL,
THERE WILL BE A PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINES.
THE WORST CASE IS THE RUPTURE OF ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-522
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM: LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN TOGGLE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ACTIVATE LV31)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
AVIONICS BAY 5
AFT LCA 2
PANEL R4
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH ($7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT STATION
ME452-0102-7257
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A PREMATURE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LV31). THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL
CLOSE IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING
FAST FILL, THERE WILL BE A PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINES.
THE WORST CASE IS THE RUPTURE OF ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-523
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5505
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN TOGGLE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN/PREMATURE OFF (INHIBIT LV31)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
AVIONICS BAY 5
AFT LCA 2
PANEL R4
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH ($7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: FLIGHT STATION
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7257
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LV31). THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL OPEN
IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
GAS TRAPPED IN THE LINE WOULD ENTER THE FEEDLINES RESULTING IN
POTENTIAL CAVITATION OF PUMPS ON ONE OR MORE SSMES. THE POSSIBLE
RESULTS INCLUDE MULTIPLE SSME SHUTDOWN, PUMP DAMAGE, FIRE AND
EXPLOSION (LOSS OF VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-524
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE (2) (IA)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL PREMATURE OFF (INHIBIT LV30)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
AVIONICS BAY 5
AFT LCA 2
PANEL R4
FUSE (2) (IA) (F9, FI0)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT STATION
E451-0018-0100
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30) OPEN
COMMAND. THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL CLOSE IF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS LOST. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST FILL,
THERE WILL BE A PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINES.
THE WORST CASE IS THE RUPTURE OF ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-525
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/28/87
EPD&C/MPS
5507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE
FAIL OPEN/PREMATURE OFF (INHIBIT LV31)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
L02 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
AVIONICS BAY 5
AFT LCA 2
PANEL R4
FUSE (IA) (FI0)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT STATION
PART NUMBER: E451-0018-0100
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LV31). THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL OPEN
IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
GAS TRAPPED IN THE LINE WOULD ENTER THE FEEDLINES RESULTING IN
POTENTIAL CAVITATION OF PUMPS ON ONE OR MORE SSMES. THE POSSIBLE
RESULTS INCLUDE MULTIPLE SSME SHUTDOWN, PUMP DAMAGE, FIRE AND
EXPLOSION (LOSS OF VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-526
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/o6/87
EPD&C/MPS
5511
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
FAIL ON THE OPEN COMMAND
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) AFT LCA 2
6) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30)
CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2) (56V76AI22AR(2))
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 2
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV30). THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL OPEN
IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
GAS TRAPPED IN THE LINE WOULD ENTER THE FEEDLINES RESULTING IN
POTENTIAL CAVITATION OF PUMPS ON ONE OR MORE SSMES. THE POSSIBLE
RESULTS INCLUDE MULTIPLE SSME SHUTDOWN, PUMP DAMAGE, FIRE AND
EXPLOSION (LOSS OF VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-527
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i/o6/8v
EPD&C/MPS
5512
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/nmC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
FAIL PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON THE OPEN COMMAND
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) AFT LCA 2
6) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30)
CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2) (56V76AI22AR(2))
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT LCA 2
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV30). THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL OPEN
IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
GAS TRAPPED IN THE LINE WOULD ENTER THE FEEDLINES RESULTING IN
POTENTIAL CAVITATION OF PUMPS ON ONE OR MORE SSMES. THE POSSIBLE
RESULTS INCLUDE MULTIPLE SSME SHUTDOWN, PUMP DAMAGE, FIRE AND
EXPLOSION (LOSS OF VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-528
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/2s/87
EPD&C/MPS
5513
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
FAIL PREMATURE OFF (INHIBIT LV30)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: Ao J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
AVIONICS BAY 5
AFT LCA 2
L02 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30)
(56V76A122AR(2))
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT LCA 2
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30) OPEN
COMMAND. THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL CLOSE IF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS LOST. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST FILL,
THERE WILL BE A PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINES.
THE WORST CASE IS THE RUPTURE OF ORBITER AND/OR GSE LINES. THE
RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND FIRE HAZARD
IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-529
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/28/87
EPD&C/MPS
5514
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
FAIL OPEN/PREMATURE OFF (INHIBIT LV31)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) AFT LCA 2
6) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV31)
CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (56V76AI22AR)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/ 1R RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 2
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LV31). THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVlO) WILL OPEN
IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
GAS TRAPPED IN THE LINE WOULD ENTER THE FEEDLINES RESULTING IN
POTENTIAL CAVITATION OF PUMPS ON ONE OR MORE SSMES. THE POSSIBLE
RESULTS INCLUDE MULTIPLE SSME SHUTDOWN, PUMP DAMAGE, FIRE AND
EXPLOSION (LOSS OF VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-530
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/28/s7
EPD&C/MPS
5515
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
211R
313
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
FAIL ON (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ACTIVATE LV31)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) AFT LCA 2
6) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV31)
CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (56V76AI22AR)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 2
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A PREMATURE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LV31). THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL
CLOSE IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING
FAST FILL, THERE WILL BE A PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINES.
THE WORST CASE IS THE RUPTURE OF ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG IO.IIA; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-531
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/1 /86
EPD&C/MPS
5521
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FAI)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OPEN COMMAND
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVl0)
4) AVIONICS BAY 4
5) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (FAI) (54V72A7)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 4
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV30). THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVIO) WILL OPEN
IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
GAS TRAPPED IN THE LINE WOULD ENTER THE FEEDLINES RESULTING IN
POTENTIAL CAVITATION OF PUMPS ON ONE OR MORE SSMES. THE POSSIBLE
RESULTS INCLUDE MULTIPLE SSME SHUTDOWN, PUMP DAMAGE, FIRE AND
EXPLOSION (LOSS OF VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-532
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/o6/87
EPD&C/MPS
5522
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FA4)
PREMATURE/ERRO_rEous OPEN COMMAND
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVl0)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (FA4) (56V72A10)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV30). THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL OPEN
IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
GAS TRAPPED IN THE LINE WOULD ENTER THE FEEDLINES RESULTING IN
POTENTIAL CAVITATION OF PUMPS ON ONE OR MORE SSMES. THE POSSIBLE
RESULTS INCLUDE MULTIPLE SSME SHUTDOWN, PUMP DAMAGE, FIRE AND
EXPLOSION (LOSS OF VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-533
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/28/87
EPD&C/MPS
5523
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (LAI)
FAIL PREMATURE OFF (INHIBIT LV30)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (LAI) (56V72A33)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30) OPEN
COMMAND. THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL CLOSE IF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS LOST. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST FILL,
THERE WILL BE A PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINES.
THE WORST CASE IS THE RUPTURE OF ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWN DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-534
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5524
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM: MDM (FAI)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL PREMATURE OFF (INHIBIT LV30)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
4) AVIONICS BAY 4
5) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (FAI) (54V72AT)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 4
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
B[ P] C[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30) OPEN
COMMAND. THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL CLOSE IF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS LOST. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST FILL,
THERE WILL BE A PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINES.
THE WORST CASE IS THE RUPTURE OF ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-535
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5525
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM: MDM (FA2)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ACTIVATE LV31)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV31)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (FA2) (55V72A8)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 1R RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 5
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A PREMATURE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LV31). THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL
CLOSE IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING
FAST FILL, THERE WILL BE A PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINES.
THE WORST CASE IS THE RUPTURE OF ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11At VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-536
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5526
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: MDM (FA2)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN/PREMATURE OFF (INHIBIT LV31)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV31)
CIRCUIT
6) MDM (FA2) (55V72AS)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ IR RTLS: 3/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 5
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE CLOSE COMMAND OF THE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LV31). THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL OPEN
IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
GAS TRAPPED IN THE LINE WOULD ENTER THE FEEDLINES RESULTING IN
POTENTIAL CAVITATION OF PUMPS ON ONE OR MORE SSMES. THE POSSIBLE
RESULTS INCLUDE MULTIPLE SSME SHUTDOWN, PUMP DAMAGE, FIRE AND
EXPLOSION (LOSS OF VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-537
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/28/87
EPD&C/MPS
5531
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE (2)
FAIL PREMATURE OFF (INHIBIT LV30)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) DIODE BOARD 55V76A208
6) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30)
CIRCUIT
7) DIODES (2) (CRI3, CR20)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DIODE BOARD 55V76A208
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30) OPEN
COMMAND. THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL CLOSE IF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS LOST. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST FILL,
THERE WILL BE A PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINES.
THE WORST CASE IS THE RUPTURE OF ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-538
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/2e/87
EPD&C/MPS
5532
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE (3A) (4)
FAIL PREMATURE OFF (INHIBIT LV30)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) AFT LCA 2
6) L02 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30)
CIRCUIT
7) DIODES (3A) (4)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 2
JANTXIN5551
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE OPENING SOLENOID (LV30) OPEN
COMMAND. THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0) WILL CLOSE IF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS LOST. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST FILL,
THERE WILL BE A PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE LINES.
THE WORST CASE IS THE RUPTURE OF ORBITER AND/OR GSE FACILITY
LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
FIRE HAZARD IN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-539
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/28/87
EPD&C/MPS
5533
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODES (2) (3A)
FAIL OPEN/PREMATURE OFF (INHIBIT LV31)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) AFT LCA 2
6) LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV31)
CIRCUIT
7) DIODES (2) (3A)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 2
JANTXIN5551
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LV31). THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV10) WILL OPEN
IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST.
GAS TRAPPED IN THE LINE WOULD ENTER THE FEEDLINES RESULTING IN
POTENTIAL CAVITATION OF PUMPS ON ONE OR MORE SSMES. THE POSSIBLE
RESULTS INCLUDE MULTIPLE SSME SHUTDOWN, PUMP DAMAGE, FIRE AND
EXPLOSION (LOSS OF VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 17
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-540
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
5550 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
ALL CREDIBLE MODES: OPENS, SHORTS, LOSS OF POWER
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9)
AVIONICS BAY 5 & 6
AFT PCA 2 & 3
AFT LCA 2
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT PROVIDES POWER, CONTROLAND MONITORING FOR THE LO2
OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE.
THE CRITICALITY 3 ITEMS REFERENCED ON THIS SHEET INCLUDE 6
RESISTORS. THE ITEMS WITH A CRITICALITY OTHER THAN 3 ARE LISTED
SEPERATELY UNDER MDAC ID 5551 THROUGH 5561.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-541
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5551
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
FAILURE MODE: FUSE FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV76)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) AFT LCA 2
6) LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV76) CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (55V76AI22AR)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT LCA 2
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV76). THE LO2
OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9) WILL OPEN. LO2 WILL BE LOST
OVERBOARD. THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL NOT WORK.
FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL
OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE AMPLITUDE
WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-542
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i1141s 
EPD&C/MPS
5552
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/Ia
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
FUSE FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV76)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVIg)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT LCA 3
6) LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV76) CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (56V76AI23AR)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORB IT: 3/3 AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 3
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV76). THE LO2
OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVIg) WILL OPEN. LO2 WILL BE LOST
OVERBOARD. THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL NOT WORK.
FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL
OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE AMPLITUDE
WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-543
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5553
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
FAILURE MODE: FUSE FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV76)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT LCA 3
6) LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV76) CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (56V76AI23AR)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 3
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV76). THE LO2
OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVlg) WILL OPEN. LO2 WILL BE LOST
OVERBOARD. THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL NOT WORK.
FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL
OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE AMPLITUDE
WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-544
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111418 
EPD&C/MPS
5554
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC24)
FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV76)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) AFT PCA 2
6) LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV76) CIRCUIT
7) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC24)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT PCA 2
ME450-0017-I030
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV76). THE LO2
OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVIg) WILL OPEN. LO2 WILL BE LOST
OVERBOARD. THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL NOT WORK.
FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL
OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE AMPLITUDE
WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-545
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/14/8v
EPD&C/MPS
5555
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC23)
FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV76)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT PCA 3
6) LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV76) CIRCUIT
7) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC23)
8)
9)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT PCA 3
PART NUMBER: ME450-0017-I030
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV76). THE LO2
OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9) WILL OPEN. LO2 WILL BE LOST
OVERBOARD. THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL NOT WORK.
FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL
OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE AMPLITUDE
WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-546
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
z/za/8 
EPD&C/MPS
5556
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/ZR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FA2)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBIT LV76)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
_)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
O2
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9)
AVIONICS BAY 5
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV76) CIRCUIT
MDM (FA2) (55V72A8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DE ORB IT: 3/ 3 ATO: 2/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 5
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV76). THE LO2
OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9) WILL OPEN. LO2 WILL BE LOST
OVERBOARD. THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL NOT WORK.
FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL
OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE AMPLITUDE
WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-547
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i1141s7
EPD&C/MPS
5557
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWlFUNC
211R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FA3)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBIT LV76)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PV19)
AVIONICS BAY 6
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV76) CIRCUIT
MDM (FA3) (56V72A9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV76). THE LO2
OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9) WILL OPEN. LO2 WILL BE LOST
OVERBOARD. THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL NOT WORK.
FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL
OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE AMPLITUDE
WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-548
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/14/87
EPD&C/MPS
5558
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FA4)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBIT LV76)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9)
AVIONICS BAY 6
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV76) CIRCUIT
MDM (FA4) (56V72AI0)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV76). THE LO2
OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9) WILL OPEN. LO2 WILL BE LOST
OVERBOARD. THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL NOT WORK.
FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL
OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE AMPLITUDE
WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-549
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
EPD&C/MPS
5559
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE (12A)
FAIL OPEN/SHORT (INHIBIT LV76)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) AFT PVA 2
6) LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV76) CIRCUIT
7) DIODE (12A) (2) (A3CRI4, A3CRI5)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LI FTO FF: i/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT PCA 2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV76). THE LO2
OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVIg) WILL OPEN. LO2 WILL BE LOST
OVERBOARD. THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL NOT WORK.
FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL
OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE AMPLITUDE
WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-550
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
EPD&C/MPS
5560
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
1/l
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE (12A)
FAIL OPEN/SHORT (INHIBIT LV76)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT PVA 3
6) LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV76) CIRCUIT
7) DIODE (12A) (A2CR7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT PCA 3
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV76). THE LO2
OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVIg) WILL OPEN. LO2 WILL BE LOST
OVERBOARD. THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL NOT WORK.
FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL
OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE AMPLITUDE
WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-551
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87
EPD&C/MPS
5561
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAIL OPEN/SHORT (INHIBIT LV76)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) AFT LCA 2
6) LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV76) CIRCUIT
7) DIODE (2)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 2
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE HELIUM SOLENOID (LV76). THE LO2
OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PV19) WILL OPEN. LO2 WILL BE LOST
OVERBOARD. THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL NOT WORK.
FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL
OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE AMPLITUDE
WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-552
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/8 
EPD&C/MPS
5600
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MPS INSTRUMENT POWER CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTANT OPERATIONS
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
"I)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
MPS INSTRUMENT POWER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT PROVIDES POWER TO THE MPS LO2/LH2 MANIFOLD GAGES.
ALL COMPONENTS IN THIS CIRCUIT ARE CRITICALITY 3. THE FAILURE OF
THESE PARTS WILL NOT CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-553
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
5650 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
ALL CREDIBLE MODES: OPENS, SHORTS, LOSS OF POWER
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (i PER SSME) (LV53, LV54 &
LV55)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AVIONICS BAY 4, 5 & 6
AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE CIRCUITS PROVIDE POWER, CONTROL AND MONITORING FOR THE GO2
PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVES.
THE CRITICALITY 3 ITEMS REFERENCED ON THIS SHEET INCLUDE 6
DIODES AND 3 RESISTORS. THE ITEMS WITH A CRITICALITY OTHER THAN
3 ARE LISTED SEPERATELY UNDER MDAC ID 5651 THROUGH 5654.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 39
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-554
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/1m/8 
EPD&C/MPS
5651
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (I PER CIRCUIT)
FAIL ON (ACTIVATE LV53, LV54, LV55)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
LV55)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (1 PER SSME) (LV53, LV54 &
AVIONICS BAY 4, 5 & 6
AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (3) (54V76AI21, 55V76AI22, 56V76AI23)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT LCA I, 2 & 3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GO2 TO PRESSURIZE THE ET L02 TANK FLOWS THROUGH THE PRESSURE FLOW
CONTROL VALVES (LV53, LV54 LV55). THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A FALSE
OPEN COMMAND TO THESE VALVES.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE
OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE ET (LOSS OF THE VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 39
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-555
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87
EPD&C/MPS
5652
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (i PER CIRCUIT)
FUSE FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV53, LV54, LV55)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (i PER SSME) (LV53, LV54 &
LV55)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AVIONICS BAY 4, 5 & 6
AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (3) (54V76AI21, 55V76AI22, 56V76AI23)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
3/2R TAL: 2/1R
3/3 AOA: 2/1R
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL PREVENT THE OPENING OF THE PRESSURE CONTROL
VALVES (LV53, LV54, LV55). GO2 TO PRESSURIZE THE ET LO2 TANK
FLOWS THROUGH THESE VALVES. THIS ET LO2 TANK ULLAGE PRESSURE IS
NECESSARY FOR THE EFFICIENT OPERATION OF THE SSMES.
THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING AN ABORT CAN CAUSE THE LOSS OF
THE VEHICLE (NOT ENOUGH PROPELLENT TO FINISH THE MISSION).
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 39
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-556
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
5653 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (I PER CIRCUIT)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON (ACTIVATE LV53, LV54, LV55)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
LV55)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (1 PER SSME) (LV53, LV54 &
AVIONICS BAY 4, 5 & 6
AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (3) (54V76AI21, 55V76AI22, 56V76AI23)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
311R TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A/_T LCA I, 2 & 3
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GO2 TO PRESSURIZE THE ET LO2 TANK FLOWS THROUGH THE PRESSURE FLOW
CONTROL VALVES (LV53, LV54, LV55). THIS FAILURE WILL GIVE A
FALSE OPEN COMMAND TO THESE VALVES.
THE WORST CASE IS THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE
OVERPRESSURIZATION OF THE ET (LOSS OF THE VEHICLE).
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 39
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-557
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 5654 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (i PER CIRCUIT)
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBIT LV53, LV54, LV55)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
LV55)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (i PER SSME) (LV53, LV54 &
AVIONICS BAY 4, 5 & 6
AFT LCA i, 2 & 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (3) (54V76AI21, 55V76AI22, 56V76AI23)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
3/2 R TAL: 2/1R
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA I, 2 & 3
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL PREVENT THE OPENING OF THE PRESSURE CONTROL
VALVES (LV53, LV54, LV55). GO2 TO PRESSURIZE THE ET LO2 TANK
FLOWS THROUGH THESE VALVES. THIS ET LO2 TANK ULLAGE PRESSURE IS
NECESSARY FOR THE EFFICIENT OPERATION OF THE SSMES.
THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING AN ABORT CAN CAUSE THE LOSS OF
THE VEHICLE (NOT ENOUGH PROPELLENT TO FINISH THE MISSION).
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 39
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-558
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
5700 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE CONTROL
CREDIBLE MODES: OPENS, SHORTS, LOSS OF POWER
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY"
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (2) (PV20, PV21)
AVIONICS BAY 4 & 5
AFT LCA 1 & 2
LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE CIRCUITS PROVIDE POWER, CONTROL AND MONITORING FOR THE LO2
POGO ACCUMULATORRECIRCULATION VALVES.
THE CRITICALITY 3 ITEMS REFERENCED ON THIS SHEET INCLUDE 6
RESISTORS AND 4 DIODES. THE ITEMS WITH A CRITICALITY OTHER THAN
3 ARE LISTED SEPERATELY UNDER MDAC ID 5701 THROUGH 5705.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-559
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1114187
EPD&C/MPS
5701
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEMs
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2 PER CIRCUIT)
FAIL ON (FALSE OPEN COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (2) (PV20, PV21)
4) AVIONICS BAY 4 & 5
5) AFT LCA 1 & 2
6) LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
(2) (LV77, LV78)
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2 PER CIRCUIT) (4) (54V76A121AR(2),
55VV6A122AR (2))
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 1 & 2
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL PREMATURELY ACTIVATE THE HELIUM SOLENOIDS
(LV77, LV78), CLOSING THE POGO RECIRCULATION VALVES (PV20, PV21).
THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL STOP THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM.
THE FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN
STRUCTURAL OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE
AMPLITUDE WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-560
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/1a/8 
EPD&C/MPS
5702
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FAI)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON (FALSE OPEN COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20)
4) AVIONICS BAY 4
5) LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
(LV77)
6) MDM (FA1) (54V72A7)
v)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 4
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL PREMATURELY ACTIVATE THE HELIUM SOLENOID
(LV77), CLOSING THE POGO RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20). THE LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL STOP THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM.
THE FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN
STRUCTURAL OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE
AMPLITUDE WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-561
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1114187
EPD&C/MPS
5703
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FA2)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON (FALSE OPEN COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV21)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
(LV78)
6) MDM (FA2) (55V72A8)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 5
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL PREMATURELY ACTIVATE THE HELIUM SOLENOID
(LV78), CLOSING THE POGO RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV21). THE LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL STOP THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM.
THE FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN
STRUCTURAL OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE
AMPLITUDE WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-562
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/14/87
EPD&C/MPS
5704
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FA3)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON (FALSE OPEN COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) L02 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
(LV77)
6) MDM (FA3) (56V72A9)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/1R
3/3 ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL PREMATURELY ACTIVATE THE HELIUM SOLENOID
(LV77), CLOSING THE POGO RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20). THE LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL STOP THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM.
THE FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN
STRUCTURAL OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE
AMPLITUDE WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-563
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5705
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: MDM (FA4)
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON (FALSE OPEN COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV21)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
(LV78)
6) MDM (FA4) (56VV2A10)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/3 AOA: 3/1R
3/3 ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL PREMATURELY ACTIVATE THE HELIUM SOLENOID
(LV78), CLOSING THE POGO RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV21). THE LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL STOP THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM.
THE FAILURE OF THE POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN
STRUCTURAL OSCILLATIONS AND FEEDLINE PRESSURES OF UNPREDICTABLE
AMPLITUDE WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-564
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5750 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: ET/ORBITER DISCONNECT VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES: OPENS, SHORTS, LOSS OF POWER
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5 & 6
5) AFT PCA 2 & 3
6) AFT LCA 2 & 3
7) ET/ORBITER DISCONNECT VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE CIRCUITS PROVIDE POWER, CONTROL AND MONITORING FOR THE FEED
DISCONNECT VALVE.
THE CRITICALITY 3 ITEMS REFERENCED ON THIS SHEET INCLUDE 12
RESISTORS AND 7 DIODES. THE ITEMS WITH A CRITICALITY OTHER THAN
3 ARE LISTED SEPERATELY UNDER MDAC ID 5751 THROUGH 5779.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-565
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
z/oe/8 
EPD&C/MPS
5751
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FA2)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON (FALSE OPEN COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
AVIONICS BAY 5
FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46) CIRCUIT
MDM (FA2) (55V72AS)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 5
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) IS CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT
OUTGASSING OF 02 IN THE ONORBIT PHASE. THIS OUTGASSING COULD
INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS.
THEREFORE A FALSE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46)
COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-566
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5752
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: MDM (FA3)
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON (FALSE OPEN COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD1)
AVIONICS BAY 6
FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46) CIRCUIT
MDM (FA3) (55V72A9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/3
313 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) IS CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT
OUTGASSING OF 02 IN THE ONORBIT PHASE. THIS OUTGASSING COULD
INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS.
THEREFORE A FALSE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46)
COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-567
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5753
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: MDM (FA4)
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE/ERRONEOUSON (FALSE OPENCOMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
AVIONICS BAY 6
FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46) CIRCUIT
MDM (FA4) (55V72AI0)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) IS CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT
OUTGASSING OF 02 IN THE ONORBIT PHASE. THIS OUTGASSING COULD
INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS.
THEREFORE A FALSE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46)
COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/15/87 C-568
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1116187
EPD&C/MPS
5754
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FA2)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBIT LV47)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
AVIONICS BAY 5
FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) CIRCUIT
MDM (FA2) (55V72A8)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/3
313 TAL: 313
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 5
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) IS CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT
OUTGASSING OF 02 IN THE ONORBIT PHASE. THIS OUTGASSING COULD
INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS.
THEREFORE THE FAILURE OF THE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LV47) COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-569
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5755
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: MDM (FA3)
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBIT LV47)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
?)
e)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
AVIONICS BAY 6
FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) CIRCUIT
MDM (FA3) (56V72Ag)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) IS CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT
OUTGASSING OF 02 IN THE ONORBIT PHASE. THIS OUTGASSING COULD
INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS.
THEREFORE THE FAILURE OF THE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LV47) COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-570
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/16/87
EPD&C/MPS
5756
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FA4)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF (INHIBIT LV47)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
02
ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD1)
AVIONICS BAY 6
FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) CIRCUIT
MDM (FA4) (56V72AI0)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) IS CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT
OUTGASSING OF 02 IN THE ONORBIT PHASE. THIS OUTGASSING COULD
INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS.
THEREFORE THE FAILURE OF THE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LV47) COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-571
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5761
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON (FALSE OPEN COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT LCA 3
6) FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46) CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (56V76AI23)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT LCA 3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) IS CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT
OUTGASSING OF 02 IN THE ONORBIT PHASE. THIS OUTGASSING COULD
INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS.
THEREFORE A FALSE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46)
COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-572
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/o8/87
EPD&C/MPS
5762
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON (FALSE OPEN COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT LCA 3
6) FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46) CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1 (56V76AI23)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT LCA 3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) IS CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT
OUTGASSING OF 02 IN THE ONORBIT PHASE. THIS OUTGASSING COULD
INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS.
THEREFORE A FALSE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46)
COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-573
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5763
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON (FALSE OPEN COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) AFT LCA 2
6) FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46) CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 [55V76AI22)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 313
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT LCA 2
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) IS CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT
OUTGASSING OF 02 IN THE ONORBIT PHASE. THIS OUTGASSING COULD
INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS.
THEREFORE A FALSE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46)
COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-574
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/o8/87
EPD&C/MPS
5764
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 19)
FAIL ON/CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT PCA 3
6) FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46) CIRCUIT
7) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 19)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT PCA 3
MC450-0017-I030
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD1) IS CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT
OUTGASSING OF 02 IN THE ONORBIT PHASE. THIS OUTGASSING COULD
INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS.
THEREFORE A FALSE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46)
COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-575
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/o8187
EPD&C/MPS
5765
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 20)
FAIL ON/CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) AFT PCA 2
6) FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46) CIRCUIT
7) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 20)
s)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT PCA 2
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I030
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) IS CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT
OUTGASSING OF 02 IN THE ONORBIT PHASE. THIS OUTGASSING COULD
INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS.
THEREFORE A FALSE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46)
COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-576
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
z/ze/s7
EPD&C/MPS
5766
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/nmC
2/ZR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 19)
FAILS PREMATURE/OFF (INHIBIT LV46)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT PCA 3
6) FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46) CIRCUIT
7) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 19)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
2/1R RTLS: 2/1R
2/1R TAL: 2/1R
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT PCA 3
MC450-0017-I030
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
L02 MUST FLOW THROUGH THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) TO FEED THE
SSMES. THE POSSIBLE RESULTS OF A FLOW INTERUPTION INCLUDE SSME
SHUTDOWN, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND FIRE/EXPLOSION.
THEREFORE THE LOSS OF THE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING SOLENOID
(LV46) WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-577
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/16/8v
EPD&C/MPS
5767
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/iR
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 20)
FAILS PREMATURE/OFF (INHIBIT LV46)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) AFT PCA 2
6) FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV46) CIRCUIT
7) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 20)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/ 1R
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 9 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT PCA 2
MC450-0017-I030
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LO2 MUST FLOW THROUGH THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) TO FEED THE
SSMES. THE POSSIBLE RESULTS OF A FLOW INTERUPTION INCLUDE SSME
SHUTDOWN, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND FIRE/EXPLOSION.
THEREFORE THE LOSS OF THE OPEN COMMAND TO THE OPENING SOLENOID
(LV46) WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-578
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5771
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON (FALSE CLOSE COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT LCA 3
6) FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (56V76AI23)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
2/1R RTLS: 2/IR
2/1R TAL: 2/1R
3/ 3 AOA: 2/1R
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 3
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
L02 MUST FLOW THROUGH THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) TO FEED THE
SSMES. THE POSSIBLE RESULTS OF A FLOW INTERUPTION INCLUDE SSME
SHUTDOWN, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND FIRE/EXPLOSION.
THEREFORE A FALSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) WILL
CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-579
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
110818?
EPD&C/MPS
5772
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON (FALSE CLOSE COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
])
4)
5)
6)
?)
8)
9)
EPD&C/MPS
O2
ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
AVIONICS BAY 6
AFT LCA 3
FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) CIRCUIT
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1 (56V76AI23)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 3
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LO2 MUST FLOW THROUGH THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) TO FEED THE
SSMES. THE POSSIBLE RESULTS OF A FLOW INTERUPTION INCLUDE SSME
SHUTDOWN, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND FIRE/EXPLOSION.
THEREFORE A FALSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) WILL
CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-580
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
z/o8/87
EPD&C/MPS
5773
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
FAIL ON (FALSE CLOSE COMMAND)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) o=
3) ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) AFT LCA 2
6) FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) CIRCUIT
7) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (55V76AI22)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 2
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LO2 MUST FLOW THROUGH THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD1) TO FEED THE
SSMES. THE POSSIBLE RESULTS OF A FLOW INTERUPTION INCLUDE SSME
SHUTDOWN, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND FIRE/EXPLOSION.
THEREFORE A FALSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) WILL
CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-581
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1108187
EPD&C/MPS
5774
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 20)
FAIL ON/CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) o2
3) ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT PCA 3
6) FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) CIRCUIT
7) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 20)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORB IT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
2/1R TAL: 2/1R
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT PCA 3
MC450-0017-I036
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LO2 MUST FLOW THROUGH THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) TO FEED THE
SSMES. THE POSSIBLE RESULTS OF A FLOW INTERUPTION INCLUDE SSME
SHUTDOWN, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND FIRE/EXPLOSION.
THEREFORE A FALSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) WILL
CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-582
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5775
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 21)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON/CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD1)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) AFT PCA 2
6) FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) CIRCUIT
7) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 21)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORB IT:
DEORBI T:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
2/1R RTLS: 2/1R
2/IR TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT PCA 2
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I036
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LO2 MUST FLOW THROUGH THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) TO FEED THE
SSMES. THE POSSIBLE RESULTS OF A FLOW INTERUPTION INCLUDE SSME
SHUTDOWN, UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND FIRE/EXPLOSION.
THEREFORE A FALSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) WILL
CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-583
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5776
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 20)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL PREMATURE/OFF (INHIBIT LV47)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT PCA 3
6) FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) CIRCUIT
7) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 20)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT PCA 3
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I036
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) IS CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT
OUTGASSING OF 02 IN THE ONORBIT PHASE. THIS OUTGASSING COULD
INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS.
THEREFORE THE LOSS OF THE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING SOLENOID
(LV47) COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG IO.IIA; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-584
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1116187
EPD&C/MPS
5777
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWlFUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 21)
FAIL PREMATURE/OFF (INHIBIT LV47)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
AFT PCA 2
FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) CIRCUIT
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC 21)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/NA RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
313 ATO: 313
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT PCA 2
MC450-0017-I036
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD1) IS CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT
OUTGASSING OF 02 IN THE ONORBIT PHASE. THIS OUTGASSING COULD
INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS.
THEREFORE THE LOSS OF THE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING SOLENOID
(LV47) COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-585
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i/2v/sv
EPD&C/MPS
5778
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE (12A)
FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV47)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
4) AVIONICS BAY 5
5) AFT PCA 2
6) FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) CIRCUIT
7) DIODE (12A) (2) (A2CRI3, A2CRI4)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT PCA 2
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) IS CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT
OUTGASSING OF 02 IN THE ONORBIT PHASE. THIS OUTGASSING COULD
INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS.
THEREFORE THE LOSS OF THE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING SOLENOID
(LV47) COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-586
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87
EPD&C/MPS
5779
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE (12A)
FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV47)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A. J. MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) 02
3) ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
4) AVIONICS BAY 6
5) AFT PCA 3
6) FEED DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV47) CIRCUIT
7) DIODE (12A) (A2CRI6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT PCA 3
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI) IS CLOSED AFTER MECO TO PREVENT
OUTGASSING OF 02 IN THE ONORBIT PHASE. THIS OUTGASSING COULD
INTERFERE WITH THE OPERATION OF SOME PAYLOADS.
THEREFORE THE LOSS OF THE CLOSE COMMAND TO THE CLOSING SOLENOID
(LV47) COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSWH DWG 10.11A; VS72-941099 SHEET 21
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-587
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6011 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: POWER & CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR LH2 FEEDLINE
DISCONNECT VALVE
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION, ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) HYDROGEN FEED SYSTEM
3) LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
4) HELIUM OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOID VALVES (LV48,LV49)
5) AVBAY 5,6
6) AFT PCA 2,3
7) AFT LCA 2,3
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES:
SHOCK
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ITEMS REFERENCED WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON
CREW, VEHICLE OR MISSION AND ARE THUS ASSIGNED CRITICALITY 3/3.
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS INCLUDED ARE 4 DIODES, 12 MDMS AND 13
RESISTORS. COMPONENTS ASSIGNED CRITICALITIES OTHER THAN 3/3 ARE
ADDRESSED SEPARATELY UNDER MDAC 6012 THROUGH 6016.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 15. MAJOR HARDWARE
ITEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CIRCUITRY ARE THE LH2 FEEDLINE
DISCONNECT VALVE, MC284-0389-0051(0411,0431), AND ITS
CORRESPONDING CONTROL SOLENOIDS, MC284-0404-0021.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-588
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1109187
EPDC/MPS
6012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (6)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) HYDROGEN FEED SYSTEM
3) LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
4) HELIUM OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOID VALVES (LV48,LV49)
5) AVBAY 5,6
6) AFT LCA 2,3
7) HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (4 TYPE III, 2 TYPE I)
e)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263,0002, MC477-0261-0002; 56V76AI2AR
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE WILL PREVENT OPERATION (OPEN OR CLOSE) OF THE
FEEDLINE DISCONNECT OR MAY ALLOW VALVE TO CLOSE DURING FILL, WITH
THE POSSIBLE RESULT A RUPTURE OF THE FEEDLINE MANIFOLD AND
CREATION OF A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. FAILURE CAUSING THE VALVE
TO CLOSE DURING POWERED FLIGHT WILL DESTROY THE VEHICLE. FAILURE
DURING ASCENT WILL ALLOW LH2 TO ESCAPE THE ET AT SEPARATION,
CAUSING RECONTACT WITH THE ORBITER AND LOSS OF VEHICLE, OR
RECONTACT MAY CAUSE DAMAGE TO TPS, PREVENTING A SAFE REENTRY.
AERO FORCES DURING RTLS WILL PREVENT RECONTACT.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 15.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-589
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/o9/87
EPDC/MPS
6013
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (4)
FAIL OPEN, FAIL CLOSED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) HYDROGEN FEED SYSTEM
3) LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
4) HELIUM OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOID VALVES (LV48,LV49)
5) AVBAY 5,6
6) AFT PCA 2,3
7) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (4)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I030: 55V76AI32RPC22,23,
56V76AI33RPC21,22
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE WILL PREVENT OPERATION OF THE FEEDLINE DISCONNECT
VALVE. PRELAUNCH FAILURE MAY CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY, OR MAY ALLOW
VALVE TO CLOSE DURING FILL, WITH THE POSSIBLE RESULT A RUPTURE OF
THE FEEDLINE MANIFOLD AND CREATION OF A FIRE/EXPLOSION
HAZARD. FAILURE CAUSING THE VALVE TO CLOSE DURING POWERED FLIGHT
WILL DESTROY THE VEHICLE. FAILURE DURING ASCENT WILL ALLOW H2 TO
ESCAPE THE ET AND ORBITER AT SEPARATION, CAUSING RECONTACT AND
DAMAGE TO TPS TILES, PREVENTING A SAFE REENTRY, OR
DESTRUCTION OF THE VEHICLE. AERO FORCES DURING RTLS WILL PREVENT
RECONTACT.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 15.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-590
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i/o9/8v
EPDC/MPS
6014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION AND BLOCKING DIODES (6)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) HYDROGEN FEED SYSTEM
3) LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
4) HELIUM OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOID VALVES (LV48,LV49)
5) AVBAY 5,6
6) AFT PCA 2,3
7) ISOLATION AND BLOCKING DIODES
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA: 55V76AI32A2CR8,15, 55V76AI33A2CR5,6,
55V76AI33A3CR5,13
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE WILL PREVENT OPERATION OF THE FEEDLINE DISCONNECT
VALVE. PRELAUNCH FAILURE MAY CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. FAILURE DURING
ASCENT WILL ALLOW H2 TO ESCAPE THE ET AND ORBITER AT SEPARATION,
CAUSING RECONTACT AND DAMAGE TO TPS TILES, PREVENTING A
SAFE REENTRY, OR IMMEDIATE DESTRUCTION OF THE VEHICLE. AERO
FORCES DURING RTLS WILL PREVENT RECONTACT.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-591
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/14/87
EPDC/MPS
6015
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLIGHT CRITICAL AFT MDM (3)
FAIL ON, FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
HYDROGEN FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
HELIUM OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOID VALVES (LV48,LV49)
AVBAY 5,6
FLIGHT CRITICAL AFT MDM (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
MC615-0004-6110,5110: 56V72A9,10, 55V75AI4
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE OF A REDUNDANT ITEM WILL PREVENT OPERATION OF THE
FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE. PRELAUNCH FAILURE MAY CAUSE LAUNCH
DELAY, OR MAY ALLOW VALVE TO CLOSE DURING FILL, WITH THE POSSIBLE
RESULT A RUPTURE OF THE FEEDLINE MANIFOLD AND CREATION OF A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. FAILURE CAUSING THE VALVE TO CLOSE DURING
POWERED FLIGHT WILL DESTROY THE VEHICLE. FAILURE DURING ASCENT
WILL ALLOW H2 TO ESCAPE THE ET AND ORBITER AT SEPARATION, CAUSING
RECONTACT AND DAMAGE TO THE TPS TILES, PREVENTING A SAFE
REENTRY, OR IMMEDIATE DESTRUCTION OF THE VEHICLE. AERO FORCES
WILL PREVENT RECONTACT DURING RTLS.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-592
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/14/8T
EPDC/MPS
6016
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDICATOR SWITCH (PD2)
FAIL OPEN, FAIL TO TRANSFER
HDW/FUNC
1/l
i/i
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
HYDROGEN FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
POSITION INDICATOR SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: 50V41PD2
HDW/FUNC
3/3
1/1
i/i
1/1
c[P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH FAILURE MAY CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY. FAILURE DURING ASCENT
MAY CAUSE INCORRECT POSITION INDICATION, ALLOWING ET SEP WITH
DISCONNECT VALVES OPEN. ESCAPING H2 COULD CAUSE THE ORBITER
AND/OR ET TO ROTATE AND RECONTACT EACH OTHER. RECONTACT CAN
CAUSE DAMAGE TO TPS TILES, PREVENTING A SAFE REENTRY, OR
IMMEDIATE DESTRUCTION OF THE ORBITER.
AERO FORCES WILL PREVENT RECONTACT DURING AN RTLS ABORT.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 15
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-593
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(2)
1/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
6021 ABORT: 3/3
POWER & CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES
FAILURE MODE:
OUTPUT
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION, ERRONEOUS
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
3) LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES (PVI7,PVI8) NORMALLY CLOSED
4) LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOIDS (LV72,LV73)
5) AVBAY 4,6
6) AFT LCA 1,3
7) MID PCA-3, AFT PCA-I
8) VALVE POWER & CONTROL CIRCUITS
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ITEMS REFERENCED WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON
CREW, VEHICLE OR MISSION AND ARE THUS ASSIGNED CRITICALITY 3/3.
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS INCLUDED ARE 14 RESISTORS, 2 DIODES, 2 MDMS
AND 2 INDICATOR SWITCHES.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14. MAJOR HARDWARE
ITEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CIRCUITRY ARE THE LH2 RTLS DUMP
VALVES, MC284-0395-0023(0024,0033,0034,0043,0044,0053,0054) AND
THEIR ASSOCIATED OPENING SOLENOIDS, MC284-0404-0012.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-594
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/8v
EPDC/MPS
6022
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
F LIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (6)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES (PVlT,PVI8) NORMALLY CLOSED
LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOIDS (LV72,LV73)
AVBAY 4,6
AFT LCA I, 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLERS (6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
56V76AI23AR(4)
SEE REFERENCES
MC477-0261-0002, 56V76AI21AR(2); MC477-0263-0002,
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PREVENT LH2 RTLS DUMP. HYDROGEN WILL
VENT THROUGH THE RELIEF VALVE DURING RTLS DESCENT AND LANDING,
CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-595
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
111s18 
EPDC/MPS
6023
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/iS
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (4)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDCIMPS
2) LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
3) LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES (PVl7,PVI8) NORMALLY CLOSED
4) LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOIDS (LV72,LV73)
5) AVBAY 4,6
6) MID PCA-3, AFT PCA-I
7) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLERS (4)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
MC450-0017: 40V76A27RPC29,30, 54V76AI31RPC31,32
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PREVENT LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES FROM
OPERATING. HYDROGEN WILL VENT THROUGH THE RELIEF VALVE DURING
RTLS DESCENT AND LANDING, CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-596
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/Is/87
EPDC/MPS
6024
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLOCKING DIODE (4)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES (PVI7,PVI8) NORMALLY CLOSED
LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOIDS (LV72,LV73)
AVBAY 4,6
AFT PCA-I, MID PCA-3
BLOCKING DIODES (4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
JANTXINI204RA: 40V76A27A4CR7,8, 54V76AI31A3CR3,9
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PREVENT LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES FROM
OPERATING. HYDROGEN WILL VENT THROUGH THE RELIEF VALVE DURING
RTLS DESCENT AND LANDING, CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-597
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
II15187
EPDC/MPS
6025
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODE (2)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
3) LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES (PVI7,PV18) NORMALLY CLOSED
4) LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOIDS (LV72,LV73)
5) AVBAY 4,6
6) AFT PCA-I
7) ISOLATION DIODES (2)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
JANTXINI204RA: 54V76AI31CR4,10
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PREVENT LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES FROM
OPERATING. HYDROGEN WILL VENT THROUGH THE RELIEF VALVE DURING
RTLS DESCENT AND LANDING, CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-598
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/16/8v
EPDC/MPS
6026
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLIGHT CRITICAL AFT MDM (FAI,FA3,FA4)
FAIL ON, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES (PVl7,PVI8) NORMALLY CLOSED
LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOIDS (LV72,LV73)
AVBAY 4,6
MDM (3)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL" 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: 54V72A7, 56V72A9,10
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES TO OPEN,
ALLOWING LH2 TO ESCAPE THE VEHICLE AND CREATE A FIRE/EXPLOSION
HAZARD. LOSS OF LH2 WILL CAUSE ENGINES TO SHUTDOWN EARLY,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-599
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6027
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/ZR
ITEM: FLIGHT CRITICAL AFT MDM (FAI,FA3,FA4)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES (PVI7,PVI8) NORMALLY CLOSED
LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOIDS (LV72,LV73)
AVBAY 4,6
MDM (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: 54V72A7, 56V72A9,10
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PREVENT LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES FROM
OPERATING. HYDROGEN WILL VENT THROUGH THE RELIEF VALVE DURING
RTLS DESCENT AND LANDING, CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-600
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/04/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6051
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
ENERGIZING CIRCUITRY
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, LOSS OF OR PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MPS
2) H2 EPDC
3) LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVES (PVI4, PV15, PV16)
4) LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV36)
5) AV BAY 4
6) AFT LCA-1
7) LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID ENERGIZING
CIRCUITRY
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: CIRCUIT COMPONENT FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
OR VEHICLE.
NO HAZARDOUS CONDITION FOR CREW
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 12.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-601
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o4/86
EPDC/MPS
6061
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP CONTROL CIRCUITRY
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, LOSS OF OR PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MPS
H2 EPDC
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (PPI, PP2, PP3)
AV BAYS 4,5,6
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP CONTROL CIRCUITRY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CIRCUIT COMPONENT FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE MAY CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
OR VEHICLE.
NO HAZARDOUS CONDITION FOR CREW
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 12.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-602
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6071
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
 /IR
ITEM: FUSE, IA (3)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
3) LH2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN, TOPPING, AND HIGH POINT BLEED
VALVES (PVI2, PVI3, PV22)
4) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
5) FUSES (3)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/ 1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
ME451-0018-0100; 32V73A4FI2,13,14
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE WILL PRECLUDE MPS DUMP AND INERT. HYDROGEN WILL
ESCAPE THROUGH THE RELIEF VALVE DURING ENTRY AND LANDING,
CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. NO EFFECT ON RTLS BECAUSE RTLS
DUMP IS NOT MADE THROUGH FILL & DRAIN VALVES.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 13.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-603
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6072
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: TOGGLE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
3) LH2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN, TOPPING, AND HIGH POINT BLEED
VALVES (PVI2,PVI3,PV22)
4) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
5) TOGGLE SWITCH
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
ME452-0102-7256:32V73A459
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE WILL PRECLUDE MPS DUMP AND INERT. HYDROGEN WILL
ESCAPE THROUGH THE RELIEF VALVE DURING ENTRY AND LANDING,
CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. NO EFFECT ON RTLS BECAUSE RTLS
DUMP IS NOT MADE THROUGH FILL & DRAIN VALVES.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 13.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-604
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
I122187
EPDC/MPS
6073
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE SWITCH
FAIL SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
3) LH2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN, TOPPING, AND HIGH POINT BLEED
VALVES (PVI2,PV13,PV22)
4) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
5) TOGGLE SWITCH
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7256:32V73A459
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE DURING TANK FILL MAY CAUSE I/B FILL & DRAIN VALVE
TO CLOSE, POSSIBLY RESULTING IN RUPTURE OF THE FILL LINE, RELEASE
OF LH2 AND CREATION OF A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. SECOND FAILURE
AFTER ENGINE START MAY ALLOW VALVE TO OPEN, RESULTING IN
GAS FROM THE FILL LINE CAUSING CAVITATION IN THE ENGINE PUMPS AND
ENGINE EXPLOSION. SECOND FAILURE CAN PRECLUDE MPS DUMP, ALLOWING
H2 TO ESCAPE OVERBOARD DURING ENTRY AND LANDING, CREATING A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 13.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-605
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87
EPDC/MPS
6074
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (4)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
3) LH2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN, TOPPING, AND HIGH POINT BLEED
VALVES (PVI2, PVI3, PV22)
4) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
5) AV BAY 4
6) AFT LCA- 1
7) HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLERS (4)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
MC477-0263-0002: 54V76AI21AR(3)
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL MAKE THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE
INOPERATIVE. THIS WILL PRECLUDE LH2 DUMP AND ALLOW H2 TO VENT
DURING ENTRY AND LANDING, CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. NO
HAZARD DURING RTLS, SINCE RTLS DUMP DOES NOT USE THE FILL &
DRAIN VALVES.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 13.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-606
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87
EPDC/MPS
6075
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
INADVERTENT OUTPUT (SHORTED)
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
3) LH2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN, TOPPING, AND HIGH POINT BLEED
VALVES (PVI2,PVI3, PV22)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
AV BAY 4
AFT LCA-I
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLERS (4)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
2/1R RTLS: 3/3
2/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
MC477-0263-0002: 54V76AI21AR(3)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
SECOND FAILURE DURING TANK FILL MAY CAUSE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN
VALVE TO CLOSE, POSSIBLY RESULTING IN RUPTURE OF FILL & DRAIN
LINE, RELEASE OF LH2 AND CREATION OF A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
SECOND FAILURE CAN PRECLUDE MPS DUMP, ALLOWING H2 TO ESCAPE
OVERBOARD DURING ENTRY AND LANDING, CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION
HAZARD. NO HAZARD DURING RTLS.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 13.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-607
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/8v
EPDClMPS
6076
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODES (16)
FAIL OPEN, FAIL SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
3) LH2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN, TOPPING, AND HIGH POINT BLEED
VALVES (PVI2,PVI3,PV22)
4) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
5) AV BAY 4
6) AFT LCA-1
7) ISOLATION DIODES (16)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/1R
311R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: JANTX 54V76AI21CR
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL MAKE THE INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE
INOPERATIVE. THIS WILL PRECLUDE LH2 DUMP AND ALLOW H2 TO VENT
DURING ENTRY AND LANDING, CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. NO
HAZARD DURING RTLS, SINCE RTLS DUMP DOES NOT USE THE FILL &
DRAIN VALVES.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 13.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-608
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
6077 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
(2)
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTORS (9) AND BLEED RESISTORS
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
3) LH2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN, TOPPING, AND HIGH POINT BLEED
VALVES (PVI2, PVI3, PV22)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
AV BAY 4
AFT LCA-I
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTORS (9) AND BLEED RESISTORS (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
54V76AI21
SEE REFERENCES
RLR07C512GR(7), RLR20C222GR(2) , RLR07CI82G(2) :
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 13.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-609
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6078
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: MDM (FAI, 2, LAI)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
3) LH2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN, TOPPING, AND HIGH POINT BLEED
VALVES (PVI2, PVI3, PV22)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
AV BAY 4,5,6
AFT LCA-I
MDM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
54V72A7, 54V72A8, 56V72A33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL ALLOW LH2 TO ESCAPE THE VEHICLE
THROUGH THE FILL & DRAIN VALVES, CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION
HAZARD, OR DEPLETION OF FUEL AND EARLY ENGINE SHUTDOWN, CAUSING
LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 13 AND 16.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-610
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/8v
EPDC/MPS
6079
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE SWITCH INDICATOR
FAIL OPEN, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
3) LH2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN, TOPPING, AND HIGH POINT BLEED
VALVES (PV12, PVI3, PV22)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
AV BAY 4,5,6
AFT LCA-I
VALVE SWITCH INDICATOR (3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
50V41PVI2,13,22
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 13 AND 16.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-611
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87
EPDC/MPS
6081
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IA FUSE
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVll)
OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LV32,LV33)
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
FUSE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/1R
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE WILL PRECLUDE MPS LH2 DUMP. H2 WILL VENT
OVERBOARD DURING DESCENT AND LANDING, CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION
HAZARD.
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON RTLS, BECAUSE FILL & DRAIN VALVES ARE NOT
USED DURING RTLS.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-612
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6082
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: TOGGLE SWITCH, 32V73A438
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)
OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LV32,LV33)
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
TOGGLE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 2/IR
AOA: 2/IR
ATO: 2/ IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
ME452-0102-7153
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE WILL PRECLUDE MPS LH2 DUMP. H2 WILL VENT
OVERBOARD DURING DESCENT AND LANDING, CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION
HAZARD.
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON RTLS, BECAUSE FILL & DRAIN VALVES ARE NOT
USED DURING RTLS.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-613
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i12o18 
EPDClMPS
6083
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE SWITCH
FAIL SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVII)
OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LV32,LV33)
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
TOGGLE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: I/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
3/IR
311R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
ME452-0102-7153:32V73A458
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN LEAD TO SEVERAL CRITICAL SITUATIONS,
AS FOLLOWS. FAILURE(S) DURING TANK FILL CAN CAUSE FILL & DRAIN
VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING RUPTURE OF FILL LINE, RELEASING LH2 AND
CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. FAILURES DURING POWERED
FLIGHT COULD ALLOW FILL & DRAIN VALVES TO OPEN, RELEASING LH2 AND
CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD OR CAUSING EARLY ENGINE SHUTDOWN
AND LOSS OF VEHICLE. FAILURES COULD PREVENT LH2 DUMP AND ALLOW
H2 TO VENT OVERBOARD DURING ENTRY AND LANDING, CREATING A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-614
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87
EPDC/MPS
6084
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (2)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
3) LH2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVII)
4) OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LV32,LV33)
5) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
6) AV BAY 5
7) AFT LCA-2
8) HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: MC471-0263-0002
B [ P ] c[P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PREVENT OPERATION OF OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE, PRECLUDING MPS LH2 DUMP AND ALLOWING H2 TO VENT
OVERBOARD DURING ENTRY AND LANDING. THIS WILL CREATE A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE.
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT DURING RTLS, BECAUSE THE O/B FILL & DRAIN
VALVE IS NOT USED DURING RTLS MPS DUMP.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-615
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/2o/87
EPDC/MPS
6085
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
3) LH2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVII)
4) OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LV32,LV33)
5) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
6) AV BAY 5
7) AFT LCA-2
8) HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/ IR TAL: 2/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: MC471-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW O/B FILL & DRAIN VALVE TO
CLOSE DURING TANK FILL, RESULTING IN RUPTURE OF FILL LINE AND
RELEASE OF LH2, CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING POWERED FLIGHT WILL ALLOW BOTH FILL & DRAIN
VALVES TO OPEN, RELEASING LH2 AND CAUSING EARLY ENGINE SHUTDOWN,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN ALSO
PREVENT OPERATION OF O/B FILL & DRAIN VALVE, PRECLUDING LH2 DUMP
AND ALLOWING VENTING OF H2 TO CREATE A FIRE/EXPLOSION DURING
ENTRY AND LANDING.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-616
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6086
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: ISOLATION DIODE (4)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
3) LH2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVll)
4) OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LV32,LV33)
5) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
6) AV BAY 5
7) AFT LCA-2
8) ISOLATION DIODES (4)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] c[P]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PREVENT OPERATION OF OUTBOARD FILL &
DRAIN VALVE, PRECLUDING MPS LH2 DUMP AND ALLOWING H2 TO VENT
OUTBOARD DURING ENTRY AND LANDING. THIS WILL CREATE A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE.
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT DURING RTLS, BECAUSE THE O/B FILL & DRAIN
VALVE IS NOT USED DURING RTLS MPS DUMP.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-617
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
I/2o/87
EPDC/MPS
6087
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT LIMITING RRESISTOR (4)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVII)
OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LV32,LV33)
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
AV BAY 5
AFT LCA-2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: RLR07512GR
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-618
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/26/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6088
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: MDM
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN, INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
g)
EPDC/MPS
LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)
OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LV32,LV33)
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
AV BAY 5
MDM FA2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/1R
3/3 AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: MDM FA2, 55V72A8
B [ F ] c[p]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PREVENT OPERATION OF OUTBOARD FILL
AND DRAIN VALVE, PRECLUDING MPS LH2 DUMP AND ALLOWING H2 TO VENT
OVERBOARD DURING ENTRY AND LANDING. THIS WILL CREATE A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE.
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT DURING RTLS, BECAUSE THE O/B FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE IS NOT USED DURING RTLS MPS DUMP.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-619
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/87
EPDC/MPS
6089
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VALVE SWITCH INDICATOR
FAIL OPEN, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI1)
OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LV32, LV33)
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
VALVE SWITCH INDICATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: 50V411PVll
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-620
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6101
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE POWER AND
CONTROL CIRCUITS
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 FILL & DRAIN SYSTEM
3) LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PV8)
4) LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV25)
5) PANEL R4 (SWITCH POSITION)
6) MID PCA-I, -3
7) VALVE POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUITS
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ITEMS REFERENCES WILL NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE OR
MISSION. ELECTRICAL ITEMS INCLUDED ARE 5 RESISTORS, 2 DIODES AND
2 MDMS. ELECTRICAL ITEMS WITH A CRITICALITY OTHER THAN 3/3 ARE
LISTED SEPARATELY UNDER MDAC ID 6102 THROUGH 6109.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT 14. MAJOR HARDWARE
ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CIRCULTRY IS THE LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF
ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-621
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1127187
EPDC/MPS
6102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (2)
FAIL OPEN, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
3) LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PV8)
4) LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV25)
5) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
6) MID PCA-I, -3
7) RPC 24, 31
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
MC450-0017-I030: 40V76A25AR48, 40V76A27AR29
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE ISOLATION VALVE TO OPEN DURING
PRELAUNCH OR POWERED FLIGHT. ESCAPING H2 WILL CREATE A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT ITEMS CAN ALSO
PREVENT VALVE FROM OPENING AT MECO, ALLOWING RUPUTRE OF LH2
FEEDLINE MANIFOLD AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-622
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1127187
EPDC/MPS
6103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
3) LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PV8)
4) LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV25)
5) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
6) MID PCA-I, -3
7) HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
MC477-0263-0002: 40V76A25AR48, 40V76A27AR29
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE MAY CAUSE NORMALLY OPEN ISOLATION VALVE TO OPEN
DURING PRELAUNCH OR POWERED FLIGHT. ESCAPING H2 WILL CREATE A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. LOSS OF FUEL COULD ALSO CAUSE EARLY
ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-623
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
EPDC/MPS
6104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE SWITCH
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PV8)
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV25)
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
TOGGLE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD FLIGHT DECK, PANEL R4
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7354 : 32V73A458
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE NORMALLY OPEN ISOLATION VALVE TO
OPEN DURING PRELAUNCH OR POWERED FLIGHT. ESCAPING H2 WILL CREATE
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. LOSS OF FUEL COULD ALSO CAUSE EARLY
ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-624
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1127187
EPDC/MPS
6105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
IIIR
I/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE SWITCH
FAIL SHORTED, INADVERENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9)
EPDClMPS
LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PV8)
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV25)
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
TOGGLE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/IR RTLS: i/IR
LIFTOFF: 1/IR TAL: i/IR
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: i/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD FLIGHT DECK, PANEL R4
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7354: 32V73A458
c[p]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATI ONALE :
A SHORT ACROSS THE "OPEN" CONTACTS WILL OVERRIDE REDUNDANT CLOSE
COMMANDS AND TURN OFF REDUNDANT VALVE DRIVERS. THE ISOLATION
VALVE WILL OPEN AND ESCAPING H2 WILL CREATE A FIRE/EXPLOSION
HAZARD.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-625
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR (3)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
3) LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PV8)
4) LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV25)
5) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
6) MID PCA-I, -3
7) CURRENT LIMITING RESISTORS (3)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
RWR8051211FR: 32V73A4A9RI, 32V73A4ABR3
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE NORMALLY OPEN ISOLATION VALVE TO
OPEN DURING PRELAUNCH OR POWERED FLIGHT. ESCAPING H2 WILL CREATE
A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. LOSS OF FUEL COULD ALSO CAUSE EARLY
ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-626
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 6107 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODE (ii)
FAIL OPEN, FAIL SHORTED, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
3) LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PV8)
4) LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV25)
5) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
6) MID PCA -I, -3
7) ISOLATION DIODES (ii)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTO F F:
ONORBIT:
DEORBI T:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/1R RTLS: 3/1R
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN424C: 3273A4CR
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE NORMALLY OPEN ISOLATION VALVE TO
OPEN DURING PRELAUNCH OR POWERED FLIGHT. ESCAPING H2 WILL CREATE
A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. LOSS OF FUEL COULD ALSO CAUSE EARLY
ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-627
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87
EPDC/MPS
6108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODE (3)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
3) LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PV8)
4) LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV25)
5) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
6) MID PCA -I, -3
7) ISOLATION DIODES (3)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
JANTXINI204RA: 40V76A25ACRII, 4076A27A4CRI, CR2
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE MAY CAUSE NORMALLY OPEN ISOLATION VALVE TO OPEN
DURING PRELAUNCH OR POWERED FLIGHT. ESCAPING H2 WILL CREATE A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. LOSS OF FUEL COULD ALSO CAUSE EARLY
ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-628
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1127187
EPDC/MPS
6109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FAI, FA3, FA4)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPDCIMPS
2) LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
3) LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PV8)
4) LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV25)
5) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
6) AV BAY 4, 6
7) MDM FAI, FA3, FA4
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
54V75AI3, 54V75AIS, 54V72A9
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE NORMALLY OPEN ISOLATION VALVE TO
OPEN DURING PRELAUNCH OR POWERED FLIGHT. ESCAPING H2 WILL CREATE
A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. LOSS OF FUEL COULD ALSO CAUSE EARLY
ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 14.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-629
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/28/8 
EPDC/MPS
6121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
I/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
FAIL ON, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
3) GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56,LV57,LV58)
4) PANEL R2 (SWITCH LOCATION)
5) AVBAY 4,5,6
6) AFT LCA-I,-2, -3
7) HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLERS (6)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
2/IR RTLS: I/IR
2/1R TAL: 1/1R
3/3 AOA: I/IR
3/3 ATO: I/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
54V76AI21, 55V76AI22, 56V76AI23
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL CAUSE TWO FLOW CONTROL VALVES TO
BE OPEN UNNECESSARILY. THIS WILL RESULT IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF
LH2 TANK. RELIEVING OF EXCESS GH2 PRESSURE AT LOW ALTITUDE WILL
CREATE A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. FIRST FAILURE DURING
ABORTS (ONE ENGINE OUT) CAN CREATE SUCH A HAZARD.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 26.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-630
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/28/87
EPDC/MPS
6122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPDC/MPS
2) _-I2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
3) GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56,LV57,LV58)
4) PANEL R2 (SWITCH LOCATION)
5) AVBAY 4,5,6
6) AFT LCA-I,-2,-3
7) HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLERS (6)
S)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: I/IR
2/1R TAL: 1/1R
3/3 AOA: I/IR
3/3 ATO: I/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21, 55V76AI22, 56V76AI23
c[P]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL PREVENT TWO FLOW CONTROL VALVES
FROM OPENING WHEN THEY SHOULD. THIS WILL RESULT IN LOW ULLAGE
PRESSURE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE. FIRST FAILURE DURING
ABORTS (ONE ENGINE ALREADY OUT) CAN CAUSE LOW ULLAGE PRESSURE AND
LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 26.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-631
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/28/87
EPDC/MPS
6123
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
I/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE (3)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56,LV57,LV58)
PANEL R2 (SWITCH LOCATION)
FUSE, IA (FI8,FI9,F20)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 1/1R
2/IR TAL: i/IR
3/3 AOA: I/IR
3/3 ATO : i/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL PREVENT TWO FLOW CONTROL VALVES
FROM OPENING WHEN THEY SHOULD. THIS WILL RESULT IN LOW ULLAGE
PRESSURE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE. FIRST FAILURE DURING
ABORTS (ONE ENGINE ALREADY OUT) CAN CAUSE LOW ULLAGE PRESSURE AND
LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 26.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-632
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/04/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6131
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION LINE VENT VALVE SOLENOID
ENERGIZING CIRCUITRY
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, LOSS OF OR PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
GH2 PRESSURIZATION LINE VENT VALVE (LV52)
AV BAYS 4,5,6
GH2 PRESSURIZATION LINE VENT VALVE ENERGIZING CIRCUITRY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: CIRCUIT COMPONENT FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE DOES NOT CREATE A HAZARDOUS CONDITION FOR CREW OR
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 16.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-633
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87
EPDC/MPS
6141
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM (FA4)
FAILS OPEN, INADVERTENT OPERATION, FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
3) LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
4) OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LV50,LV51)
AV BAY 6
MDM FA4
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
i/1
i/i
i/i
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
56V72AI0
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL PREVENT CLOSURE OF RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE.
IF THE VALVE IS NOT CLOSED AT ET SEP, THE THRUST OF ESCAPING LH2
CAN CAUSE RECONTACT WITH THE ET AND LOSS OF THE ORBITER. IF
RECONTACT DAMAGE IS LIMITED TO TPS TILES, THE ORBITER CAN BE
DESTROYED DURING ENTRY.
AERO FORCES WILL PREVENT RECONTACT FOLLOWING AN RTLS ET SEP.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 16.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-634
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21187
EPDC/MPS
6142
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (2)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
3) LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
4) OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LV50,LV51)
5) AV BAY 6
6) AFT LCA-3
7) HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLERS (2)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: i/i ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
1/1
1/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
MC471-0263-0002: 56V76AI23AR
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL PREVENT CLOSURE OF RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE.
IF THE VALVE IS NOT CLOSED AT ET SEP, THE THRUST OF ESCAPING LH2
CAN CAUSE RECONTACT WITH THE ET AND LOSS OF THE ORBITER. IF
RECONTACT DAMAGE IS LIMITED TO TPS TILES, THE ORBITER CAN BE
DESTROYED DURING ENTRY.
AERO FORCES WILL PREVENT RECONTACT FOLLOWING AN RTLS ET SEP.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 16.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-635
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87
EPDC/MPS
6143
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR, 5.1K (4)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
3) LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
4) OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LV50,LV51)
5) AV BAY 6
6) AFT LCA-3
7) CURRENT LIMITING RESISTORS (4)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR: 56V76AI23R
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 16.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-636
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6144
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: ISOLATION DIODES (4)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
3) LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
4) OPEN/CLOSE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LVS0,LV51)
5) AV BAY 6
6) AFT LCA-3
7) ISOLATION DIODES (4)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: JANTXIN5551: 56V76AI23CR
C [NA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 16.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-637
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/2 i/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6145
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: POSITION INDICATOR SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN, FAIL SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
3) LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
POSITION INDICATOR SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
50V41PD3
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHT 16.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-638
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6151
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: LH2 PREVALVE POWER & CONTROL CIRCUITS
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN, FAIL SHORTED, INADVERTENT OUTPUT,
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
LV23)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PVS, PV6)
PREVALVE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LVI8, LVI9, LV20, LV21, LV22,
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
AVBAY 4,5,6
AFT PCA -4,-5,-6
AFT LCA -i,-2,-3
PREVALVE POWER & CONTROL CIRCUITS
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS ARE CRITICALITY 3/3 WITH THE EXCEPTION OF
9 FUSES, 3 SWITCHES, 12 RPCS, 84 DIODES AND 4 MDMS. THESE ITEMS
ARE ASSESSED UNDER MDAC ID 6152 THROUGH 6160.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT. 9 AND I0. MAJOR
HARDWARE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CIRCUITRY IS THE LH2 PREVALVES (3),
MC284-0396-0006, AND THEIR ASSOCIATED OPENING AND CLOSING
SOLENOIDS (6), MC284-0404-0021.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-639
i
<_
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/29/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6152
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM: FUSE
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
3) LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
4) PREVALVE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LVI8, LVI9, LV20, LV21, LV22,
LV23)
5) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
6) 1A FUSES (9)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
ME451-0018-0100:32V73A4F25 THRU F33
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE PREVALVE TO CLOSE DURING POWERED
FLIGHT, RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT. 9 AND i0.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-640
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/29/8v
EPDC/MPS
6153
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE SWITCH
FAIL OPEN, FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
3) LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
4) PREVALVE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LVI8, LVI9, LV20, LV21, LV22,
LV23)
5) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
6) TOGGLE SWITCH (3)
v)
s)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3 / 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD FLIGHT DECK, PANEL R4
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7354: 32V73A4514, 515, 516
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE PREVALVE TO CLOSE DURING
ENGINE BURN, RESULTING IN ENGINE EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT. 9 AND i0.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-641
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/29/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6154
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 3A
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN, FAIL SHORTED, INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
3) LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
4) PREVALVE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LVI8, LVI9, LV20, LV21, LV22,
LV23)
5) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
6) AVBAY 4,5,6
7) AFT PCA -4,-5,-6
8) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLERS, 3A (12)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I030: 54V76AI34RPC35,36,39,40,
55V7 6A13 5RPC35,36,39,40, 56V76AI36RPC35,36,39,40
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE PREVALVE TO CLOSE DURING
ENGINE BURN, RESULTING IN ENGINE EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT. 9 AND i0.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-642
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/29/s7
EPDC/MPS
6155
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/iS
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I (6)
FAIL OPEN, FAIL SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
3) LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PVS, PV6)
4) PREVALVE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LVI8, LVI9, LV20, LV21, LV22,
LV23)
5) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
6) AVBAY 4,5,6
7) AFT LCA -1,-2,-3
8) HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I (6)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76A123AR(2)
SEE REFERENCES
MC477-0261-0002: 54V76AI21AR(2), 55V76AI22AR(2),
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF .ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE PREVALVE TO CLOSE DURING
ENGINE BURN, RESULTING IN ENGINE EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT. 9 AND i0.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-643
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/29/87
EPDC/MPS
6156
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III (12)
FAIL OPEN, FAIL SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
3) LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
4) PREVALVE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LVI8, LVI9, LV20, LV21, LV22,
LV23)
5) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
6) AVBAY 4,5,6
7) AFT LCA -i,-2,-3
8) HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLERS, TYPE III (12)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
55V76A123AR (4 )
SEE REFERENCES
MC477-0261-0002: 54V76AI21AR(4), 55V76AI22AR(4),
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE PREVALVE TO CLOSE DURING
ENGINE BURN, RESULTING IN ENGINE EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT. 9 AND I0.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-644
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/29/87
EPDC/MPS
6157
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODES, 12A (18)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
3) LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PVS, PV6)
4) PREVALVE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LVI8, LVI9, LV20, LV21, LV22,
LV23)
5) PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
6) AVBAY 4,5,6
7) AFT PCA -4,-5,-6
8) ISOLATION DIODES, 12A (18)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA: 54V76AI34A4CR25 THRU 28,31,32,
55V76AI35A4CR25 THRU 28,31,32, 56V76AI36A4CR25 THRU 28,31,32
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE PREVALVE TO CLOSE DURING
ENGINE BURN, RESULTING IN ENGINE EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT. 9 AND i0.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-645
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i12918 
EPDCIMPS
6158
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODES, 4.2A (3)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
3) LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
4) PREVALVE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LVI8, LVI9, LV20, LV21, LV22,
LV23)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
AVBAY 4,5,6
AFT PCA -4,-5,-6
AFT LCA -I,-2,-3
ISOLATION DIODES, 4.2A (30)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246: 54V76AI34AICRII,12,15,16,18,
54V76AI34A2CRII,12,15,16,18, 55V76AI35AICRII,12,15,16,18,
55V76AI35A2CRII,12,15,16,18, 56V76AI36AICRII, 12,15,16,18,
56V76A136A2CRII, 12,15,16,18
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE PREVALVE TO CLOSE DURING
ENGINE BURN, RESULTING IN ENGINE EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT. 9 AND I0.
REPORT DATE 01116/87 C-646
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/29/87
EPDC/MPS
6159
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODE (36)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2)
3)
4)
LV23 )
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PVS, PV6)
PREVALVE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LVI8, LVI9, LV20, LV21, LV22,
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
AVBAY 4,5,6
AFT PCA -4,-5,-6
AFT LCA -I,-2,-3
ISOLATION DIODES (36)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AXXXXX(12), 55V76AI22AXXXXX(12),
56V76A123AXXXXX (12)
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE PREVALVE TO CLOSE DURING
ENGINE BURN, RESULTING IN ENGINE EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT. 9 AND i0.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-647
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1129187
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 6160
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: MODULATOR DEMODULATOR (4)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN, FAIL SHORTED, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
3) LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PVS, PV6)
4) PREVALVE CONTROL SOLENOIDS (LVI8, LVI9, LV20, LV21, LV22,
LV23)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
AVBAY 4,5,6
MDM FAI, FA2, FA3, FA4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF : 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
54V72A7, 55V72A8, 56V72A9, 56V72AI0
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE PREVALVE TO CLOSE DURING ENGINE BURN,
RESULTING IN ENGINE EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT. 9 AND I0.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-648
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 7100
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: VALVE POWER & CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR HELIUM
ISOLATION VALVES
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPDC/MPS
2) ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
3) HELIUM ISOLATION VALVES, REG PNL A,B (LV 1,2; 3,4; 5,6)
4) PANEL R2 (SWITCH LOCATION)
5) AVBAY 4,5,6
6) AFT LCA 1,2,3
7) AFT PCA 4,5,6
8) VALVE POWER & CONTROL CIRCUITS
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ITEMS REFERENCED ON THIS SHEET WILL NOT EFFECT CREW,
VEHICLE, OR MISSION. ALL ARE CRITICALITY 3. ELECTRICAL ITEMS
INCLUDED ARE 39 RESISTORS, 18 DIODES, AND 6 REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLERS. ELECTRICAL ITEMS WITH A CRITICALITY OTHER THAN 3
ARE LISTED SEPARATELY UNDER MDAC ID 7110 THROUGH 7180.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17,18,19. MAJOR
HARDWARE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CIRCUITRY ARE THE SSME HELIUM
ISOLATION VALVES(6), ME284-0403-0017(0007).
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-649
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86
EPDC/MPS
7110
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IAMP (9)
OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EPDC/MPS
2) ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
3) HELIUM SUPPLY ISOL VALVE A,B (LV 1,2; 3,4; 5,6)
4) AV BAY 4,5,6
5) ALCA 1,2,3
6) APCA 4,5,6
7) PANEL R2
8) FUSE (F 76,61,62; 27,25,26; 59,57,58)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT STATION
ME451-0010-0100
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO OPEN OR REMAIN OPEN IS EASILY RECOGNIZABLE. SHOULD
THE VALVE FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN DURING ENGINE OPERATION A REDUNDANT
SUPPLY ROUTE IS AVAILABLE, BUT ONLY ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF
AN ENGINE FROM LOSS OF HELIUM (MISSION FAILURE). DURING
ABORTS, SHOULD THIS SCENARIO OCCUR, LOSS OF THE 2ND ENGINE (SEE
MPS GRs) RESULTS IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17, 18, 19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-650
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/1s/s 
EPDC/MPS
7120
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE SWITCH, IP3T (3)
OPEN, FAILS TO TRANSFER, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPDC/MPS
2) ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
3) HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION 'A' VALVES (LV 1,3,5)
4) AV BAY 4,5,6
5) ALCA 1,2,3
6) PANEL R2
7) TOGGLE SWITCH (S 55,56,57)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 1R
LI FTOFF: 3/2 R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT STATION
ME452-0102-7103
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO OPEN OR REMAIN OPEN IS EASILY RECOGNIZABLE. SHOULD
THE VALVE FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN DURING ENGINE OPERATION A REDUNDANT
SUPPLY ROUTE IS AVAILABLE, BUT ONLY ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF
AN ENGINE FROM LOSS OF HELIUM (MISSION FAILURE). DURING
ABORTS, SHOULD THIS SCENARIO OCCUR, LOSS OF THE 2ND ENGINE (SEE
MPS GRs) RESULTS IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17, 18, 19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-651
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86
EPDC/MPS
7130
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE SWITCH, 2P3T (3)
OPEN, FAILS TO TRANSFER, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPDC/MPS
2) ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
3) HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION 'B' VALVES (LV 2,4,6)
4) AV BAY 4,5,6
5) ALCA 1,2,3
6) APCA 4,5,6
7) PANEL R2
8) TOGGLE SWITCH (S 12,13,14)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 2R TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT STATION
PART NUMBER: UNKNOWN
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO OPEN OR REMAIN OPEN IS EASILY RECOGNIZABLE. SHOULD
THE VALVE FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN DURING ENGINE OPERATION A REDUNDANT
SUPPLY ROUTE IS AVAILABLE, BUT ONLY ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF
AN ENGINE FROM LOSS OF HELIUM (MISSION FAILURE). DURING
ABORTS, SHOULD THIS SCENARIO OCCUR, LOSS OF THE 2ND ENGINE (SEE
MPS GRs) RESULTS IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17,18,19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-652
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86
EPDC/MPS
7140
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (3)
OPEN, CLOSE, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVES 'A' (LV 1,3,5)
AV BAY 4,5,6
ALCA I, 2,3
HYBRID DRIVER (AR #s UNKNOWN)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2 R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT LCA 1,2,3
PART NUMBER: ME477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE TO OPEN OR REMAIN OPEN IS EASILY RECOGNIZABLE. SHOULD
THE VALVE FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN DURING ENGINE OPERATION A REDUNDANT
SUPPLY ROUTE IS AVAILABLE, BUT ONLY ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF
AN ENGINE FROM LOSS OF HELIUM (MISSION FAILURE). DURING
ABORTS, SHOULD THIS SCENARIO OCCUR, LOSS OF THE 2ND ENGINE (SEE
MPS GRs) RESULTS IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17,18,19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-653
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86
EPDC/MPS
7150
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I (6)
OPEN, CLOSE, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPDC/MPS
2) ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
3) HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVES 'B' (LV 2,4,6)
4) AV BAY 4,5,6
5) ALCA 2,3,1
6) APCA 6,4,5
7) HYBRID DRIVER (AR #s UNKNOWN)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 2,3,1
ME477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO OPEN OR REMAIN OPEN IS EASILY RECOGNIZABLE. SHOULD
THE VALVE FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN DURING ENGINE OPERATION A REDUNDANT
SUPPLY ROUTE IS AVAILABLE, BUT ONLY ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF
AN ENGINE FROM LOSS OF HELIUM (MISSION FAILURE). DURING
ABORTS, SHOULD THIS SCENARIO OCCUR, LOSS OF THE 2ND ENGINE (SEE
MPS GRs) RESULTS IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17,18,19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-654
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86
EPDC/MPS
7160
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODES (6)
SHORTED, OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVES 'B' (LV 2,4,6)
AV BAY 4,5,6
APCA 5,6,4
ISOLATION DIODES (A4CR23, A4CR24)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT PCA 5/6; 6/4; 4/5
JANTXlN 1204 RA
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO OPEN OR REMAIN OPEN IS EASILY RECOGNIZABLE. SHOULD
THE VALVE FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN DURING ENGINE OPERATION A REDUNDANT
SUPPLY ROUTE IS AVAILABLE, BUT ONLY ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF
AN ENGINE FROM LOSS OF HELIUM (MISSION FAILURE). DURING
ABORTS, SHOULD THIS SCENARIO OCCUR, LOSS OF THE 2ND ENGINE (SEE
MPS GRs) RESULTS IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17,18,19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-655
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/os/87
EPDC/MPS
7170
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODES (9)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPDC/MPS
2) ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
3) HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVES (LVI,2;3,4;5,6)
4) AV BAY 4,5,6
5) APCA 4,5,6
6) ISOLATION DIODES (A3CR3, AICR4, -3 EACH)
7) ALCA 1,2,3
8) ISOLATION DIODES (# UNKNOWN-3)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
313 ATO: 311R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT PCA 4,5,6; AFT LCA 1,2,3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE DIODES ARE INLINE DEVICES TO THE SWITCHES CONTROLLING EACH
OF THE ISOLATION VALVES. LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY DURING POWERED
FLIGHT MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION AND IN THE ABORT CASES MAY
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE OR CREW DUE TO LOSS OF HELIUM PURGE
TO AN ENGINE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17,18,19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-656
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2105187
EPDC/MPS
7180
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODES (3)
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVES, REG PNL A (LVl, 3,5)
AV BAY
ALCA 1,2,3
ISOLATION DIODES (AR # UNKNOWN)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT LCAs 1,2,3
PART NUMBER: JANTXYIN4246
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE DIODES ARE IN SERIES WITH THE OUTPUT OF MDM CHANNELS
SUPPLYING REDUNDANT SIGNALS TO THE HELIUM ISOL VALVES 'A'.
COMMANDS THRU THE MDM'S ARE TERMINATED AT MECO. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DURING POWERED FLIGHT MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION OR
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE OR CREW DURING ABORT CASES.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17,18,19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-657
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/26/87
EPDC/MPS
7190
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM, FLIGHT AFT 1,2,3,4
FAILS OPEN, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OFF)
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
HELIUM ISOLATION VALVES, PEG PNL A,B (LVI,2;3,4;5,6)
AV BAY 4,5,6
MDM FA 1,2,3,4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAYS 4,5,6
MC615-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING POWERED FLIGHT THE ISOL VALVES ARE COMMANDED ON THRU THE
MDM AS WELL AS FROM PANEL R2. FAILURE TO OUTPUT HAS NO EFFECT
UNLESS ACCOMPANIED BY OTHER FAILURES.
REFERENCES: RI DWG VS72-941102 SHT. 17,18,19 AND BOOSTER SYSTEMS
BRIEFS, JSC 19401, I-OCT-1984.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-658
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1127187
EPDC/MPS
7191
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWlFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM, FLIGHT AFT 1,2,3,4
FAILS SHORTED, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (ON)
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
HELIUM ISOLATION VALVES, REG PNL A,B (LVI,2;3,4;5,6)
AV BAY 4,5,6
MDM FA 1,2,3,4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAYS 4,5,6
MC615-0004-6110, 5110
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
DURING POWERED FLIGHT THE ISOL VALVES ARE COMMANDED ON THRU THE
MDM'S AS WELL AS FROM PANEL R2. FAILING ON DURING THIS PERIOD OR
AFTER MECO HAS NO EFFECT. FAILING ON DURING RTLS OR TAL ABORTS
HAS NO EFFECT SINCE THE 'BI VALVE OF THE LEFT ENGINE (LV4)
IS REQUIRED TO BE OPEN FOR PURGE OF THE AFT COMPARTMENT WHILE
ENGINE PNEUMATIC PACKAGE PRESSURE ACTUATED VALVES PREVENT
OVERBOARD LOSS OF HELIUM THRU THE ENGINES. FAILING ON HAS NO
EFFECT DURING NORMAL ENTRIES AS ISOL VALVES (LV 1,2,3,5,6) ARE
PLACED IN THE CLOSED POSITION (CREW) BLOCKING ERRONEOUS MDM
OUTPUTS.
REFERENCES: RI DWG VS72-941102 SHT. 17,18,19 AND BOOSTER SYSTEMS
BRIEFS, JSC 19401, I-OCT-1984.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-659
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 7200
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: VALVE POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR HELIUM
INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
3) HELIUM INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES (LV 59,61,63)
4) PANEL R2 (SWITCH LOCATION)
5) AV BAY 4,5,6
6) MPCA 1,2,3
7) VALVE POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUITS
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCE
SEE REFERENCE
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ITEMS REFERENCED ON THIS SHEET WILL NOT EFFECT CREW,
VEHICLE OR MISSION. ALL ARE CRITICALITY 3. ELECTRICAL ITEMS
INCLUDED WITHIN THIS SHEET ARE 33 RESISTORS, 12 ISOLATION DIODES,
6 REMOTE POWER CONTROLLERS AND 9 HYBRID DRIVERS. FAILURE
MODES FOR COMPONENTS WITH A CRITICALITY OTHER THAN 3 ARE LISTED
SEPARATELY UNDER MDAC ID 7210 THROUGH 7260.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17,18,19. MAJOR
HARDWARE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CIRCUITRY ARE THE SSME HARDWARE
HELIUM INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES (6). ME284-0403-0017(0007).
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-660
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86
EPDC/MPS
7210
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 1AMP (6)
OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
HELIUM INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES (LV 59,61,63)
AV BAY 4,5,6
MPCA 1,2,3
FUSE (F 73,74,75,28,29,30)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT STATION
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT UNLESS IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM TO AN ENGINE HELIUM PURGE SYSTEM. THE LEFT
ENGINE INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE (LV61) IS ALSO CRITICAL TO AFT
COMPARTMENT PURGES DURING RTLS AND TAL ABORT LANDING PHASES.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17, 18, 19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-661
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86
EPDC/MPS
7220
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2R
1/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE SWITCH, 2P3T (3)
OPEN, FAILS TO TRANSFER, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
3) HELIUM INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES (LV 59,61,63)
4) AV BAY 4,5,6
5) ALCA 1,2,3
6) MPCA 1,2,3
7) PANEL R2
8) TOGGLE SWITCH (S 9,10,ii)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: I/IR
2/2R TAL: i/IR
3/3 AOA: I/IR
3/3 ATO: 1/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT STATION
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7203
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT UNLESS IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM TO AN ENGINE HELIUM PURGE SYSTEM. THE LEFT
ENGINE INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE (LV61) IS ALSO CRITICAL TO AFT
COMPARTMENT PURGES DURING RTLS AND TAL ABORT LANDING PHASES.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17, 18, 19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-662
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/19/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 7230
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
2/1R
ITEM: ISOLATION DIODES (6)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
HELIUM INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES (LV 59,61,63)
AV BAY 4,5,6
MPCA 1,2,3
ISOLATION DIODES (A2CRI2,15; 14,A4CR9; 10,5)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/2R TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/3 ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ALL OTHERS)
MID PCA 1/2; 2/3; 3/1
JANTXINII88RA (35A, A2CRI2); JANTXINI204RA (12A,
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT UNLESS IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM TO AN ENGINE HELIUM PURGE SYSTEM. THE LEFT
ENGINE INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE (LV61) IS ALSO CRITICAL TO AFT
COMPARTMENT PURGES DURING RTLS AND TAL ABORT LANDING PHASES.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17, 18, 19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-663
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86
EPDC/MPS
7231
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
I/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODES (6)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
HELIUM INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES (LV 59,61,63)
AV BAY 4,5,6
MPCA 1,2,3
ISOLATION DIODES (A2CRI2,15; 14,A4CR9; 10,5)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: i/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID PCA 1/2; 2/3; 3/1
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT UNLESS IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM TOAN ENGINE HELIUM PURGE SYSTEM. THE LEFT
ENGINE INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE (LV61) IS ALSO CRITICAL TO AFT
COMPARTMENT PURGES DURING RTLS AND TAL ABORT LANDING PHASES.
AN INCREASE IN MAIN BUS VOLTAGE, IN THE REDUNDANT CIRCUIT, ABOVE
THE FAILED CIRCUIT BUS VOLTAGE WILLRESULT IN REVERSE CURRENT
THRU THE SHORTED DIODE AND RPC. THIS WILL CAUSE THE REDUNDANT
RPC TO TURN OFF DUE TO CURRENT OVERLOAD. AS A RESULT, THE
HIGHER CRITICALITY IS ASSIGNED TO ABORT CASES.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17, 18, 19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-664
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/19/86
EPDC/MPS
7240
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
312R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (6)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
HELIUM INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES (LV 59,61,63)
AV BAY 4,5,6
MPCA 1,2,3
RPCA (39,37; 38,33; 38,34)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID PCA 1/2; 2/3; 1/3
MC450-0017-1050
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT UNLESS IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM TOAN ENGINE HELIUM PURGE SYSTEM. THE LEFT
ENGINE INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE (LV61) IS ALSO CRITICAL TO AFT
COMPARTMENT PURGES DURING RTLS AND TAL ABORT LANDING PHASES.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17, 18, 19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-665
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/22/86
EPDC/MPS
7250
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I (6)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
HELIUM INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES (LV 59,61, 63)
AV BAY 4,5,6
MPCA 1,2,3
HYBRID DRIVERS (AR 51,41; 42,31; 32,50)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID PCA 1/2; 2/3; 3/1
ME477-0261-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
CONTAMINATI ON
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT UNLESS IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM TO AN ENGINE HELIUM PURGE SYSTEM. THE LEFT
ENGINE INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE (LV61) IS ALSO CRITICAL TO AFT
COMPARTMENT PURGES DURING RTLS AND TAL ABORT LANDING PHASES.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17, 18, 19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-666
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
21o51s7
EPDCIMPS
7260
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION DIODES (12)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
EACH)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
HELIUM INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES (LV 59,61,63)
AV BAY 4,5,6
MPCA 1,2,3
ISOLATION DIODES (A6CR3,4,5,6 - 1 EACH, A5CR3,4,5,6 - 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID PCA 1,2,3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE DIODES ARE INSTALLED IN SERIES WITH THE OUTPUT OF MDM
CHANNELS SUPPLYING REDUNDANT SIGNALS TO THE INTERCONNECT INLET
VALVES. COMMANDS THRU THE MDMtS ARE TERMINATED AT MECO. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY DURING POWERED FLIGHT MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION OR LOSS OF VEHICLE OR CREW DURING ABORT CASES.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17, 18, 19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-667
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1129187
EPDC/MPS
7270
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM, FLIGHT AFT 1,2,3
FAILS OPEN, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (OFF)
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
HELIUM INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES (LV 59,61,63)
AV BAY 4,5,6
MDM FA 1,2,4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO OUTPUT HAS NO EFFECT DURING POWERED FLIGHT AS THE
INLET VALVES ASSOCIATED WITH THESE MDM'S ARE NOT OPENED DURING
THIS PERIOD. FAILURE TO OUTPUT DURING AN RTLS OR TAL ABORTS MAY
SEVERELY LIMIT THE QUANTITY OF HELIUM AVAILABLE FOR THE AFT
COMPARTMENT PURGE. THIS PURGE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS MANDATORY
TO PREVENT HYDROGEN ACCUMULATION AND POSSIBLE EXPLOSION DURING
THE LANDING PHASE OF THESE ABORTS. NOTE: THE CRITICALITY APPLIES
TO THE MDM'S (FA 2,3,) SUPPORTING THE LEFT ENGINE
INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE ONLY (LV61). ALL OTHERS ARE CRIT 3.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17,18,19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-668
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1129187
EPDC/MPS
7271
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM, FLIGHT AFT 1,2,3
FAILS SHORTED, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (ON)
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
HELIUM INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES (LV 59,61,63)
AV BAY 4,5,6
MDM FA 1,2,4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-6110,5110
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE MDM IN THIS MODE HAS NO EFFECT ON LOSS OF HELIUM
FROM THE SYSTEM. HOWEVER, UNEXPECTED PRESSURE VARIATIONS MAY
OCCUR ACROSS THE SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17,18,19.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-669
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 7300
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: VALVE POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR HELIUM
INTERCONNECT OUTLET VALVES
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
HELIUM INTERCONNECT OUTLET VALVES (LV 60,62,64)
AV BAY 4,5,6
ALCA i, 2,3
VALVE POWER & CONTROL CIRCUITS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE OF ITEMS REFERENCED ON THIS SHEET WILL NOT EFFECT CREW,
VEHICLE OR MISSION. ALL ARE CRITICALITY 3. ELECTRICAL ITEMS
INCLUDED WITHIN THIS SHEET ARE 12 RESISTORS, 9 ISOLATION DIODES,
3 HYBRID DRIVERS, 3 SWITCHES, AND 3 FUSES. THE 3 FUSES AND 3
SWITCHES ARE COMMON TO THE SINGLE REDUNDANT STRING OF THE INLET
VALVES AND ARE ASSESSED A CRITICALITY OF 3 WITH RESPECT TO THE
OUTLET VALVES, BUT NOT THE INLET VALVES. SEE MDAC ID 7210 AND
7220.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT. 17,18,19. MAJOR
HARDWARE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CIRCUITRY ARE THE SSME HELIUM
INTERCONNECT OUTLET VALVES (6). MC284-0403-0011(-0001).
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-670
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 7400 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE POWER AND
CONTROL CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE, REG PNL 4 (LV7,LV8)
4) PANEL R2 (SWITCH LOCATION)
5) AVBAY 4,5,6
6) AFT LCA 1,2
7) VALVE POWER & CONTROL CIRCUITS
s)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES:
SHOCK
VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ITEMS REFERENCED WILL NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE OR
MISSION. ELECTRICAL ITEMS INCLUDED ARE 5 RESISTORS AND 14
DIODES.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT 20. MAJOR HARDWARE
ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CIRCUITRY ARE THE PNEUMATIC HELIUM ISOLATION
VALVES (2), MC284-0403-0011.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-671
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 7420 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN, SHORTED, OR INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE (LVI0)
4) PANEL R2 (SWITCH LOCATION)
5) AV BAY 6
6) AFT LCA 3
7) PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ITEMS REFERENCED WILL NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE, OR
MISSION. ELECTRICAL ITEMS INCLUDED ARE 4 RESISTORS AND 2 DIODES.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHT 18.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-672
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
7430 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
CIRCUIT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE CONTROL
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO CLOSE, SHORTED TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE (LVI0) CONTROL
CIRCUIT
4) TOGGLE SWITCH (PANEL R2,$54)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FLIGHT DECK
ME452-0102-7103
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SWITCH WILL PREVENT OPERATION OF CROSSOVER VALVE. NO
EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE IN NOMINAL FLIGHT BUT LOSS OF CREW OR
VEHICLE IN ABORT MODES, DUE TO LOSS OF AFT COMPARTMENT PURGE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT 18.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-673
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
7440 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
CIRCUIT FUSE
FAILURE MODE:
PNEUMATICHELIUM CROSSOVERSOLENOIDVALVE CONTROL
FAILS OPEN (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE (LVI0) CONTROL
CIRCUIT
4) PANEL R2 (SWITCH LOCATION)
5) FUSE, 1A (F 6)
6)
V)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAF ING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD FLIGHT DECK
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE OF FUSE WILL PREVENT OPERATION OF CROSSOVER VALVE. NO
EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE IN NOMINAL FLIGHT BUT LOSS OF LIFE OR
VEHICLE IN ABORT MODES, DUE TO LOSS OF AFT COMPARTMENT PURGE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT 18.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-674
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 7450 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE CONTROL
CIRCUIT ISOLATION DIODES
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE (LVI0) CONTROL
CIRCUIT
4) PANEL R2 (SWITCH LOCATION)
5) AVBAY 6
6) AFT LCA 3
7) ISOLATION DIODES (4)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
56V76AI23CR
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ISOLATION DIODES WILL PREVENT OPERATION OF CROSSOVER
VALVE. NO EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE IN NOMINAL FLIGHT, BUT LOSS
OF CREW OR VEHICLE IN ABORT MODES, DUE TO LOSS OF AFT COMPARTMENT
PURGE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT 18.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-675
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 7460 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: PNEUMATICHELIUM CROSSOVERSOLENOIDVALVE CONTROL
CIRCUIT HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE (LVI0) CONTROL
CIRCUIT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PANEL R2 (SWITCH LOCATION)
AVBAY 6
AFT LCA 3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: ME477-0263-0002
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF DRIVER WILL PREVENT OPERATION OF CROSSOVER VALVE. NO
EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE IN NOMINAL FLIGHT, BUT LOSS OF CREW OR
VEHICLE IN ABORT MODES, DUE TO LOSS OF AFT COMPARTMENT PURGE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHT 18.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-676
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
7470 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE:
HELIUM SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVES POWER AND CONTROL
FAILS OPEN, SHORTED, OR INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVES (LV26,LV27)
AV BAY 4
AFT LCA 1
BLOWDOWN VALVE POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUITS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ITEMS REFERENCED WILL NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE OR
MISSION. ELECTRICAL ITEMS INCLUDED ARE 2 RESISTORS AND 2 DIODES.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHEET 20.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-677
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID: 7480
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: HELIUM SUPPLY BLOWDOWNVALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVES (LV20,LV27)
4) AV BAY 4
5) AFT LCA 1
6) BLOWDOWN VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
(ARIII)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
54V76AI21
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF DRIVER ON WILL ALLOW OFF NOMINAL OPENING OF BLOWDOWN
VALVES RESULTING IN LOSS OF HELIUM AVAILABLE FOR LO2 DUMP. LOSS
OF LO2 DUMP RESULTS IN LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROL AND LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHEET 20.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-678
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
7490 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
COMMANDS
FAILURE MODE:
HELIUM SUPPLYBLOWDOWNVALVESCONTROLCIRCUIT MDM
FAILS ON (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVES (LV20, LV27)
AV BAY 4
AFT LCA 1
BLOWDOWN VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT MDM COMMANDS (FA3,FA4)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: V41KI631N, 35N
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE OF MDM COMMAND ON WILL ALLOW OFF NOMINAL OPENING OF
BLOWDOWN VALVES RESULTING IN LOSS OF HELIUM AVAILABLE FOR LO2
DUMP. LOSS OF L02 DUMP RESULTS IN LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROL.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHEET 20.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-679
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1127187
EPDC/MPS
7500
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLI GHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE:
L02 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL
FAILS OPEN, SHORTED OR INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
L02 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES (LV40,LV41)
AV BAY 6
AFT LCA 3
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUITS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ITEMS REFERENCED WILL NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE OR
MISSION. ELECTRICAL ITEMS INCLUDED ARE 5 RESISTORS AND I0
DIODES.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHEET 20.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-680
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 7510 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT HYBRID
DRIVER CONTROLLER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPDC/MPS
2) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
3) LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES (LV40,LV41)
4) AV BAY 6
5) AFT LCA 3
6) LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT HYBRID DRIVER
CONTROLLER (ARIII)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
56V76A123
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE OF DRIVER OFF WILL NOT ALLOW OPENING OF REPRESS VALVES
RESULTING IN LOSS OF HELIUM AVAILABLE FOR MPS L02 DUMP. LOSS OF
LO2 DUMP RESULTS IN LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROL AND LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHEET 20.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-681
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
7520 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
COMMANDS
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT MDM
FAILS OFF (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
L02 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES (LV40,LV41)
AV BAY 6
AFT LCA 3
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT MDM COMMANDS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] SIP] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
V41FI535X, 37X
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF MDM COMMANDS OFF WILL NOT ALLOW OPENING OF REPRESS
VALVES RESULTING IN LOSS OF HELIUM AVAILABLE FOR MPS LO2 DUMP.
LOSS OF LO2 DUMP RESULTS IN LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROL AND LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHEET 20.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-682
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
7530 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT SWITCH
FAILS OFF (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES (LV40,LV41)
PANEL R4
TOGGLE SWITCH (SI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER"
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SWITCH OFF WILL NOT ALLOW LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES
TO OPEN RESULTING IN LOSS OF LO2 DUMP. LOSS OF LO2 DUMP RESULTS
IN LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROL AND LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHEET 20.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-683
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87
EPDC/MPS
7540
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL
FAILS OPEN, SHORTED, OR INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES (LV42,LV43)
AV BAY 5
AFT LCA 2
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ITEMS REFERENCED WILL NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE, OR
MISSION. ELECTRICAL ITEMS INCLUDED ARE 5 RESISTORS AND i0
DIODES.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHEET 20.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-684
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 7550 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT HYBRID
DRIVER CONTROLLER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
3) LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES (LV42,LV43)
4) AV BAY 5
5) AFT LCA 2
6) LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT HYBRID DRIVER
CONTROLLER (ARIII)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
55V76AI22
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER ON WILL ALLOW OFF NOMINAL
OPENING OF THE LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES WITH HELIUM INGESTION
INTO ALL THREE MAIN ENGINES RESULTING IN EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHEET 20.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-685
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
7560 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
COMMANDS
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT MDM
FAILS ON (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES (LV42,LV43)
AV BAY 5
AFT LCA 2
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT MDM COMMANDS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
V41KI435X, 37X
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF MDM COMMAND ON WILL ALLOW OFF NOMINAL OPENING OF LH2
MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES WITH HELIUM INGESTION INTO ALL THREE MAIN
ENGINES RESULTING IN EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHEET 20.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-686
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
7570 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT SWITCH
FAILS ON (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES (LV42,LV43)
PANEL R4
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CONTROL CIRCUIT SWITCH ($2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE SWITCH ON WILL ALLOW OFF NOMINAL OPENING OF LH2
MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES WITH HELIUM INGESTION INTO ALL THREE MAIN
ENGINES RESULTING IN EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHEET 20.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-687
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/27/87
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/MPS
MDAC ID" 7580
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: LH2 FEED MANIFOLDRTLS PRESS VALVES POWER AND
CONTROL CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN, SHORTED, OR INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
3) LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES (LV74,LV75)
4) AV BAY 4
5) AFT LCA 1 & 3
6) LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL
CIRCUIT
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ITEMS REFERENCED WILL NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE, OR
MISSION. ELECTRICAL ITEMS INCLUDED ARE I0 RESISTORS AND 8
DIODES.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHEET 20.1.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-688
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/1R
7590 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
CONTROLLER
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES REMOTE POWER
FAILS ON (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
(RPC27,28,29
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES (LV74,LV75)
AV BAY 4
AFT LCA 1 & 3
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES REMOTE POWER CONTROLLERS
30)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
40V76A27, 54V76AI31
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER ON WILL ALLOW OFF NOMINAL
OPENING OF LH2 RTLS PRESS VALVES WITH HELIUM INGESTION INTO ALL
THREE MAIN ENGINES RESULTING IN EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHEET 20.1.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-689
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
7600 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
CONTROLLER
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES HYBRID DRIVER
FAILS ON (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS
2) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
3) LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES (LV74,LV75)
4) AV BAY 4
5) AFT LCA 1 & 3
6) LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES HYBRID DRIVER
CONTROLLERS (ARIII)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SEE REFERENCES
56V76AI23, 54V76AI21
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER ON WILL ALLOW OFF NOMINAL
OPENING OF LH2 RTLS PRESS VALVES WITH HELIUM INGESTION INTO ALL
THREE MAIN ENGINES RESULTING IN EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHEET 20.1.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-690
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPDC/MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
7610 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LH2 FEED MANIFOLDRTLSPRESS VALVES MDM COMMANDS
FAILS ON (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO SUBSYS LEAD: A.J.MARINO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPDC/MPS
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES (LV74,LV75)
AV BAY 4
AFT LCA 1 & 3
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES MDM COMMANDS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 1R
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION: SEE REFERENCES
PART NUMBER: V41KI905X, 06X, 07X, 08X, 09X, 10X
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF MDM COMMANDS ON WILL ALLOW OFF NOMINAL OPENING OF LH2
RTLS PRESS VALVES WITH HELIUM INGESTION INTO ALL THREE MAIN
ENGINES RESULTING IN EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102, SHEET 20.1.
REPORT DATE 01/16/87 C-691
MDAC
ID
i001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
i012
1013
1014
1021
1022
1023
1024
1025
1026
i031
1032
1033
1034
1035
1041
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK
VALVE (CVI8, 19, 20)
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK
VALVE (CVI8, 19, 20)
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK
VALVE (CVI8, 19, 20)
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK
VALVE (CVI8, 19 20)
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK
VALVE (CVI8, 19, 20)
GO2 PRESSUR ISOLATION CHECK
VALVE (CVI8, 19, 20)
L02 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK
VALVE (CVI6)
L02 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK
VALVE (CVI6)
L02 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK
VALVE (CVI6)
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31,
33, 35)
L02 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31,
33, 35)
L02 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31,
33, 35)
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31,
33, 35)
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31,
33, 35)
L02 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31,
33, 35)
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL
VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL
VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL
VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL
VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL
VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)
L02 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
(PDI)
FAILURE MODE
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF
PART
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF
PART
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF
PART
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF
PART
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF
PART
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
D-I
MDAC
ID
1042
1043
1044
1045
1046
1052
1053
1054
1055
1063
1064
1073
1083
1085
1091
1092
1093
1094
1102
1103
1104
1107
1108
1123
1124
1131
ITEM
LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
(PDI)
L02 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT(PDI)
502 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
(PDI)
L02 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
(PDI)
L02 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT
(PDI)
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET)
DISCONNECT (PD4)
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET)
DISCONNECT (PD4)
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET)
DISCONNECT (PD4)
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET)
DISCONNECT (PD4)
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND)
DISC (PD9)
502 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND)
DISC (PD9)
502 GROUND FILL & DRAIN
(ORB/GND) DISCONNECT (PDI2)
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND)
DISCONNECT (PDI3)
502 OVERBOARD BLEED (ORB/GND)
DISCONNECT (PDI3)
GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD
TEST POINT COUPLING (PDIL)
GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD
TEST POINT COUPLING (PDIL)
GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD
TEST POINT COUPLING (PDIL)
GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD
TEST POINT COUPLING (PDIL)
L02 PREVALVE (PVl, 2, 3)
L02 PREVALVE (PVl, 2, 3)
LO2 PREVALVE (PVI, 2, 3)
L02 PREVALVE (PVI, 2, 3)
LO2 PREVALVE (PVI, 2, 3)
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF
VALVE (PV7)
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF
VALVE (PV7)
L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE (PV9)
FAILURE MODE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF
PART
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF
PART
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED,
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (INTO AFT
FUSELAGE)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (INTO AFT
FUSELAGE)
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF
PART
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF
PART
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO RELIEVE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
D-2
MDAC
ID
1132
1135
1151
1152
1155
1157
1174
1175
1176
i183
1184
1185
1192
1202
1211
1221
1231
1241
1242
1243
1252
1253
1261
1262
1263
1271
1272
1273
1281
1282
ITEM FAILURE MODE
L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE (PV9)
L02 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE (PV9)
L02 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE (PVI0)
L02 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE (PVl0)
L02 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE (PVI0)
L02 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE (PVI0)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERIOR LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
EXTERIOR LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED,
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
L02 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PVI9) EXTERIOR LEAKAGE
L02 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PVI9) FAILS TO RELIEVE
L02 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PVI9) FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
L02 POGO ACCUMULATOR
RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20, 21)
L02 POGO ACCUMULATOR
RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20, 21)
502 POGO ACCUMULATOR
RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20, 21)
502 LOW LEVEL LIQUID SENSOR
(MTI, 2)
L02 SYSTEM DELTA P TRANSDUCER
(MT44, 50)
L02 PREPRESS DISCONNECT CHECK
VALVE TEST PORT (TP9)
L02 17 INCH ORBITER DISCONNECT EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERIOR LEAKAGE
FAILS TO RELIEVE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (FALSE DRY)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
BLOCKED FLOW
RUPTURE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RUPTURE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
BLOCKED FLOW
RUPTURE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
BLOCKED FLOW
RUPTURE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED,
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
TEST PORT (TPI7, 18)
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF TEST PORT
(TP24)
L02 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD (MAI)
L02 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD (MAI)
L02 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD (MAI)
L02 FILL & DRAIN LINE (FHI)
L02 FILL & DRAIN LINE (FHI)
L02 17 INCH FEEDLINE (FH2)
L02 17 INCH FEEDLINE (FH2)
L02 17 INCH FEEDLINE (FH2)
L02 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH3,
4, 5)
L02 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH3,
4, 5)
L02 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH3,
4, 5)
502 FEED MANIFOLD RELIEF
VALVE (RVL)
L02 FEED MANIFOLD RELIEF
VALVE (RVL)
D-3
MDAC
ID
1283
2001
2002
2005
2007
2011
2012
2013
2016
2021
2031
2041
2042
2043
2054
2055
2062
2063
2071
2081
2083
2093
2094
2103
2111
2112
2121
ITEM FAILURE MODE
L02 FEED MANIFOLD RELIEF
VALVE (RV5)
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE (PVI2)
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE (PVI2)
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE (PVI2)
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE (PVI2)
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE (PVII)
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE (PVll)
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE (PVII)
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN
VALVE (PVll)
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN LINE (FH6)
LH2 GROUND FILL AND DRAIN
(ORB/GND) DISCONNECT
(ORBITER HALF) (PDII)
LH2 HI POINT BLEED (ORB/GND)
DISCONNECT (ORB HALF) (PDI7)
LH2 HI POINT BLEED (ORB/GND)
DISCONNECT (ORB HALF) (PDI7)
LH2 HI POINT BLEED (ORB/GND)
DISCONNECT (ORB HALF) (PDI7)
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PVI3)
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PVI3)
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE
(PV22)
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE
(PV22)
LH2 SYSTEM DELTA-P
TRANSDUCER (MT44, MTL0)
FAILS TO RELIEVE
FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
FAIL TO RELIEVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
FAIL TO OPEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RUPTURE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAK
FAIL TO CLOSE
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED,
FAIL TO CLOSE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LH2 HI POINT BLEED LINE (FH19) RUPTURE
LH2 HI POINT BLEED LINE (FH19) LOSS OF INSULATING VACUUM
LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO
VALVE (PD3) REMAIN CLOSED
LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT
VALVE (PD3)
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE
(PVI4, PVIL, PVI6)
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING
MANIFOLD (MA3)
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING
MANIFOLD (MA3)
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING
PUMP LINE (FHII, FHI3, FHIL)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RUPTURE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RUPTURE
D-4
MDAC
ID
2131
2132
2141
2151
2161
2163
2177
2182
2183
2191
2192
2201
2202
2203
2211
2212
2213
2222
2231
2241
2251
2261
2262
2263
ITEM FAILURE MODE
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING
RETURN LINE (FH12, FHI4, FHI6)
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING
RETURN LINE (FHI2, FHI4, FHI6)
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING
REPLENISH LINE (FHI7)
LH2 PRESTART CONDITIONING
RETURN LINE (FHI8)
LH2 RECIRCULATION MANIFOLD
RELIEF VALVE (RV7)
LH2 RECIRCULATION MANIFOLD
RELIEF VALVE (RV7)
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP
(PPl, PP2, PP3)
LH2 PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE
(CVI7)
LH2 PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE
(CVI7)
GH2 PRESSURIZATION ISOLATION
CHECK VALVE (CV21,CV22,CV23)
GH2 PRESSURIZATION ISOLATION
CHECK VALVE (CV21,CV22,CV23
AND TEST PORTS TP5,TP6,TP7)
RUPTURE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RUPTURE
RUPTURE
FAIL TO OPEN (RELIEVE)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL TO CLOSE (RESEAT),
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO
REMAIN OPEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO
CONTROL VALVE (LV56,LV57,LV58) REMAIN OPEN
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO
CONTROL VALVE (LV56,LV57,LV58) REMAIN CLOSED
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW
CONTROL VALVE (LVS6,LVS7,LV58)
GH2 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT
(PD5)
GH2 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT
(PD5)
GH2 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT
(PD5)
LH2 TANK GROUND PRE-PRESS
DISCONNECT (PDI0)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO
REMAIN CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO
REMAIN CLOSED, EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
GH2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD
TEST POINT COUPLING (PDI6)
LH2 PREPRESSURIZATION
DISCONNECT CHECK VALVE TEST
PORT (TPI0)
GH2 PRESSURIZATION DUAL CHECK
VALVE TEST PORT (TP21,TP22,TP23)
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL
TO REMAIN CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE
(PD2)
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE
(PD2)
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE
(PD2)
D-5
MDAC
ID
2271
2273
2274
2281
2291
2292
2301
2302
2311
2312
2321
2322
2323
2331
2341
2352
2373
2381
2382
2383
2391
2392
2393
3010
3020
3021
3030
3040
3050
ITEM FAILURE MODE
LH2 PREVALVE (PV4,PV5,PV6) FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO
REMAIN OPEN
LH2 PREVALVE (PV4,PV5,PV6) EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LH2 PREVALVE (PV4,PV5,PV6) FAIL TO RELIEVE
LH2 17 INCH ORBITER DISCONNECT EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
TEST PORT (TPII,TPI2)
LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD (MA2)
LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD (MA2)
LH2 17 INCH FEEDLINE (FH7)
LH2 17 INCH FEEDLINE (FH7)
LH2 12 INCH FEEDLINE
(FH8,FH9,FHI0)
LH2 12 INCH FEEDLINE
(FH8,FH9,FHI0)
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF
VALVE (PVS)
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF
VALVE (PV8)
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF
VALVE (PVS)
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF LINE TEST
PORT (TP25)
LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD RELIEF
VALVE (RV6)
LH2 DUMP PRESSURIZATION
ORIFICE (RPI0)
LH2 PRESSURIZATION LINE VENT
VALVE (LV52)
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE
(PVI7)
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE
(PVl7)
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE
(PVI7)
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE
(PVI8)
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE
(pv18)
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE
(PVI8)
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK
VALVE (CVI,CV2,CV3)
HELIUM SUPPLY DISCONNECT
(ORB/GND, ORB HALF), (PD8)
HELIUM SUPPLY DISCONNECT
(ORB/GND, ORB HALF), (PD8)
TEST PORT (TP8)
17.3 CU. FT. HELIUM SUPPLY
TANK (TK6, 8, i0)
4.7 CU. FT. HELIUM SUPPLY
TANK (TKI,2,3,7,9,11)
RUPTURE
RESTRICTED FLOW
RUPTURE
RESTRICTED FLOW
RUPTURE
RESTRICTED FLOW
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO
REMAIN CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL TO OPEN (RELIEVE)
EXTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL TO OEPN, FAIL TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO
REMAIN CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO
REMAIN CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, OR REMAIN
CLOSED
FAILS TO CLOSE, OR REMAIN
CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAKAGE
RAPID LEAK
RAPID LEAK
D-6
MDAC
ID
3060
3071
3080
3081
3082
3092
3111
3112
3120
3121
3122
3123
3130
3150
3162
3181
3200
4021
4030
4051
4090
4100
4152
ITEM FAILURE MODE
PRESSURE TAP PORT (TP26,27,28) RAPID LEAK
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK
VALVE (CV25,26;36,37;41,42)
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY FILTER -
PANEL A;B (FL2,6;3,7;4,8)
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY FILTER -
PANEL A;B (FL2,6;3,7;4,8)
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY FILTER -
PANEL A;B (FL2,6;3,7;4,8)
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY
FAILS TO OPEN, OR REMAIN
OPEN
RESTRICTED FLOW, BLOCKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (ELEMENT
COLLAPSE)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
ISOLATION VALVE (LV1,2;3,4;5,6)
ENGINE HELIUM PRESSURE
REGULATOR (PRI,7;2,8;3,9)
ENGINE HELIUM PRESSURE
REGULATOR (PRI,7;2,8;3,9)
HE RELIEF VALVE PANEL A;B
(RVI,8;2,9;3,10)
ENGINE HE RELIEF VALVE PANEL
A;B (RVI,8;2,9;3,10)
ENGINE HE RELIEF VALVE PANEL
A;B (RVI,8;2,9;3,10)
ENGINE HE RELIEF VALVE PANEL
A;B (RVI,8;2,9;3,10)
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY RELIEF
VALVE SENSE LINE
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY
INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE
(LV59,61,63)
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY
INTERCONNECT OUTLET VALVE
(LV60,62,64)
ENGINE HELIUM INTERCONNECT
CHECK VALVE-PANEL INLET
(CV27,38,43)
FACILITY PORTS
PNEU VALVE HE ISOLATION CHECK
VALVE (CV8)
PNEU VALVE HE ISOLATION CHECK
VALVE (CV9)
LO2 FEED MANIF REPRESS CHECK
VALVE (CVI2)
L02 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK
VALVE (CVI6)
LH2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK
VALVE (CVI7)
L02 PREVALVE OPENING
SOLENOID (LVl2,LVI4,LV16)
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE (HIGH)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE (RESEAT), OR
REMAIN CLOSED
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN OR REMAIN
OPEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, OR REMAIN
OPEN
GROSS LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
D-7
MDAC
ID
4160
4161
4166
4167
4168
4170
4171
4172
4180
4181
4182
4190
4192
4202
4222
4224
4228
4234
4236
4252
4260
ITEM
L02 PREVALVE OPENING
SOLENOID (LVI3,LVI5,LVI7)
L02 PREVALVE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LVI3,LVI5,LV17)
LH2 PREVALVE OPENING
SOLENOID (LVIS,LV20,LV22)
LH2 PREVALVE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LVI9,LV21,LV23)
LH2 PREVALVE CLOSING
SOLENOID (LVIg,LV21,LV23)
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF
VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF
VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF
VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV24)
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF
VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV25)
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF
VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV25)
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF
VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV25)
HE SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVE
(LV26,LV27)
HE SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVE
(LV26,LV27)
L02 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE
OPENING SOLENOID (LV28)
L02 INBOARD FILL VALVE
OPENING SOLENOID (LV30)
L02 INBOARD FILL VALVE
CLOSING SOLENOID (LV31)
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL VALVE
OPENING SOLENOID (LV32)
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE
OPENING SOLENOID (LV34)
LH2 INBOARD FILL VALVE
CLOSING SOLENOID (LV35)
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE OPENING
SOLENOID (LV39)
L02 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE
(LV40,LV41)
FAILURE MODE
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN,
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE
D-8
MDAC
ID
4261
4281
4301
4322
4330
4331
4340
4341
4342
4350
4351
4352
4362
4370
4371
4382
4392
4400
4401
4412
ITEM
L02 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE
(LV40,LV41)
L02 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE
OPENING SOLENOID (LV46)
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE
OPENING SOLENOID (LV48)
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE
OPENING SOLENOID (LV50)
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE
CLOSING SOLENOID (LV51)
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE
CLOSING SOLENOID (LV51)
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD DUMP
VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV72)
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD DUMP
VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV72)
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD DUMP
VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV72)
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD DUMP
VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV73)
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD DUMP
VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV73)
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD DUMP
VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV73)
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS
VALVE (LV74,LV75)
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE
CLOSING SOLENOID (LV76)
L02 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE
CLOSING SOLENOID (LV76)
L02 POGO ACCUM RECIRC VALVE
CLOSING SOLENOID (LV77,LV78)
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE
OPENING SOLENOID (LV79)
LO2 PREVALVE REDUNDANT
CLOSING SOLENOID (LV80,LV81,
LV82)
L02 PREVALVE REDUNDANT
CLOSING SOLENOID (LV80,LV81,
LV82)
L02 PREVALVE REDUNDANT
OPENING SOLENOID (LV83,LV84,
LV85)
FAILURE MODE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN,
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN,
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, EXPERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO OPEN, EXPERNAL
LEAKAGE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
D-9
MDAC
ID
4420
4422
4430
4432
4460
4490
4500
4510
4530
4540
4550
4570
4580
4590
4630
4640
4650
5001
5002
5003
5004
5011
5012
ITEM
L02 TANK GND PRE-PRESS
(ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF)
(PD9)
L02 TANK GND PRE-PRESS
(ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF)
(PD9)
LH2 TANK GND PRE-PRESS
(ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF)
(PDI0)
LH2 TANK GND PRE-PRESS
(ORB/GND) DISC. (ORB HALF)
(PDI0)
TEST PORT, PNEU HE OUTLET
(TPI)
TEST PORT, 502 PREPRESS DISC.
CHECK VALVE (TP9)
TEST PORT, LH2 PREPRESS DISC.
CHECK VALVE (TPI0)
TEST PORT, PNEU SUPPLY
HELIUM (TP29)
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY
REGULATOR (PR4)
L02 MANIF REPRESS REGULATOR
(PR5)
LH2 MANIF REPRESS REGULATOR
(PR6)
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY TANK
(TK4)
502 PREVALVE PNEU ACCUMULATOR
(AU5)
LH2 PREVALVE PNEU ACCUMULATOR
(AU6)
PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE LINE
(.50" DIA)
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE
ACTUATION LINE (.25",.38" DIA)
PNEUMATIC HELIUM INTERCONNECT
LINE (.63",1.00",.50" DIA)
L02 PREVALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
L02 PREVALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
FUSE (IA) (4 PER CIRCUIT)
FUSE (IA) (4 PER CIRCUIT)
MDM (FAI)
MDM (FA2)
FAILURE MODE
FAILS TOA CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW, FAILS TO
OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW, FAILS TO
OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RESTRICTED FLOW, FAILS TO
OPEN, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE (RUPTURE)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE (RUPTURE)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE (RUPTURE)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
FAILS (SHORTS) (FALSE OPEN
COMMAND)
FAILS (SHORTS) (FALSE CLOSE
COMMAND)
FAILS OPEN (INHIBIT CLOSE
COMMAND)
FAILS OPEN (INHIBIT OPEN
COMMAND)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF
(INHIBITS CLOSING SOLENOIDS)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF
(INHIBITS CLOSING SOLENOIDS)
D-IO
MDAC
ID
5013
5014
5031
5033
5035
5041
5042
5043
5044
5051
5052
5053
5061
5064
5071
5072
5073
5074
5075
5076
5121
5122
5125
5127
5128
ITEM
MDM (FA3)
MDM (FA4)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
(2 PER CIRCUIT)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
DIODE, ISOLATION (12A)
(2 PER CIRCUIT)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
(2 PER CIRCUIT)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
(2 PER CIRCUIT)
DIODE, ISOLATION (12A)
(2 PER CIRCUIT)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
(2 PER CIRCUIT)
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
(2 PER CIRCUIT)
DIODE, ISOLATION (12A)
(2 PER CIRCUIT)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
(2 PER CIRCUIT)
DIODE, ISOLATION (12A)
(2 PER CIRCUIT)
DIODE (i0 PER CIRCUIT)
DIODE (2 PER CIRCUIT)
DIODE (3 PER CIRCUIT)
DIODE (I0 PER CIRCUIT)
DIODE (6 PER CIRCUIT)
DIODE (7 PER CIRCUIT)
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF
VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF
VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (AR42)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (AR30)
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
(RPC28)
FAILURE MODE
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF
(INHIBITS CLOSING SOLENOIDS)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF
(INHIBITS CLOSING SOLENOIDS)
FAIL ON (FALSE OPEN COMMAND,
ACTIVATE LVI2, LVI4, LVI6)
FAIL OFF (INHIBIT LVI2,
LVI4, LVI6)
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT
POWER
FUSE FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LVI3,
LVIL, LVI7)
FAIL OFF (INHIBIT LVI3, LVIL,
LVI7)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF
(INHIBIT LVI3, LVIL, LVI7)
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT
POWER (INHIBIT LVI3, LVI5,
LVI7)
FUSE FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV80,
LV81, LV82)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF
(INHIBIT LV80, LV81, LV82)
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT
POWER (INHIBIT LV80, LV81,
LV82)
FAIL ON (FALSE OPEN COMMAND,
ACTIVATE LV83, LV84, LV85)
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT
POWER
FAILS OPEN (INHIBIT OPEN
COMMAND TO OPENING SOLENOIDS)
AILS OPEN (INHIBIT OPEN
COMMAND TO OPENING SOLENOIDS)
FAILS OPEN (INHIBIT OPEN
COMMAND TO OPENING SOLENOIDS)
FAILS OPEN (INHIBIT CLOSE
COMMAND TO CLOSING SOLENOIDS)
FAILS OPEN (INHIBIT CLOSE
COMMAND TO CLOSING SOLENOIDS)
FAILS OPEN (INHIBIT CLOSE
COMMAND TO CLOSING SOLENOIDS)
FAIL SHORTED OPEN-TO-BUS
(ACTIVATE LV24)
FAIL PREMATURE OPEN-TO-BUS
(ACTIVATE LV24)
FUSE FAIL ON (ACTIVATE LV24)
FUSE FAIL ON (ACTIVATE LV24)
FAIL ON/CLOSED (ACTIVATE
LV24)
D-II
MDAC
ID
5129
5130
5132
5134
5136
5141
5142
5143
5165
5168
5169
5506
5507
5511
5512
5513
5514
5515
5551
5552
5553
5554
5555
5556
5557
5558
5559
ITEM
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
(RPC32)
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
(RPC32)
MDM (FA3)
MDM (FAI)
MDM (FA2)
L02 PROPELLENT DUMP SEQUENCE
TOGGLE SWITCH
L02 PROPELLENT DUMP SEQUENCE
TOGGLE SWITCH
FUSE (F31, F32)
FUSE
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
FUSE (2) (IA)
FUSE (IA)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
(RPC24)
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
(RPC23)
MDM (FA2)
MDM (FA3)
MDM (FA4)
DIODE (12A)
FAILURE MODE
FAIL ON/CLOSED (ACTIVATE
LV24)
FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV24)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON
(ACTIVATE LV24)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON
(ACTIVATE LV24)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON
(ACTIVATE LV24)
SHORTS (PREMATURE DUMP
START)
FAIL OPEN (DUMP IS NOT
STARTED)
FAIL OPEN (DUMP IS NOT
STARTED)
FAIL OPEN (PREMATURE
DEACTIVATE LV28)
FAIL OFF (PREMATURE
DEACTIVATION LV28)
FAIL ON (PREMATURE
ACTIVATION OF LV29)
FAIL PREMATURE OFF
(INHIBIT LV30)
FAIL OPEN/PREMATURE OFF
(INHIBIT LV31)
FAIL ON THE OPEN COMMAND
FAIL PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS
ON THE OPEN COMMAND
FAIL PREMATURE OFF (INHIBIT
LV30)
FAIL OPEN/PREMATURE OFF
(INHIBIT LV31)
FAIL ON (PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS
ACTIVATE LV31)
FUSE FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV76)
FUSE FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV76)
FUSE FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV76)
FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV76)
FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV76)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF
(INHIBIT LV76)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF
(INHIBIT LV76)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS OFF
(INHIBIT LV76)
FAIL OPEN/SHORT (INHIBIT
LV76)
D-12
MDAC
ID
5560
5561
5766
5767
5771
5772
5773
5774
5775
5778
5779
6012
6013
6014
6015
6016
6026
6071
6072
6073
6075
6078
6081
6082
6085
6086
6O88
6102
6103
6105
6108
6109
6121
6122
ITEM
DIODE (12A)
DIODE
REMOTEPOWERCONTROLLER
(RPC 19)
REMOTEPOWERCONTROLLER
(RPC 20)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3
REMOTEPOWERCONTROLLER
(RPC 20)
REMOTEPOWERCONTROLLER
(RPC 21)
DIODE (12A)
DIODE (12A)
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (6)
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (4)
ISOLATION AND BLOCKING
DIODES (6)
FLIGHT CRITICAL AFT MDM (3)
INDICATOR SWITCH (PD2)
FLIGHT CRITICAL AFT MDM
(FAI,FA3,FA4)
FUSE, IA (3)
TOGGLE SWITCH
TOGGLE SWITCH
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
MDM (FAI, 2, LAI)
IA FUSE
TOGGLE SWITCH, 32V73A438
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
ISOLATION DIODE (4)
MDM
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (2)
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
TOGGLE SWITCH
ISOLATION DIODE (3)
MDM (FA1, FA3, FA4)
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
FAILURE MODE
FAIL OPEN/SHORT (INHIBIT
LV76)
FAIL OPEN/SHORT (INHIBIT
LV76)
FAILS PREMATURE/OFF
(INHIBIT LV46)
FAILS PREMATURE/OFF
(INHIBIT LV46)
FAIL ON (FALSE CLOSE
COMMAND)
PREMATURE/ERRONEOUS ON
(FALSE CLOSE COMMAND)
FAIL ON (FALSE CLOSE
COMMAND)
FAIL ON/CLOSED
FAIL ON/CLOSED
FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV47)
FAIL OPEN (INHIBIT LV47)
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN, FAIL CLOSED,
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAIL OPEN
FAIL ON, FAIL OFF
FAIL OPEN, FAIL TO TRANSFER
FAIL ON, INADVERTENT
OPERATION
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL SHORTED
INADVERTENT OUTPUT (SHORTED)
FAIL ON, INADVERTENT
OPERATION
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTED
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN, INADVERTENT
OUTPUT
FAIL OPEN, INADVERTENT
OPERATION
FAIL OPEN
FAIL SHORTED, INADVERENT
OPERATION
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL ON, SHORTED,
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
FAIL OPEN
D-13
MDAC
ID
6123
6141
6142
6155
6156
6157
6158
6159
6160
7110
7120
7130
7160
7170
7180
7190
7210
7220
7231
7260
ITEM
FUSE (3)
MDM (FA4)
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER(2)
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER,
TYPE I (6)
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER,
TYPE III (12)
ISOLATION DIODES, 12A (18)
ISOLATION DIODES, 4.2A (3)
ISOLATION DIODE (36)
MODULATORDEMODULATOR(4)
FUSE, 1AMP (9)
TOGGLESWITCH, IP3T (3)
TOGGLESWITCH, 2P3T (3)
ISOLATION DIODES (6)
ISOLATION DIODES (9)
ISOLATION DIODES (3)
MDM, FLIGHT AFT 1,2,3,4
FUSE, 1AMP (6)
TOGGLESWITCH, 2P3T (3)
ISOLATION DIODES (6)
ISOLATION DIODES (12)
FAILURE MODE
FAIL OPEN
FAILS OPEN, INADVERTENT
OPERATION, FAILS ON
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN, FAIL SHORTED
FAIL OPEN, FAIL SHORTED
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN, FAIL SHORTED,
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT
OPEN, FAILS TO TRANSFER,
SHORTED
OPEN, FAILS TO TRANSFER,
SHORTED
SHORTED, OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN, ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT (OFF)
OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT
OPEN, FAILS TO TRANSFER,
SHORTED
SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
D-14
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